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The notion that children use statistical distributions present in the input to 
acquire various aspects of linguistic knowledge has received considerable recent 
attention. But the roles of learner’s initial state have been largely ignored in those 
studies. What remains unclear is the nature of learner’s contribution. At least two 
possibilities exist.  
One is that all that learners do is to collect and compile accurately predictive 
statistics from the data, and they do not have antecedently specified set of possible 
structures (Elman, et al. 1996; Tomasello 2000). On this view, outcome of the 
learning is solely based on the observed input distributions.  
A second possibility is that learners use statistics to identify particular abstract 
syntactic representations (Miller & Chomsky 1963; Pinker 1984; Yang 2006). On this 
view, children have predetermined linguistic knowledge on possible structures and 
the acquired representations have deductive consequences beyond what can be 
derived from the observed statistical distributions alone.  
  
This dissertation examines how the environment interacts with the structure of 
the learner, and proposes a linking between distributional approach and nativist 
approach to language acquisition. To investigate this more general question, we focus 
on how infants, adults and neural networks acquire the phrase structure of their target 
language.  
This dissertation presents seven experiments, which show that adults and 
infants can project their generalizations to novel structures, while the Simple 
Recurrent Network fails. Moreover, it will be shown that learners’ generalizations go 
beyond the stimuli, but those generalizations are constrained in the same ways that 
natural languages are constrained. This is compatible with the view that statistical 
learning interacts with inherent representational system, but incompatible with the 
view that statistical learning is the sole mechanism by which the existence of phrase 
structure is discovered.  
This provides novel evidence that statistical learning interacts with innate 
constraints on possible representations, and that learners have a deductive power that 
goes beyond the input data. This suggests that statistical learning is used merely as a 
method for mapping the surface string to abstract representation, while innate 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Syntactic knowledge that a child comes to acquire is highly complex. 
Syntactic rules are stated in abstract forms, in that they operate over variables 
(categories and phrases) rather than individual words. In order for a child to learn 
syntactic rules, it is necessary not only to generalize over categories but also to have a 
hierarchical structural representation. And yet, children acquire their native language 
in a relatively short period of time, without explicit teaching, irrespective of the 
language they are learning, and most of all, despite the fact that input data available to 
children seems imperfect and uninformative with respect to the complex syntactic 
patterns that are learned in the end (Chomsky 1975). For example, structure 
dependency of movement rules is argued to be unlearnable from the exposure to data 
(Chomsky 1975; Crain & Nakayama 1987; Crain 1991; Legate & Yang 2002). The 
acquired syntactic knowledge is a grammar that generates sentences that include the 
input data but also exceed them. That is, children’s resultant grammar can produce 
sentences that were not necessarily learnable from exposure. Any approach to 
language acquisition needs to be able to account for this fact.  
These observations led researchers in language acquisition to two different 
types of approaches to language acquisition. One (so-called nativist) approach is that 
children come equipped with the innate knowledge of possible structural 
representations (Chomsky 1959, 1975, 1980, 1981; Fodor 1966; Baker 1979; Pinker 




not learned from the environment but is already built-in to the learner. This approach 
does not claim that everything is innate. The dimensions that are proposed to be 
innate are those that the input is uninformative for, e.g., formal categories (nounhood, 
verbhood), vocabulary of representations (subjects, complements, constituents) and 
constraints. This limits hypothesis space, which in turn restricts the number of 
possible interpretations of the input data. Under this view, learners look at the data 
and compare it against a class of possible models. One important consequence of this 
approach is it can account for the fact that children’s grammar produces structures 
that they have never encountered before.  
The other type is that the input contains sufficient statistical regularities that 
guide the learner to arrive at the abstract representations (Elman et al. 1996; Bybee 
1998; Tomasello 2000). In this case, learners’ task is to collect and compile 
accurately predictive statistics from the data, and learners would not have 
antecedently specified set of possible models. It is suggested “even in the total 
absence of [reliable] evidence, the stochastic information in data uncontroversially 
available to children is sufficient to allow for learning… [T]he correct generalization 
emerges from the statistical structure of the data” (Lewis & Elman 2002). 
These two approaches are incompatible with each other as stated in the 
traditional terms. However, such nature/nurture distinction is a false dichotomy.   
First, nature alone is not sufficient. It may be that the representational 
vocabulary needs to be inherently known, but that does not entail that the input data is 
irrelevant. For example, child might come with innate knowledge about formal 




in a given sentence is the verb. There must also be a mechanism for a child to find the 
verbs in the input (Fodor 1966; Pinker 1984; Grimshaw 1981; Chomsky 1981; 
Macnamara 1982). In this sense, the input is not trivial in determining how the 
surface strings map onto abstract representations. Innate knowledge about possible 
abstract representations helps restrict the hypothesis space, but learners still need a 
mechanism to identify which particular abstract representation best fits the surface 
form in any given sentence in the exposure language.  
Second, nurture alone is not sufficient either. Simply showing that the input 
contains sufficient data for a child to learn a certain phenomenon and that the child is 
sensitive to them does not entail that there is no constraint from the learner on the set 
of possible representations. Additionally, there are countless number of distributions a 
learner can track in the input, and without a space of possible representations, it is 
impossible to determine which distributions are the relevant ones to build the 
representations from. Tracking distributions needs to feed into a decision process 
about representations, and having a predetermined space of possible representations 
helps that (Pinker 1984). Therefore, a learner must know in advance which statistical 
distribution they should pay attention to, and for what purpose.  
In this way, both nature and nurture need each other. This dissertation 
proposes a linking between distributional approach and nativist approach to language 
acquisition. We need both nativism and distributional learning from the input, but the 
question is how the two interact, what is innate and what is learned from the input. 
The two might play different roles in language acquisition – innate knowledge 




method for mapping the surface string to abstract representation. If statistical learning 
was the sole mechanism of acquiring a language, then it can only reproduce the 
statistical distribution of exposure sentences, but if the learner comes with innate 
constraints and knowledge on possible operations and structures, it can go beyond 
simply reproducing the exposure sentences. In any case, this dissertation is an attempt 
to examine how the environment interacts with the structure of the learner.  
The notion that children use statistical distributions present in the input to 
acquire various aspects of linguistic knowledge has received considerable recent 
attention (Saffran, Aslin & Newport 1996a; Redington, Chater & Finch 1998; Maye 
& Gerken 2000; Gomez 2002; Maye, Werker & Gerken 2002; Mintz, Newport & 
Bever 2002; Mintz 2003; Swingley 2005; among others). In specific, it has been 
suggested that distributional information can play a role in the acquisition of 
phonemes (Maye, Werker & Gerken 2002; Maye & Gerken 2000), word 
segmentation (Saffran, et al. 1996a), word categories (Redington, et al. 1998; Mintz 
2003), syntax-like regularities (Gomez & Gerken 1999) and non-adjacent 
dependencies (Gomez 2002; Gomez & Maye 2005). The roles of statistical 
distributions have traditionally been examined by those who put more emphasis on 
the roles of the environment, and the roles of learner’s initial state have been largely 
ignored in those studies. What remains unclear is the nature of learner’s contribution. 
At least two possibilities exist.  
One is that learners use these acquired statistics to create an illusion of 
structure.1 What a learner does is to track the surface distributions and carry forward a 
                                                
1 One possible explanation for why distributions seem to be informative for structure-like 




summary of those distributions (Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi, & 
Plunkett 1996). According to this view, a learner does not come equipped with 
linguistic symbolic component. Under this view, the learner does not have domain-
specific constraints on possible linguistic structures, but the learning may be restricted 
by constraints on general learning mechanism. As Saffran, Aslin & Newport (1996a) 
suggests, “some aspects of early development may turn out to be best characterized as 
resulting from innately biased statistical learning mechanisms rather than innate 
knowledge.”  
A second possibility is that learners use statistics to identify particular abstract 
syntactic representations (Miller & Chomsky 1963; Yang 2006; Pearl 2007). 
According to this view, the learner may come equipped with antecedently known 
knowledge and the statistical learning interacts with that knowledge by determining 
the questions that the statistical distributions are relevant for answering. Hence, the 
outcome of the learning is a combination of the generalization formed based on the 
observed input and innate knowledge.  
To investigate this more general question, we focus on how infants (and adults 
and networks) acquire the phrase structure (PS) of their target language in this 
dissertation. 
Traditionally in linguistic theory, it has been believed that sentences of human 
language are not simply linear strings of words, but words in a sentence constitute a 
hierarchical phrase structure (Chomsky 1957; Jackendoff 1977). It has been proposed, 




meanings for the sentence with identical linear order. Imagine a phrase like the 
following. 
  
(1) Fake turkey sandwich  
 
There are two possible meanings for this ambiguous phrase. One is that it is a turkey 
sandwich but is fake. It could be a toy or a plastic model of one, i.e., not edible. The 
other meaning is that it is a sandwich made with fake turkey like Tofurky. So it is 
edible, but may be vegetarian. These two distinct meanings are possible because the 











(2) is the tree structure representation for the first meaning where the whole is a fake, 
and (3) is the tree representation for the second meaning where the sandwich is made 
with fake turkey. In this way, the fact that one identical linear string can be 
ambiguous supports that human language sentences have abstract hierarchical 
structure. Furthermore, this hierarchical constituency is what gives rise to recursive 
nature of language. In other words, because we have internal units within units, it is 
possible to achieve infinite creativity, which is a hallmark of natural language. 
To illustrate the roles that constituents play, imagine a sentence like (4). This 
sentence is composed of higher-level groupings, such as [the boy from the creek], 
[from the creek], [the creek], and [met Steven Spielberg], and you can draw a phrase 
structure (PS) tree as in Figure 1. 
 
(4) The boy from the creek met Steven Spielberg  
 






Each of those nodes in the tree forms a grouping called constituents. Notice that the 
constituent [the boy from the creek] contains two other constituents inside of it ([from 
the creek], [the creek]) yielding a nested hierarchical structure. 
Syntactic constituency is important because all operations of the grammar 
make reference to them. Human language is a combinatorial system that operates not 
on linear strings of words but on those units called constituents.  
Here are examples of roles constituents play in the grammar. First, you can 
substitute words with a proform (e.g., pronouns), but whatever being substituted must 
be a constituent. For example, you can replace the NP [the boy from the creek] with a 
pronoun he, and say (5). But you cannot just replace the boy and say (6). 
 
(5) He met Steven Spielberg  
(6) *He from the creek met Steven Spielberg  
 
This is because the two words the boy do not form a constituent by themselves in this 
particular sentence. You can only substitute a syntactic constituent with a proform. 
Even if you know this rule (that only constituents are substituted by a proform), if you 
do not know the constituency of the sentence, you would not know which words can 
be replaced or not.  
Similarly, if you have a sentence like (7), you can replace the VP [met the 





(7) The boy from the creek met the director of E.T. and the girl did so too 
(8) *The boy from the creek met the director of E.T. and the girl did so of 
Notting Hill too 
 
Here, the proform did so must replace the whole VP [met the director of E.T.] and not 
just met the director. The sentence in (7) must mean, “The boy from the creek met the 
director of E.T. and the girl also met the director of E.T.” This is because in (7), the 
words met the direct of E.T. forms a constituent, but the words met the director does 
not form a constituent of their own. Proform substitution only replaces a constituent, 
and it cannot replace a non-constituent. 
Second, only phrasal constituents can undergo movement operations such as 
wh-question and clefting as in (9)-(10).  
 
(9) a. Steven Spielberg met the boy from the creek 
b. Who did Steven Spielberg meet? 
c. *Who from did Steven Spielberg meet the creek? 
 
(10) a. It was the boy from the creek that met Steven Spielberg  
b. *It was the boy that from the creek met Steven Spielberg 
 
In (9)b and (10)a, what is being moved (in addition to being replaced by a wh-word in 
(9)) is the whole NP [the boy from the creek]. On the other hand, in (9)c and (10)b, 




and (10)b are unacceptable in English because non-constituents are being moved. 
Again, even if you inherently know that only constituents can be moved, if you do not 
know the specific phrase structure for the given sentence, you would not know which 
words you can move. 
Third, some constituents can be optional. In (12), the PP [from the creek] is 
missing, but the sentence is still grammatical. 
 
(11) The boy [from the creek] met Steven Spielberg 
(12) The boy met Steven Spielberg 
 
Fourth, on the category level, the same phrasal type can appear more than 
once in the sentence. For instance in (13), there are two NPs. 
  
(13) NP[The boy from the creek] met NP[Steven Spielberg]  
 
Fifth, the constituents are interchangeable as long as they are of the same 
category. 
 
(14) NP[Steven Spielberg] met NP[the boy from the creek]  
 
In this way, phrasal constituents play a fundamental role in any syntactic 
operation. All syntactic operations refer to and manipulate constituents.2 This fact is 
                                                
2 This, in turn, leaves statistical footprints that could be informative about the syntactic 




called “structure dependence,” and it is a term for the fact that “the rules operate on 
expressions that are assigned a certain structure in terms of a hierarchy of phrases of 
various types” (Chomsky, 1988; 45). In order to acquire a grammar, all a child has 
access to, as input data is sentences together with possible meanings. A scientist can 
try to discover what grammar a child has acquired or what grammar the child thinks 
generated the sentence by using those constituency tests above that reveal the posited 
structure. One potential problem for a child is the fact that constituency and phrase 
structure are highly abstract notions and the surface form does not come with visible 
labels or brackets to signal the constituency. At first glance, the input seems like 
simply linear sequences of sounds. A child might come with innate knowledge about 
constraints on possible phrase structure representations (e.g., binary branching, nested 
hierarchical structure, endocentricity), which would restrict the representational space 
for possible structures. However, even that does not guarantee that the learner will 
build the correct phrase structure representation. Since words vary from language to 
language, a child has to learn exactly which words go with which words in the 
particular language they are learning in order to arrive at the correct structural 
representation. In other words, it is not enough for a child to know that “there exists 
phrase structure” or that “a sentence is composed of a subject NP and a predicate” to 
figure out the constituency of a sentence. There must also be a mechanism that guides 
the child to the correct phrase structure representation of sentences for a particular 





What kind of information might be readily available for a prelinguistic child, 
other than the linear strings of sounds? It has been proposed that prosodic, semantic 
and distributional information of sentences are perceptually available to a child 
(Gleitman & Wanner 1982; Gleitman, Gleitman, Landau & Wanner 1988; Morgan 
1986; Pinker 1984; Grimshaw 1981; Macnamara 1982; Morgan, Meier & Newport 
1989; Saffran 2001; Thompson & Newport 2007, among others). We will review 
studies that investigated infants’ sensitivity to those properties in Chapter 2. Earlier 
research emphasized the necessary role of semantic (Pinker 1984) and/or prosodic 
(Gleitman & Wanner 1982; Gleitman, Gleitman, Landau & Wanner 1988; Morgan 
1986; Peters 1983) cues in driving the acquisition of phrase structure. In a comparison 
of the utility of distributional and linguistic cues, Morgan, Meier & Newport (1987) 
found that adults were able to acquire the constituency of artificial languages only 
when the distributional information was augmented with correlated semantic, 
prosodic or morphological cues. 
Recently, however, Thompson & Newport (2007) suggested that the 
distributional cues in those experiments were simply not strong enough, in and of 
themselves, to be informative. Instead, they showed that adult language learners 
could, indeed, exploit transitional probabilities in acquiring an artificial phrase 
structure grammar. In particular, it has been proposed that “transitional probabilities”, 
which is a statistic that measures the predictiveness of the following element given 
one element, can be used by adults to successfully learn phrasal groupings of words 
(Thompson & Newport 2007) in miniature artificial languages. One problem with the 




with no internal structure, but internally nested hierarchical structure is a hallmark of 
natural language syntax. Therefore, these findings leave unresolved whether learners 
can detect statistical cues to internally structured phrases.  
 As mentioned above, another question that still remains unclear is what 
exactly is learned via this statistical learning algorithm. Focusing on the phrase-
structure learning problem, one possibility is that learners use the statistics to create 
phrase structure representations from scratch. This view holds that each child has to 
discover the existence of phrase structure and its characteristics on the basis of 
distributional information. Under this view, statistical learning does not interact with 
knowledge that the learners might already have, and the generalizations the learners 
form is entirely based on the observed input. There are two concepts within this view. 
One is that learners have no innate knowledge about possible representations prior to 
the exposure (Tomasello 2000). Then after being exposed to the target language, the 
learner would build and construct the representations. This concept acknowledges 
that what a child ends up with is abstract, but they get there not because of innate 
syntactic competence, but because of other usage-based mechanisms. The other 
concept is that the acquired grammar only has the properties that are derived from the 
observed distributions. Under this view, what the learner ends up with is not an 
abstract structure but only an illusion of one (Elman 1991).  
A second possibility is that learners use the statistics to identify particular 
abstract syntactic representations. According to this view, each child uses the input 
distribution to determine how the particular language maps words to trees of a highly 




learners may already have and the outcome of the learning is based on both the 
observed input and the antecedently known knowledge. Here, the antecedently known 
knowledge implies that the class of possible representations is predetermined (e.g., 
endocentricity, binary branching, proform substitution only replaces constituents and 
not non-constituents, etc.). If the range of possible representations is already known 
to a learner, then all a learner has to do is to select the correct grammar that derives 
the surface strings. Under this selective learning theory, the acquired representations 
have deductive consequences beyond what can be derived from the observed 
statistical distributions alone. Previous studies have failed to explicitly distinguish 
these possibilities and thus neither possibility was explicitly supported by past 
studies.  
 The predictions for these two approaches can be summarized as follows 
(excerpt from Lust, 2006). 
 
(15) Predictions of a purely statistical approach 
i. Learners have a direct relation to input data 
ii. No universal linguistic constraints are predicted (e.g., no structure dependence) 
iii. Only randomly, if at all, attend to parametric variations of language 
iv. Not creative but highly imitative; generalizations should only be based on 
perceived forms or analogy 





(16) Predictions of an approach in which nativism and statistics interact 
i. Learners have an indirect relation to input data 
ii. Be constrained in language acquisition 
iii. Be structure dependent from the beginning, and attend to the parameters of 
language variation 
iv. Be creative, i.e., go beyond the stimuli, and not simply copy 
v. Not offend universals shown across natural languages  
 
This dissertation presents seven experiments investigating the answers to the 
questions: (a) whether adults, infants and Simple Recurrent Networks (SRN) are 
sensitive to the distributional information as a cue to the hierarchical phrase structure, 
(b) whether adults, infants and SRN can learn the constituency of an artificial 
language without any prosodic or semantic cues, (c) whether the representations are 
part of the learning system prior to the experience, and (d) what the deductive 
consequences of distributional learning are. We show that human adults and infants 
can learn nested hierarchical phrase structure by using statistics alone, while the SRN 
fails. Specifically, it will be shown that the predictions of a nativist approach in (16) 
are borne out, in particular we will show that learners’ generalizations go beyond the 
stimuli and they are not simply copies of the input, but those generalizations are 
constrained in the same ways that natural languages are constrained. More 
specifically, even when the input only contained the information for constituency, the 
learners not only learned the constituent structure but also inferred that non-




show knowledge of the constraint on movement even in the absence of movement in 
the exposure data, which suggests that the learners knew the constraint antecedently. 
Importantly, knowing the constituent structure alone does not give this result. 
These results are compatible with the view that statistical learning interacts 
with inherent representational system, but it is incompatible with the view that 
statistical learning does not interact with innate linguistic knowledge as proposed by 
Saffran et al. (1996a) and Elman (1991), for example. In this dissertation, we propose 
a way in which the innate knowledge and the environment might interact. We suggest 
that innate knowledge supplies a range of possible representations and constraints 
(e.g., constraint on movement rules), while statistical learning is used as a method for 
mapping the surface strings to abstract representations.  
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews past findings on 
what types of cues children are sensitive to and might employ when learning phrase 
structure, in particular, prosodic, semantic and distributional information. Chapter 3 
presents the results from the experiments done with adults. Chapter 4 presents 
experiments with infants. Chapter 5 presents SRN simulations. Finally, Chapter 6 





Chapter 2: An Overview of Previous Research in the 
Acquisition of Phrase Structure 
 
2.1 Prosodic bootstrapping hypothesis 
In this dissertation, we are interested in how children arrive at the correct 
phrase structural representation for their target language. Discovering the relevant 
syntactic units of a language is a fundamental step in language acquisition. All 
grammatical operations make reference to syntactic constituents, such as Noun 
Phrases and Verb Phrases. Without knowing which words in a particular sentence 
form constituents, it is impossible to perform any grammatical operations. Even given 
innate constraints on possible phrase structure representations and knowledge that 
sentences must be represented with nested hierarchy, some learning mechanism must 
be present for the learner to arrive at the correct representation in a particular 
language. In other words, innate knowledge is not sufficient for this task and some 
kind of information in the input is necessary. One of the most obvious information 
sources in the environment is acoustic information. 
It has been suggested that the input speech signal comes with acoustic cues to 
syntactic organization and that children are sensitive to those cues as information 
about the syntactic structure of the sentence. This proposal is known as the prosodic 
bootstrapping hypothesis (Gleitman & Wanner 1982, Gleitman, Gleitman, Landau & 




proposes that acoustic information contains cues to syntactic boundaries that can be 
employed by learners. The majority of research on lexical, phrasal and clausal 
segmentation has been done in the framework of prosodic bootstrapping. Now, it 
might be worthwhile to note that what was intended by the original proposal of 
prosodic bootstrapping (Gleitman & Wanner 1982) was that prosodic information is 
one of many kinds of cues that could be used to discover or construct the phrase 
structure. In this section, we will review past findings to examine whether the 
prosodic bootstrapping is a real possibility for language learners.  
 
2.1.1 Acoustic correlates at syntactic boundaries  
Prosodic phonology (Selkirk 1984, Nespor & Vogel 1986) proposes that 
utterances are hierarchically organized with several layers. The highest constituent of 
prosodic hierarchy is the intonational phrase. An utterance is composed of one or 
more intonational phrases, which roughly corresponds to a clause. An intonational 
phrase is composed of one or more phonological phrases, which in turn is composed 
of one or more prosodic words. A prosodic word consists of one content word and 






Figure 2: Prosodic hierarchy based on Nespor & Vogel (1986) (from Hicks 2006).  
 
 
 A phonological phrase boundary always corresponds with a syntactic 
boundary. Whenever there is a phonological phrase boundary, there is a syntactic 
phrase boundary there. But the opposite may not be true: a syntactic boundary does 
not always correspond with a phonological phrase boundary. In other words, one 
phonological phrase may consist of more than one syntactic phrase. For example, in 
the sentence S[ NP[the dog] VP[chased NP[the cat]]], the VP chased the cat may form 
one phonological phrase, but it contains another syntactic boundary inside of it, which 
is the boundary for the object NP. 
It has been widely observed that there are acoustic correlates that signal 
syntactic boundaries (Selkirk 1984, Nespor & Vogel 1986). These cues include 
preboundary lengthening (Beckman & Edwards 1990, 1992, Cooper & Paccia-




pause duration (Cooper & Paccia-Cooper 1980, Scott 1982), change in pitch 
(Beckman & Pierrehumbert 1986), greater initial strengthening (Fougeron & Keating 
1997, Keating, Cho, Fougeron & Hsu 2003) and reduction of coarticulation between 
phonemes across boundary (Byrd, Kaun, Karayanan & Saltzman 2000, Hardcastle 
1985, Holst & Nolan 1995). Additionally, a phonological phrase typically contains 
one melodic contour. Moreover, the presence of these prosodic cues has been 
confirmed in a number of languages (Barbosa 2002 for Brazilian Portuguese; de 
Pijper & Sanderman 1994 and Quené 1992 for Dutch; Fisher & Tokura 1996b for 
Japanese; Hayes & Lahiri 1991 for Bengali; Keating, Cho, Fougeron & Hsu 2003 for 
English, French, Korean and Taiwanese; Pasdeloup 1990 and Rietveld 1980 for 
French; Wightman et al. 1992 for English).  
The strength of those prosodic cues varies depending on the indicated 
boundaries. The boundaries that are higher on the prosodic hierarchy (i.e., 
intonational phrase) are indicated by stronger prosodic cues (Cooper & Paccia-
Cooper 1980). In particular, there are longer pauses, stronger preboundary 
lengthening and increased intonation at intonational phrase (i.e., clause) boundaries 
than at phonological phrase boundaries (Cho & Keating 1999; Shattuck-Hufnagel & 
Turk 1996).  
Although they may be weaker, there are prosodic cues at phonological phrase 
boundaries, including final lengthening and a single pitch contour (Wightman, 
Shattuck-Hufnagel, Ostendorf & Price 1992), greater initial strengthening (Fougeron 




between phonemes that span across the phonological phrase boundary (Byrd, Kaun, 
Narayanan & Saltzman 2000, Hardcastle 1985, Holst & Nolan 1995).  
One potential problem is that not all syntactic boundaries (17) correspond 
with prosodic boundaries (18).  
 
(17) He was / eating an enormous apple  
(18) [He was eating] [an enormous apple] 
 
Often you observe no, or even misleading, prosodic changes at phrase boundaries 
((19) vs. (20)).  
 
(19) [[NP This] [VP is [NP the dog that chased [NP the cat that bit [NP the rat that 
lived in [NP the house that Jack built]]]]]] 
 
(20) This is the dog / that chased the cat / that bit the rat / that lived in the house 
/ that Jack built  
 
(19) is the syntactic bracketing of the sentence, while (20) is how a speaker would 
produce prosodic boundaries. It has been long noted that prosody does not always 
mirror the hierarchical structure of syntax (e.g., Chomsky & Halle 1968). In the 
example above, the major syntactic constituents are the NPs embedded within the 
VPs as in (19). However, speakers tend to produce prosodic boundaries between the 




there is a syntactic boundary at that pause, then the learners would not incorrectly 
parse the sentence. That is because there is a syntactic boundary at the pauses in (20), 
namely the boundary between a noun and a relative clause. However, if the 
conclusion the learners make is that words on both sides of the pause form a 
constituent, then the sentence would not be correctly parsed. For example, the 
learners might conclude that this is the dog and that chased the cat both form 
constituents which is wrong. At this point, we do not know which conclusion (the 
stronger one or the weaker one) the learners might draw. In any case, the problem is 
that learners need to eventually figure out what inferences are licensed by the 
prosodic information.  
 
2.1.2 Infants’ sensitivity to acoustic cues at syntactic boundaries   
 We see that the acoustic cues are present in the input, but are infants sensitive 
to these cues? It has been found that infants as young as 6-months of age are sensitive 
to prosodic cues at clause boundaries (Hirsh-Pasek, Kemler Nelson, Jusczyk, Cassidy, 
Druss & Kennedy 1987, Jusczyk 1989). In Hirsh-Pasek et al. (1987), two sets of 
passages were created. In the “coincident” version, 1-sec pauses were inserted at 
clause boundaries. In the “non-coincident” version, 1-sec pauses were inserted 
between words in the middle of a clause. 7-10 month-old infants listened longer to the 
coincident version. Accordingly, the authors claim that prosodic cues serve as a 
marker of clause boundaries and infants are sensitive to it.  
In order to make sure that the infants were responding to prosody and not 




were low-pass filtered at 400Hz to remove most of the phonetic information. 6 
month-old infants showed a preference for the coincident version, by listening 
significantly longer to it. This suggests that well before their first birthday, infants are 
sensitive to prosody as a marker of clause boundaries.  
So, very young infants seem to be sensitive to the prosodic markings of clause 
boundaries, but what about phrases? Past research have suggested that the prosodic 
cues at phrasal boundaries are weaker than the ones at clausal boundaries (Beckman 
& Edwards 1990; Fisher & Tokura 1996a, 1996b; Gerken et al. 1994). Jusczyk, 
Hirsh-Pasek, Kemler Nelson, Kennedy, Woodward & Piwoz (1992) conducted a 
series of experiments to investigate whether infants are sensitive to the acoustic 
correlates at phrasal boundaries. Two sets of passages were created. In the coincident 
set, 1-sec pauses are inserted right before the predicate, as in (21). In the non-
coincident set, 1-sec pauses were placed right after the verb, as in (22).  
 
(21) Coincident version:  
Did you / spill your cereal? Do you / want to pick it all up? That / looks great. 
You / want to put it back in your little container here?  
 
(22) Non-coincident version:  
Did you spill / your cereal? Do you want / to pick it all up? That looks / great. 





The idea is that, in the “coincident” sentences, a prosodic cue (in this case, a pause) 
coincided with a syntactic phrase boundary, and everything after the pause is the 
predicate which usually forms a phonological phrase. On the other hand, in the “non-
coincident” version, the pause is always after the verb. The results showed that 9-
month-old infants, but not 6-month-olds, listened longer to the “coincident” samples, 
which had pauses at the major phrase boundaries.  
 In these experiments, the coincident version always had a pause before the 
predicate and the non-coincident version after the verb. Therefore, one might raise 
concerns that there was something special about verbal predicates. In order to check 
this possibility, Jusczyk et al. (1992) created two new sets of passages.  
 
(23) Coincident version:  
Many different kinds of animals / live in the zoo. The dangerous wild animals 
/ stay in cages. Some of the animals / are friendly and like to be petted.  
 
(24) Non-coincident version:  
Many different kinds / of animals live in the zoo. The dangerous / wild 
animals stay in cages. Some / of the animals are friendly and like to be petted.  
 
The coincident version was created by placing 1-sec pauses immediately after subject 
NPs, which commonly form a phonological phrase. In the non-coincident version, 1-
sec pauses were placed somewhere within the subject NPs, which is an unnatural 




longer to the coincident version, indicating that the infants are sensitive to the 
prosodic information at phrasal boundaries.  
The findings of Hirsh-Pasek et al. (1987) and Jusczyk et al. (1992) indicate 
that infants are sensitive to acoustic properties of clause and phrase boundaries when 
the prosodic cues are reliably available. But it has not been shown yet that infants 
actually use such sensitivity in processing of fluent speech. Nazzi, Kemler Nelson, 
Jusczyk & Jusczyk. (2000) investigated this issue with clauses. 6-month-old infants 
were familiarized with sequences such as rabbits eat leafy vegetables, and then tested 
with either well-formed “Rabbits eat leafy vegetables” or non-unit “… rabbits eat. 
Leafy vegetables …” Infants listened longer to the passages containing the well-
formed familiar sequence.  
However, Soderstrom, Kemler Nelson & Jusczyk (2005) argue that in Nazzi 
et al. (2000), infants did not have to segment the speech stream based on the prosodic 
cues, since they were presented with already segmented target sequences. Thus, it 
does not tell us whether prosodic cues help infants extract the relevant sequences, 
which is much more similar to what they actually have to do in language acquisition. 
Therefore, Soderstrom et al. (2005) conducted the following experiment.  
 
(25) Familiarization  
i. John doesn’t know what rabbits eat. Leafy vegetables taste so good.  






i. Leafy vegetables taste so good. Salad is best with dressing.  
ii. Students like to watch rabbits eat. Leafy vegetables make them chew.  
iii. Squirrels often feed on acorns. Rabbits eat leafy vegetables.  
iv. Mothers must buy leafy vegetables. Taste so good helps their families.  
 
The underlined sequences are “clause straddling” and the italicized ones are “clause 
coincident.” During familiarization, infants heard either (25)i or (25)ii. At test, infants 
heard all four passages in (26). This experimental setup is claimed to be more realistic 
because target sequences are embedded in fluent speech throughout the experiment. 
The results showed that 6-month-old infants listened longer to the test passages that 
contained the sequences that were “clause coincident” (italicized) during 
familiarization. In addition, infants also listened longer to the test passages that 
matched the prosodic structure during familiarization (regardless of coincident or 
straddling). Therefore, the authors conclude that infants are able to use prosodic 
information to recognize the sequences in fluent speech and detect such sequences in 
different fluent speech. In sum, prosodic cues appear to be useful for infants to 
encode and recognize word sequences in fluent speech.  
To investigate the same issue with phrases, Soderstrom et al. (2003) created a 





(27) At the discount store, new watches for men are simple and stylish. In fact, 
some people # buy the whole supply of them. 
(28) In the field, the old frightened gnu # watches for men and women seeking 
trophies. Today, people by the hole seem scary.  
 
The boldfaced phrases without # are the syntactically well-formed noun phrase (NP) 
target sequences. The boldfaced phrases with # are the syntactic non-unit (NU) target 
sequences. Infants were assigned to either the “watches” condition or “people” 
condition. During the familiarization, infants just heard the boldface target sequences. 
During the test, infants heard the entire passages. 6-month-olds, as well as 9-month-
olds, listened longer to the NP version than the NU version at test. In other words, 
infants preferred to listen to the passage that contained the syntactically well-formed 
familiarized target sequence.  
 In order to examine whether the obtained effect was specific to NPs, the same 
experiment with VPs was carried out.  
 
(29) Inventive people design telephones at home. A fresh idea with promise # 
surprises no-one who words there.  
(30) The director of design # telephones her boss. New developments promise 
surprises for their old buyers.  
 
Again, 6-month-old infants showed a preference for the passages containing the well-




Even though this result suggests that infants can recognize the familiar 
sequences embedded in the larger passages, Soderstrom et al.’s (2005) criticism also 
applies here. Since infants were familiarized with already-extracted sequences 
(boldface), we do not know whether prosodic information helped infants to segment 
the speech stream. Therefore, a follow-up study one could do is to train infants with 
passages as in (31)-(32) and to test them with (27)-(28).  
 
(31) I got these new watches for men from that store in Montreal. I saw people 
# buy the whole boxful of them.  
(32) Did you know that gnu # watches for men in the field? Especially people 
by the hole are the excellent target for them.  
 
In this way, we can examine whether children use prosodic markers for both 
extracting and recognizing sequences of words in fluent speech.  
In any case, Soderstrom et al.’s (2003) results are the first evidence that 
infants recognize familiar phrases embedded in the fluent speech only when that 
phrase is prosodically well-formed.  This is also the first evidence that infants as 
young as 6-month old are sensitive to the prosodic phrasal grouping.  
As mentioned earlier, the main acoustic correlates at syntactic boundaries are 
preboundary lengthening, pause duration and change in pitch. But these cues do not 
seem to weigh the same. Seidl (2007) showed that pitch is an essential cue for 
successful segmentation of clauses, while neither pause duration nor preboundary 




most significant finding was that none of these cues was sufficient on its own. Even 
pitch, which was found to be an essential cue, had to be paired with either pause or 
preboundary lengthening in order for 6-month-old infants to successfully segment 
clauses. This suggests that a combination of at least two acoustic cues is required for 
detecting syntactic boundaries. This finding is relevant to us because it strengthens 
our suggestion that in order to figure out phrase structure of a sentence, infants do not 
just use one kind of cue, but probably a combination of several kinds of cues are used, 
or that at least it is more helpful to have more cues than just one.  
 
2.1.3 Using prosodic cues for lexical access 
In addition to clausal and phrasal segmentation, a number of studies have 
investigated prosody’s effect on lexical segmentation. 3-day-old infants discriminated 
sequences of syllables that contain a word boundary from those that do not, 
suggesting that newborns are sensitive to acoustic correlates at phonological phrase 
boundaries (Christophe, Dupoux, Bertoncini & Mehler 1994, Christophe, Mehler and 
Sebastián-Gallés 2001). However, we should remember that being sensitive to the 
acoustic correlates does not necessarily entail that babies actually use them for the 
purpose of lexical segmentation.  
Gout, Christophe & Morgan (2004) investigated whether infants can use 
phonological phrase boundaries to constrain lexical access online. The stimuli of the 





(33) a. [The scandalous paper] [sways him] [to tell the truth] 
b. [The outstanding pay] [persuades him] [to go to France]  
 
In (33)a, the bisyllable paper is contained within a phonological phrase, whereas in 
(33)b, the same bisyllable pay#per straddles a phonological phrase boundary. One of 
the prosodic differences between the two bisyllables was phrase-final vowel 
lengthening: the vowel [eɪ] in pay#per was longer than in paper, while the vowel [ә] 
in paper was longer than in pay#per. The consonant [p] in pay#per was longer than in 
paper (phrase-initial consonant lengthening). There was a short pause between the 
two syllables in pay#per, but not in paper. During the familiarization phrase, the 
infants were presented with paper-type stimuli, and at test, they were presented with 
both paper- and pay#per-type sentences. It was found that 13-month-old English-
learning infants listened longer to paper-type sentences than to pay#per-type 
sentences, while 10-month-old infants did not show any difference in looking times. 
This shows that 13-month-olds are sensitive to prosodic correlates at phonological 
phrase boundaries and can exploit it in segmenting words from fluent speech. Adults 
also have been shown to use the acoustic cues at phonological phrase boundaries to 
constrain online lexical access (Christophe, Peperkamp, Pallier, Block & Mehler 
2004). These results suggest that both infants and adults use prosodic information to 
help them with segmentation of words.  
Furthermore, Christophe, Nespor, Guasti & Van Ooyen (2003) proposed that 
infants make use of prosodic features to infer the syntactic head parameter. French 




head-initial language, Turkish is head-final. Therefore, the phonological phrase 
prominence is final in French and initial in Turkish. Thus, regarding the phonological 
properties, the phonological phrase prominence is the only thing that distinguishes the 
two languages. The French and Turkish materials were synthesized and all the 
phonemes were made identical. The only difference between the two materials was 
the phonological phrase prominence. Using the high amplitude sucking paradigm, 6-
12-week-old French infants discriminated the French and Turkish sentences. This 
result suggests that young infants are sensitive to the difference in phonological 
phrase prominence.  
 
2.1.4 Mismatch between syntax and prosody 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, not all syntactic boundaries are marked 
with a prosodic boundary. Often you observe no, or even sometimes misleading, 
prosodic markers. Can prosodic cues be useful for infants to detect syntactic 
boundaries in those non-isomorphic cases?   
Gerken, Jusczyk & Mandel (1994) investigated this problem. They presented 
infants with one set of passages that had 1-sec pauses inserted immediately after the 
subject (e.g., he / ate four strawberries), while the other set had pauses immediately 
after the verb (e.g. he ate / four strawberries). Half of the 9-month-old infants heard 
passages with lexical subjects (e.g. the caterpillar). The other half heard passages 
with pronoun subjects (e.g. he). Only the infants in the lexical subject condition 
listened longer to the passages with pause after subject than the passages with pause 




What Gerken et al. (1994) show is that when the prosodic boundaries match 
the syntactic boundary, infants are able to detect such cues, as in the lexical subject 
case. However, when the syntactic boundary and prosodic boundaries do not match, 
learners are not able to identify the syntactic boundaries from the prosodic cues. This 
suggests that there must be other cues, in addition to prosody, that infants can employ 
to help them bootstrap the syntactic structure of their language. In this disseration, we 
will investigate whether one type of statistical information, transitional probability, 
can be one of such cues.  
 
2.1.5 Prosodic cues vs. statistical cues  
A number of studies, including ones that are reviewed here, have shown that 
infants can use prosodic cues as one information source about where the word 
boundaries might be (Cutler & Norris 1988, Jusczyk, Houston & Newsome 1999b, 
Morgan 1996). Recently, it has also been shown that infants can use statistical cues 
for word segmentation (Saffran, Aslin & Newport 1996a). For example, the 
transitional probability from one sound to the next within a word (pre-tty) is usually 
higher than that of between words (pretty#baby). Given this, Saffran et al. (1996a) 
tested 8-month-old infants using the familiarization-preference procedure. Infants 
were exposed to auditory arrays of an artificial language for 2 minutes 
(bidakupadotigolabubidaku…). The transitional probability between syllables within 
a (artificial) “word” was 1.0 (e.g., bida) while the TP between syllables across words 
was 0.33 (e.g., kupa). The peaks and dips of the TPs were the only cue to the word 




auditory stimuli (e.g., no pauses, no stress changes). At test, the infants were 
presented with two types of test samples: one with “words” from that artificial 
language (e.g., pabiku) and “part-words” (e.g., pigola). The part-words were created 
by joining the last syllable of a word with the first two syllables of another word. The 
8-month-old infants had significantly longer listening time for part-words than words, 
showing a novelty preference. These results indicate that 8-month-old infants are 
sensitive to the distributional information and they can use that information to 
discriminate between words and part-words.  
Saffran, Newport & Aslin (1996b) explored the interaction of prosodic cues 
and statistical cues. A distributional cue (transitional probabilities) was combined 
with a prosodic cue (vowel lengthening). The experiment with adults showed that the 
vowel lengthening alone was not informative and it was informative only when it was 
combined with the distributional cue, which suggests that statistical cue prevailed 
over acoustic cue. However, in that study, the statistical cue and prosodic cue were 
not in conflict with each other. The potential “words” cued by transitional probability 
and the ones cued by vowel lengthening were the same.  
When the two types of cues are in conflict, 8-month-old infants listened 
longer to (prosodically ill-formed) statistical words than (prosodically well-formed) 
statistical part-words (Johnson & Jusczyk 2001). Given that the infants in Saffran et 
al. (1996a) listened longer to part-words showing a novelty effect, we can also 
interpret this result as a novelty effect. In that case, it means that infants treated the 
statistical words as nonwords and prosodic words as real words. This indicates that 




 But was it really novelty effect? What if it was a familiarity effect? In the 
infant literature, when the stimuli are relatively simple and easy for them to learn, 
infants are familiarized soon and they get bored, hence they tend to listen longer to 
the novel items at test (Hunter & Ames 1989, Aslin, Saffran & Newport 1998, 
Echols, Crowhurst & Childers 1997, Saffran et al. 1996a). On the other hand, when 
the stimuli are complex, it takes longer for infants to be familiarized, so they tend to 
listen longer to the familiar items at test (Houston, Santelmann & Jusczyk 2004, 
Jusczyk & Aslin 1995, Jusczyk, Hohne & Bauman 1999a, Jusczyk et al. 1999b, 
Mattys & Jusczyk 2001). Could it be that the stimuli in Johnson & Jusczyk (2001) 
were too complex, therefore infants listened longer to the familiar items? If so, it 
would mean that infants relied more on statistics than prosody.  
To examine this possibility, Johnson & Jusczyk (2001) carried out a follow-up 
study, where the words cued by the statistics and prosody matched. 8-month-old 
infants listened longer to part-words, indicating that they did learn the words and 
showed a novelty preference. This result implies that the materials involving both 
statistical and prosodic cues were not too complex for the infants to learn. Therefore, 
it confirms the account for the previous experiment, which is that infants weigh the 
prosodic cues more heavily than statistical cues when the two cues are in conflict.  
Thiessen & Saffran (2003) investigated infants’ developmental reliance on 
conflicting cues. When the two cues – stress and transitional probability – signaled 
conflicting word boundaries, 6.5- to 7-month-old infants listened longer to the 
(prosodically well-formed) statistical part-words, showing a novelty preference, 




information. This suggests that 6.5-7-month-olds weigh statistical cues more heavily 
than stress cues.3 However, a recent study reports that when provided with a list of 
segmented words prior to testing, 7-month-olds can use stress as a cue for lexical 
segmentation, which shows that experience with isolated words facilitates infants’ 
learning of language specific rhythmic patterns (Thiessen & Saffran 2007, Gambell & 
Yang 2005).  
These results let us begin to see a developmental trend of infants’ attention to 
different cues. At around 7.5 months, infants begin to be sensitive to stress patterns 
(Jusczyk et al. 1999b). As a result, at 8-9 months, they start relying more heavily on 
stress cues than statistical cues. This might be because infants at this stage are not 
capable of integrating more than one type of cues (Morgan & Saffran 1995). Morgan 
& Saffran (1995) demonstrated that 6-month-olds were not able to integrate 
sequential and suprasegmental cues, while 9-month-olds were. Thus, it was suggested 
that the ability to integrate multiple kinds of information arises sometime between 6 
and 9 months.  
 
2.1.6 Summary of prosodic bootstrapping 
One of the most obvious information sources for phrase structure available in 
the input is acoustic information. As the prosodic bootstrapping hypothesis proposes, 
prosody can provide information for some syntactic structures. When the prosodic 
cues are reliably available, young infants are sensitive to acoustic markers at as 
                                                
3 Nevertheless, whether infants can really use statistical cues in real life is debatable. Gambell 
& Yang (2005) have shown that speech to young children does not contain reliable TP 




clausal, phrasal and lexical boundaries. However, the inferences about structures that 
are cued by prosody are not sufficient for building complete phrase structure 
representations. For example, when there is a mismatch between phonological and 
syntactic phrases, infants could be misled and misparse the sentence. More 
importantly, even when the learners are sensitive to the acoustic cues at syntactic 
boundaries, that does not entail that learners make the correct inferences about the 
relation between the surface cues and structures that they indicate. So, infants need 
additional information to help them infer the correct phrase structure. In the following 




2.2 Semantic bootstrapping hypothesis  
 Another source of prelinguistic information that can be useful to a child in 
figuring out syntactic structure of a sentence is semantics. Pinker (1984) proposes 
what is called the semantic bootstrapping hypothesis (also based on Pinker 1982, 
Grimshaw 1981, Macnamara 1982). This hypothesis makes use of the fact that a lot 
of the times, nouns refer to physical objects, verbs refer to actions, adjectives refer to 
attributes, subject of a sentence is usually the agent of the action, object of a sentence 
is usually the patient or theme, and so on. In other words, there exist these syntax-
semantics correspondences. It is hypothesized that the concepts such as physical 
objects, actions, attributes, and agent-of-action and patient-of-action are perceptible 




hypothesis is that, if these notions are perceptible by children, then children can use 
the fact that each of these notions corresponds on numerous occasions to a respective 
grammatical entity, such as nouns, verbs, subjects and objects. Coupled with basic 
notions of phrase structure rules (e.g., that S consists of a subject NP and a VP, VP 
consists of a V and an object NP), children can correctly parse a sentence using this 
syntax-semantics correspondence.  
 Let us see how this works. Imagine a child hears a sentence The dog chased 
the cat. The child uses the syntax-semantics correspondences to identify and label 
each word with its category. Dog and cat are physical objects, so the child would 
label them nouns. Chased is an action, so it will be labeled as a verb. The refers to 




Figure 3: Labeling the categories 
 
Next task is to group the words into phrases. Grimshaw (1981) and Pinker (1984) 
suggest that the constituents of each phrase (which is universal) is antecedently 
known to a child, and what a child has to learn is the linear order of its constituents 
(which varies cross-linguistically). For example, a child knows inherently that a 
sentence consists of a subject NP and a VP, a subject NP consists of an optional 




obligatory verb, and so on. If a child knows that, then they will arrive at the 
intermediate structure below. 
 
 
Figure 4: Forming Noun Phrases 
 
 Now, at this point, nothing prevents a child from incorrectly parsing the 
sentences as follows. 
 
 
Figure 5: An incorrect tree 
 
 
However, if the child can perceive from the discourse that the dog in this sentence is 
the agent of the chasing, and that the cat here is the patient of the chasing, then using 




can infer that the dog must be the subject of the sentence and that the cat must be the 
object of the sentence. If the child figures that out and if they antecedently know that 
the subject NP is the immediate daughter of a sentence, and the object NP is the 
daughter of the VP, they can parse the sentence correctly.  
 
 
Figure 6: Correct phrase structure representation of an example sentence 
 
 
 One obvious problem with the semantic bootstrapping hypothesis is that the 
syntax-semantics correspondence is not perfect and in fact, often does not hold. For 
example, not all nouns denote a physical object (e.g., a thought), not all actions are 
verbs (e.g., the reading, a flight), and not all subjects denote an agent of an action 
(e.g., John received a letter, John sustained an injury). In case of passives, the agent-
subject patient-object relation is reversed (e.g., The pizza was eaten by John). In case 
of topicalization, the subject appears at the end of the sentence (e.g., Eats a lot of 
pizza, that guy). In other words, the syntax-semantics correspondence only holds 
mostly in what is called “basic sentences” which are declarative, simple, affirmative, 




These points are well noted by the researchers who proposed the semantic 
bootstrapping hypothesis and here is their solution to this problem. Pinker (1984) 
proposes that at first, a child only utilizes the basic, canonical examples in which the 
syntax-semantics correspondences hold. This could be achieved by either (a) the fact 
that first set of (very early) parental input rarely contains sentences that violates 
syntax-semantics correspondences; (b) the child would filter out and ignore non-
basic, non-canonical examples at first, by using contextual cues such as special 
intonation, extra marking on the verb, presuppositions and interrogative or negative 
illocutionary force of an utterance. This suggestion is supported by a general 
observation that children’s first words that are nouns are universally physical objects, 
children’s first verbs usually denote actions, first adjectives are attributes, subjects are 
usually agent of an action, and objects are usually patients (e.g., Brown 1973, 
Bowerman 1973, Macnamara 1982, Nelson 1973, Slobin 1973).  
It is proposed that a child first uses semantic bootstrapping for the basic 
sentences, and when they encounter non-basic sentences, they use other means to 
parse the sentence, in particular Pinker (1984) proposes a process called structure-
dependent distributional learning. For instance, if a child encounters a sentence like 
The situation justified the measures, since the syntax-semantics correspondence does 
not hold in this sentence, the semantics alone cannot help the child to correctly parse 
it. Pinker (1984) suggests that in this case, the distributional information helps the 
learner. For example, a child would know by now that the is a determiner. And 
because they would also already know that the only phrase a determiner can be a part 




they may not know that the word justified is a verb because it does not denote an 
action, they can notice the –ed ending and if they know that the –ed ending signals 
past tense of verbs, then they can deduce that justified must be a verb. And if they 
know the PS rules of English, they can arrive at the correct parse for the sentence.  
 
 
Figure 7: PS tree of a sentence in which syntax-semantics correspondence does not hold 
 
 
 In sum, similarly to the prosodic bootstrapping, the semantic bootstrapping is 
not sufficient by itself. Pinker (1984) specifically states that the semantic 
bootstrapping hypothesis does not claim that children fail to perform distributional 
analyses. On the contrary, Pinker (1984) claims that distributionally-based analyses 
override semantically-based analyses when the two are in conflict. Previous studies 
have shown that distributional information can aid learners in parsing a sentence 
when it is semantically ambiguous or when the semantics are misleading (Lebeaux & 
Pinker 1981, Katz, Baker & Macnamara 1974, Gelman & Taylor 1983). What is 




interact with distributional analyses and that semantics can help learners determine 
which are the relevant distributional analyses to perform. 
In other words, neither the prosodic or semantic bootstrapping hypotheses are 
in conflict with what I will propose in this dissertation, nor am I claiming that 
statistical distribution is the only cue that the learners use in figuring out the phrase 
structure of a language. All I am claiming is that statistical distribution may be one of 
the many cues to constituency. But are learners actually sensitive to distributional 
information? In the next section, we review previous studies that examined 
effectiveness of statistical cues for infants and adults.  
 
 
2.3 Artificial language experiments  
Recent studies have suggested that statistical distribution might be one of the 
information sources for acquisition of various features of language. For example, it 
has been suggested that distributional information can play a role in the acquisition of 
phonemes (Maye, Werker & Gerken 2002, Maye & Gerken 2000), word 
segmentation (Saffran et al. 1996a, Swingley 2005), word categories (Redington, 
Chater & Finch 1998, Mintz, Newport & Bever 2002, Mintz 2003) and syntax-like 
regularities (Gomez & Gerken 1999). The question then is, can learners use 
distributional information as a cue to constituency? Below, I will review a series of 






2.3.1 Learning constituency through reference 
Morgan and Newport (1981) was the first of a series of studies that 
investigated what cues learners might employ to learn the constituent structure of a 
miniature artificial language. In the artificial language of this study, each word had a 
referent (shaped objects). Adult participants simultaneously heard the spoken 
sentence and saw the corresponding referents on a screen. At test, they were asked to 
judge which of two fragments formed a better group or unit. In each pair, one 
fragment constituted a syntactic phrase in the language, whereas the other fragment 
consisted of adjacent but syntactic non-constituent words. Another test asked asked 
which of the two sentences was preferable. Each pair had structure-preserving and 
structure-destroying transformations of a sentence. In the former, a syntactic 
constituent had undergone movement and in the latter, adjacent but non-constituent 
words had undergone movement. The results showed that only the participants who 
were given the input where the referents were spatially organized consistently with 
the syntactic constituency fully learned the language.4 The participants who were not 
given the syntactically-consistent spatial organization of referents failed at the tests. It 
is claimed that these results show that you can induce a phrase structure tree 
                                                
4 Morgan & Newport (1981) note that it is surprising how well participants performed on the 
transformation test even though the input did not contain any transformation sentences and 
they were not given any criteria for choosing the structure-preserving answers. They state: 
“This is striking evidence that adults, given a brief exposure to a simple language, may be 
capable of developing sophisticated linguistic intuitions and that the acquisition of artificial 
languages by adults may be quite similar to the acquisition of natural languages by children.” 
It is also suggested that “natural language structure is constrained by the acquisition process”, 
rather than the acquisition process being constrained by the linguistic structure. Morgan & 
Newport (1981) does not discuss this issue any further, so it is difficult to comprehend their 
point, but it seems that they are suggesting that learners develop structure-dependent rules 
themselves, instead of learners being equipped with some inherent knowledge. In view of our 





representation only if you receive an extra (in this case, semantic) cue in addition to 
the distributional cue. However, that might have been due to the fact that, as we will 
see below, the statistical cue in this study was not very reliable. At any rate, these 
results show that perceptual grouping of words facilitates the learning of hierarchical 
phrase structure. 
 
2.3.2 Learning constituency through prosody 
In a subsequent study, Morgan, Meier and Newport (1987) show that 
prosody is a helpful cue when learning phrasal groupings of an artificial language. 
Their claim was that even though distributional cues alone should be logically 
sufficient to deduce the syntactic structure, other redundant cues are necessary for 
successful learning of the language. The same artificial language and test items as 
Morgan & Newport (1981) were used. Only the adult subjects who were given the 
input sentences read with prosody that was consistent with syntactic bracketing fully 
learned the language. These results suggest that prosodic cues that are consistent with 
syntactic bracketing strongly enhance the learning of syntactic structure.  
 
2.3.3 Morphological cues to phrase structure  
Morgan et al. (1987) also claim that grammatical morphology can be a signal 
to phrase structure. In particular, function words are often placed at phrase 
boundaries, either at the beginning or the end of a phrase (Clark & Clark 1977, 




 Morgan et al. (1987) tested whether adults can bootstrap phrase structure 
based on morphological cues. The results showed that the adult subjects who were 
given the input sentences with function words at the edges of syntactic phrases 
performed significantly better than subjects who received no such information. This 
suggests that function words placed at phrasal boundaries help enhance the learning 
of syntactic constituency.5  
Another type of morphological cue Morgan et al. (1987) suggest is concord 
morphology. In natural languages, words can agree in case, gender, number or 
definiteness (Morgan et al. 1987). As with the previous experiments, this experiment 
tested whether concord morphology could be a cue to phrasal grouping using an 
artificial language. Adult participants who were given the input that contained 
inflectional morphemes that matched the syntactic bracketing performed the best. 
These results suggest that the presence of concord morphology can significantly 
improve the learning of syntax. One caveat is that it is not always the case that 
agreement happens within a phrase. In case of adjective-noun agreement, for 
example, the agreement occurs within a phrase, but in case of subject-verb agreement, 
for instance, the agreement crosses phrase boundary. So the learners have to know 
that there might be a phrase boundary between agreeing elements.  
 
                                                
5 A similar idea was proposed in Christophe et al. (1997). It was proposed that young infants 
recognize function words early and that can help segmentation and categorization of 
neighboring words (“function word stripping hypothesis”: Christophe et al. 2007, Hicks 
2006). It has further been proposed that recognition of function words can help not only 




2.3.4 Cross-sentential cues to phrase structure   
We reviewed studies that investigated what cues learners might employ to 
figure out the constituent structure of a language. The cues the previous studies 
looked at were overt and local in the sense that they were internal to the sentence 
themselves, such as prosody and function words. Morgan, Meier & Newport (1989) 
propose that non-local cues might also be available to the learner for figuring out the 
constituency. These are cross-sentential cues that can only be detected if compared 
with another sentence. They note that a number of transformational rules in natural 
language are structure-dependent. For example, only phrasal constituents can be 
substituted by pro-forms.  
 
(34)  
a. Paul likes to go to the movies and John does so too 
b. *Paul likes to go to the movies and John does so to the concerts  
 
(35)  
a. The man with the glasses is tall 
b. He is tall 
c.       *He with glasses is tall 
 






a. John likes that girl over there 
b.  That girl over there, John likes  
c.   *That girl, John likes over there  
 
Accordingly, Morgan et al. (1989) created an artificial language that 
incorporated substitution and movement rules. The basic phrase structure rules and 
PS tree are given in (37) and Figure 8.  
 
(37) S  AP + BP + (CP) 
 AP  A + (D) 
 BP      E  
     CP + F 
 CP   C + (D) 
 
 






Adult subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three input conditions. The input 
of Condition 1 included only the sentences drawn from the base language, which 
involved no substitution. The input of Condition 2, on the other hand, included two 
new transformational rules (38) that allowed for a constituent to be replaced by a 
proform.  
 
(38) a. A + (D)  “ib” 
b. C + (D)  “et”  
 
In the input, the sentences with proforms were shown along with the base sentence as 
in Figure 9. By comparing the two sentences, subjects could figure out that “ib” 
substituted for BIF and PEL, in the example in Figure 9. Condition 3 included a 
transformational rule to allow a constituent to move to the front of the sentence.  
 
(39) AP – BP – (CP)  BP + AP – (CP) 
 
Again, the permuted sentence was shown alongside the base sentence as in Figure 9 
in the input. In the example of Figure 9, by looking at how SOG FAC is moved to the 






Figure 9: Examples of input stimuli 
 
 
The subjects in Conditions 2 and 3 performed significantly above chance on the 
constituency tests, while subjects in Condition 1 were at chance. These results suggest 
that non-local cues such as substitution or permutation can be a cue to phrase 
structure. One caveat is that the transformed sentence (substituted or permuted) was 
always shown together with the corresponding base sentence, as in Figure 9. This 
made the comparison between the base and transformed sentences obvious. Morgan 
et al. (1989) also ran a pilot follow-up study where the base and transformed 
sentences were shown separately. In this case, the subjects who were exposed to 




only exposed to the base language in input. Morgan et al. (1989) therefore conclude 
that cross-sentential cues such as substitution and permutation serve as a cue to 
phrase structure only when the related sentences are presented side by side. 
Nevertheless, in the current paper, we are going to show that it is possible to learn 
phrase structure on the basis of distributional cues such as permutation and 
substitution, without presenting the related sentences side by side.  
 
2.3.5 Predictive dependencies as a cue to phrase structure  
Saffran (2001) and Saffran, Hauser, Seibel, Kapfhamer, Tsao & Cushman 
(2008) were concerned with a similar question as we are in this dissertation. Given 
the linear strings of words as input, how do children arrive at the hierarchical phrase 
structure representation? In the series of experiments we reviewed above (Morgan & 
Newport 1981, Morgan et al. 1987, 1989), the successful learning of phrase structure 
was achieved only when there were additional correlated cues, such as prosody and 
function words. Saffran (2001) and Saffran et al. (2008) propose that, in addition to 
those supplementary cues, other cues exist within the PS rules themselves, namely the 
dependencies between words. In these experiments, the artificial language used in the 
above experiments (Morgan & Newport 1981, Morgan et al. 1987, 1989) was slightly 
adapted as follows.  
 
(40) S  AP + BP + (CP) 




 BP    E  
  CP + F 
 CP   C + (G) 
 
  
Figure 10: PS tree for the artificial language in Saffran (2001) 
 
The only change was that in the previous grammar, CP consisted of a C and an 
optional D, which was also present in another phrase (i.e. AP), whereas in this 
grammar, CP consists of a C and an optional G, which is not present in other phrases. 
In this way, there were complete dependencies between A and D, and C and G. These 
dependency relations were the crucial predictive pattern in this language. The 
occurrence of a D word invariably predicts the occurrence of an A word, however, the 
occurrence of an A word does not necessarily predict the occurrence of a D word. 
Such unidirectional predictability is observed in natural languages. For example in 




while the existence of a noun does not always indicate the occurrence of a determiner 
(e.g. men, cats). 
 The stimuli were presented auditorily. Adult subjects were divided into three 
groups – two experimental groups and one control group. In one of the experimental 
groups, the intentional condition, subjects were given explicit instruction to learn the 
rules of the nonsense language. In the incidental condition, the primary task was to 
color on the computer while the nonsense language played in the background. On all 
test items, both intentional and incidental groups outperformed the control group.  
Given the success of the incidental condition with adults, Saffran (2001) 
tested children between the ages of 6 and 9 (Mean = 7 years 7 months) on the same 
material. Again, the main task was coloring on the computer. The same test items 
were used. The children in the experimental group significantly outperformed the 
control group, although the effect was smaller compared with the adults’ data.  
Saffran et al. (2008) tested 12-month-old infants on the same artificial 
language, using the head-turn preference procedure. Half of the infants were 
familiarized with the artificial language described in (40) that exhibited predictive 
dependencies. For example, whenever there is a D word, there must be an A word 
preceding it, and whenever there is a G word, there must be a C word in front of it. 
Such predictive dependencies only occurred within a phrase, thus giving rise to the 
TP peaks and dips at phrase boundaries. This condition was called “predictive” 
condition. The other half of the infants were familiarized to a “non-predictive” 
language. The non-predictive language lacked the aforementioned predictive 




thus the occurrence of a word in a phrase did not predict the occurrence of another 
word. The 12-month-old infants in Saffran et al. (2008) listened longer to the 
ungrammatical test sentences than the grammatical test sentences, but only in the 
predictive condition and not in the non-predictive condition. 
 
 
Figure 11: Results from the infant experiment in Saffran et al. (2008) 
 
 
 Saffran (2001) and Saffran et al. (2008) argue that these results suggest that 
the predictive dependencies within phrases alone are sufficient for learners to detect 
the phrasal units. When the presence of one element predicts the presence of another, 
phrases are easily detected. However, the languages learned by the subjects in these 






Figure 12: FSA of the predictive language in Saffran (2001) 
 
 
Figure 13: FSA of the predictive language in Saffran et al. (2008) 
 
 
For example in Saffran (2001), in the fragment test, subjects chose CG over FC, and 
CGF over GFC. It is claimed that it was because learners formed a hierarchical 
phrase structure representation as in Figure 10. But subjects could have chosen CG 
over FC, simply because there was a strong backward dependency between C and G, 
but not between F and C. This kind of probabilistic FSA could explain the learning in 
Saffran (2001). Similarly, since the artificial languages in Saffran et al. (2008) can 
also be represented by a finite state grammar like in Figure 13, it has not yet been 
shown that infants learned a hierarchical phrase structure. All that the infants learned 




of words in this artificial language. This is because the grammatical test sentences 
obeyed the linear order of the language, whereas the ungrammatical test sentences 
violated the linear order. Furthermore, the ungrammatical test sentences involved 
novel structures that were never seen by the infants, whereas the grammatical test 
sentences involved the structures that were already exhibited in the familiarization 
period. Although the actual word strings were new, at the category level, the 
grammatical test sentences were not new, so it is impossible to conclude that the 
infants in Saffran et al. (2008) were extending their generalizations to a novel 
structure. If one of the test sentences is completely novel and ungrammatical, and the 
other has a very familiar structure, it is not surprising that infants were able to 
distinguish the two. If the test items included a transformational test like the ones in 
Morgan et al. (1989), it would have been a more powerful assessment for the 
subjects’ knowledge of constituency, and of their deductive power.  
 
2.3.6 Transitional probability as a cue to phrase structure 
In Saffran et al. (1996a), it was shown that 8-month-old infants can detect 
word boundaries based on the transitional probabilities calculated over syllables. 
Transitional probability is the degree to which one element predicts the following 






(41) Forward transitional probability 
€ 




(42) Backward transitional probability  
€ 




In a recent study, Thompson & Newport (2007) investigated whether learners 
can use such TPs, calculated over words, to discover phrasal boundaries in an 
artificial language. Now, one might wonder whether the transitional probability was 
at work in the above studies we just reviewed. Thompson & Newport calculated both 
forward and backward TPs between word classes in those studies. In Morgan & 
Newport (1981) and Morgan et al. (1987, 1989), neither forward nor backward TPs 
were informative as to the location of phrase boundaries. That is, the TP was neither 
higher within phrases nor lower across phrases. Even though the grammars in those 
studies exhibited key features such as optionality, repetition, substitution and 
movement, other factors such as optionality of elements within single phrases worked 
against them. For example, in the PS rules of Saffran (2001) in (40), the D word is 
optional within AP, whereas the A word is obligatory. This makes the backward TP 
between A and D always 1.0 (because whenever there is a D, there is an A). This is 
good, since A and D form a constituent. However, since D is optional, the forward TP 
between A and D is 0.5. It means that half the time A is directly followed by an 




constituent made the whole TP pattern uninformative. This means that no previous 
literature has shown whether the transitional probability can signal phrasal 
boundaries.  
Accordingly, Thompson & Newport (2007) created a miniature artificial 
language that was made up of word classes, A, B, C, D, E, and F. Each word class 
had three lexical items. The words were further grouped into phrasal units [AB], [CD] 
and [EF]. If all the sentences in the language were canonical sentences as in (43), then 
both the TP within phrases (e.g. AB) and the TP across phrasal boundaries (e.g. BC) 
would be 1.0. 
 
(43) A B C D E F 
 
However, natural language has ways in which sentences differ from canonical ones. 
First, some phrases can be optional as follows.  
 
(44) a. The box on the counter is red 
b. The box is red 
 
In the case of this artificial language, imagine that the phrase CD is optional and is 
dropped half of the time.  
 





Now, the TP between phrases (e.g. BC) is 0.5, while within phrases is still 1.0. 
Second, some phrases appear more than once in a sentence. 
  
(46) [NP The cat] chased [NP the mouse] 
 
Imagine that the phrase AB appears twice, provided that we are computing TPs over 
word categories.  
 
(47) A B C D E F A B  
 
In (47), the TP between phrases (e.g. BC) is reduced to 0.5, while within phrases is 
kept constant. Third, some phrases undergo movement.  
 
(48) a. [The cat] chased [the mouse] 
b. [The mouse] is chased by [the cat] 
 
Imagine that the phrase EF moves to the front half of the time.  
 
(49) E F A B C D 
 
Again, the TP across the phrase boundary (e.g. DE) is reduced to 0.5, while that of 
within phrases is still 1.0. In this way, because the rules of syntax manipulate 




peaks, and dips within and across phrases, respectively. The three key features taken 
up in Thompson & Newport (2007) are optionality, repetition and movement.  
A female speaker read the sentences aloud with a list intonation. Adult 
subjects were divided into an experimental group and a control group. The input to 
the experimental condition incorporated either one of the three key features – 
optionality, repetition and movement of phrasal constituents – or all the three. These 
manipulations served to create TP peaks within phrases and TP dips between phrases. 
The input to the control condition also incorporated the three features, only in this 
case, any adjacent elements were allowed to be optional, repeated and moved. This 
served to flatten the TP peaks and dips. These manipulations resulted in the TP 
patterns in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: TPs when all three key features were incorporated (Thompson & Newport 2007) 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E E-F 
Experimental Condition 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.22 1.00 
Control Condition  0.67 0.71 0.58 0.59 0.47 
 
 
 The experiment extended for 5 days. Each day, subjects were exposed to the 
auditory input for 20 mins. Tests were administered on Days 1 and 5. The phrase test 
consisted of pairs of words, one of which was a phrasal constituent in the language 
(e.g. AB) and the other was a legal sequence in the language but not a constituent 
(e.g. BC). The task was a forced-choice on a computer and the subjects were told to 




The adult subjects in the experimental condition chose the constituents over 
non-constituents significantly more often as early as Day 1 and on Day 5 (the testing 
was administered only on Days 1 and 5). The control group performed at chance. The 
effect was much larger when all the three key features were incorporated in the input 
(Figure 14) than when only one of the features was used, for example, when only the 
optionality was included (Figure 15).  
 
 
Figure 14: Results of the Phrase Test on Day 1 (left) and Day 5 (right), with all features 






Figure 15: Results of the Phrase Test on Day 1 (left) and Day 5 (right), when incorporating only 
the optionality (Thompson & Newport 2007) 
 
 
Based on these results, Thompson & Newport (2007) conclude that the 
subjects successfully learned the phrasal groupings based on the TP statistics and that 
distributional information can help learning of phrase structure. However, one could 
ask whether it was really the transitional probability that was in play, or some 
frequency effect. Subjects could have been choosing a word sequence over another 
simply because it appeared more frequently together than the other one. Thompson & 
Newport (2007) examined this and found no positive correlation between the right 
answers and the co-occurrence frequency. To illustrate, imagine the phrase test 
consisted of a pair SOT FAL and FAL SIB, and that the right answer (the syntactic 




answer) appeared four times more frequently than FAL SIB. This shows that there 
was no frequency effect.  
 What Thompson & Newport (2007) showed is that the computation of 
transitional probability statistics can help learners with phrasal segmentation. 
However, what was learned in that study was phrasal bracketing that had a flat 
structure as in Figure 16, not a hierarchical structure.  
 
          
Figure 16: Sentence structure used in Thompson & Newport (2007) 
 
 
But, having the correct hierarchical phrase structure is crucial for any later syntactic 
or semantic development. Then, can the transitional probability also be a cue to the 
hierarchical phrase structure?  
 
2.4 The present experiments  
Above, we reviewed studies that showed that learners can use various cues to 
learn artificial languages. Generally in artificial language studies, words are not 
associated with particular meanings. One question then is whether phrase structure 




are given, at least some parts of the phrase structure should be attained for free. For 
example, if you have a sentence like (50),  
 
(50) That boy likes this little puppy  
 
and if you knew the meaning of “this little puppy”, since these three words together 
denote a single object, you will naturally consider them as a unit. However, this 
mechanism does not seem to work for the VP. Without knowing whether this 
language is an SVO or OVS language, you cannot tell whether the object of the verb 
“likes” is “that boy” or “this little puppy”. In this way, even though knowing the 
meanings of words would be helpful for building the structure, it is unlikely that you 
can learn the meanings of most words without learning the syntactic structure first. 
Therefore, we propose that there must be some way to acquire phrase structure that 
does not require prior acquisition of the word meanings. This paper examines one 
such mechanism.  
One issue that has not been brought up in previous artificial language studies 
is whether the statistical learning mechanism interacts with anything other than the 
input the learners receive. Here, we present three possibilities. We realize that these 
three possibilities might be extremes of a spectrum and that there is probably a range 
of possibilities in between. However, we will present those three for the sake of 
brevity and clarity of the argument.  
One possibility is that what is learned through statistical learning is solely 




learning does not interact with other constraints that the learners might already have. 
We will call this first possibility “Limited” Hypothesis. Second possibility is that 
what is learned through statistical learning is not limited to what is observed in the 
input, but the generalizations the learners form are bounded by some constraints in a 
predictable way. We will call this “Beyond and Constrained” Hypothesis. According 
to this hypothesis, statistical learning interacts with knowledge that was not obtained 
from the observed input. An example of being “constrained in a predictable way” 
would be movement of a constituent which is a natural rule in languages. In other 
words, under this view, the generalizations the learners form are compatible with 
what is possible in natural languages. Finally, a third possibility is that learners 
generalize beyond what they see in the input, but their generalizations are not 
necessarily constrained in a predictable way. We will call this third possibility 
“Beyond and Unconstrained” Hypothesis. This view would predict that the 
generalizations the learners form can go beyond the observed input and do not 
necessarily have to be compatible with what is allowed in natural languages. An 
example of this might be something like movement of a non-constituent, which is 
unnatural in natural languages, but if a learner is unconstrained, this is a logical 
possibility.  
In order to find out which of these hypotheses’ predictions would be borne 
out, we conducted seven original experiments with human adult subjects, infants and 




Chapter 3: Adult Experiments 
 
In this chapter, we present two experiments with adult participants that 
investigated whether the representations are part of the learning system prior to the 
experience, and what the deductive consequences of distributional learning are. We 
look into whether statistical learning interacts with antecedently known constraints, or 
whether learners create an illusion of structure entirely based on observed input alone. 
By manipulating what is included or excluded from the exposure set, we can control 
to see whether certain information is necessary in the input for a learner to deduce the 
target structure or not. If adults cannot generalize beyond the received input, then it 
would suggest that the deductive power of a learner is limited to the observed 
distributions, whereas if adults can generalize beyond the input, then it would suggest 
that the acquired representations have deductive consequences beyond what can be 
derived from the observed statistical distributions alone.  
A more immediate question in this chapter is, given that previous studies 
(Thompson & Newport 2007) have only shown that transitional probabilities serve as 
a cue to phrasal groupings, whether the statistical cues to the multiply embedded 
hierarchical structures can be detected by learners. In addition, these experiments ask 
whether adults can learn the constituency of an artificial language without any 





3.1 Experiment 1 (Adult 1) 
3.1.1 Description of the linguistic systems  
Two miniature artificial languages – Grammar 1 and Grammar 2 – were 
created. While the artificial language in Thompson & Newport (2007) contained 
phrases with a flat structure as in Figure 17, the artificial language in Morgan & 
Newport (1981), Morgan et al. (1987, 1989) and Saffran (2001) did contain phrases 
with internal hierarchical structures. Thus, that language was adapted here as our 
Grammar 1.  
 
          
Figure 17: Sentence structure used in Thompson & Newport (2007) 
 
 
The control group in Thompson & Newport (2007) failed to learn the phrasal 
bracketing. But was this because the transitional probabilities were not an informative 
cue for the phrase structure, and so there was no statistical cue? In the control 
condition in Thompson & Newport (2007), not only constituents but also non-
constituents could undergo operations such as movement, substitution, repetition and 
optionality. This led to lack of TP peaks in dips in the control familiarization set (e.g., 
mean of TPs within a phrase = 0.57, mean of TPs across phrases = 0.65). In this way, 




could argue that the failure to learn in the control group could be due to the fact that 
learners could not find any grammar that would generate the sentences. Since the 
presented sentences were so random in that both constituents and non-constituents 
were operated on, there was no single grammar that could generate all the sentences. 
Such lack of grammar may have caused the control subjects to fail. In our 
experiments, we wanted to avoid this confound of causes. Therefore, we created a 
second grammar, Grammar 2, to serve as our control. In this way, both groups 
(people who hear Grammar 1 as input and people who hear Grammar 2 as input) 
would have a grammar that can generate the sentences. So failure to learn the 
language would not be due to lack of grammar that generates the sentences.  
The two grammars share the identical word classes and lexical items, which 
were adapted from Thompson & Newport (2007). Each word class contained three 
nonsense lexical items.  
 
Table 2: Nonsense words assigned to each word class 
Word Class A B C D E F 
 KOF HOX JES SOT FAL KER 
 DAZ NEB  REL ZOR TAF  NAV 
 MER LEV  TID LUM RUD SIB 
 
The basic phrase structure rules and phrase structure trees for Grammar 1 and 
Grammar 2 are given below.  
 
(51) PS rules for Grammar 1 
S’ → S + (CP) 




AP →    A + B 
               ib 
EP →    CP + E 
              F 
CP →    C + D 
              et 
 
 
Figure 18: PS trees of the basic sentence in Grammar 1 
 
 






Figure 20: PS trees in Grammar 1 showing substitution 
 
 
(52) PS rules for Grammar 2 
S’ → S + (BP) 
S → AP + DP 
AP →     A + BP 
                F 
DP →     D + E 
                ib 
BP →     B + C 






















Grammars 1 and 2 are maximally similar and minimally different – 
contrasting only in constituent structure. In particular, the canonical sentences in both 
grammars are identical – A B C D E. The only difference is the phrase structure. For 
example, while AB is a constituent in Grammar 1, it is not in Grammar 2. CD is a 
constituent in Grammar 1 but not in Grammar 2. On the other hand, BC and DE are 
both constituents in Grammar 2 whereas they are not in Grammar 1.  
In addition, the grammars also display nested hierarchical structure. In 
Grammar 1, a phrasal unit EP consists of an E word and another phrase CP, which in 
turn consists of C and D. The whole EP can also contain just an F word. Likewise in 
Grammar 2, the phrase AP contains an A word plus a BP, which contains B and C 
words. The whole AP can simply be represented by an F word.  
These grammars incorporate the manipulations featured in Thompson & 
Newport (2007) such as repetition and optionality. The optional CP in Grammar 1 
and BP in Grammar 2 bring about the repetition and optionality. Take Grammar 1 as 




sentences in the language had the structure canonical sentences as in ABCDE, then 
the TPs would not be a very informative cue for constituency, because both the TP 
within phrases (e.g., AB) and the TP across phrasal boundaries (e.g., BC) would be 
1.0. Natural language has ways in which sentences differ from canonical ones, 
however. First, some constituents can be optional as follows.  
 
(53) a. The boy [from the creek] met Steven Spielberg 
b. The boy met Steven Spielberg 
 
In the case of Grammar 1, imagine that the phrase CD is optional and is dropped half 
of the time as in (55), and there are two types of sentences in this language. 
 
(54) A B C D E  
(55) A B E 
 
Now, the forward TP between phrases (e.g., BC) is 0.5, while within phrases (e.g., 
AB) is still 1.0. Second, some constituents (at the category level) appear more than 
once in a sentence and can be repeated. 
  
(56) [NP The boy from the creek] met [NP Steven Spielberg] 
 
Imagine that the phrase AB appears twice in Grammar 1, provided that we are 





(57) A B C D E A B  
 
Now, the backward TP between phrases (e.g., BC) is reduced to 0.5, while TP within 
phrases (e.g., AB) is still kept constant. In this way, repetition and optionality in 
natural languages create TP peaks and dips that serve as informative cues to phrase 
structure. 
The artificial grammars used in our experiments also display another feature 
observed in natural languages, which is substitution of a phrasal constituent by a 
proform, just like in Morgan et al. (1989). For example in Grammar 1, the constituent 
AP, which usually consists of A and B words, can also be replaced with a pronoun-
like element ib. Similarly, the CP in Grammar 1, which normally consists of C and D 
words, can be substituted by a profrom et. The proforms are borrowed from Morgan 
et al. (1989). In Grammar 2, the same proforms et and ib substitute for different 
constituents, BP and DP respectively. Substitution creates TP peaks and dips too. For 
example in Grammar 1, the constituent CD can be replaced by a proform et, as in 
(59). 
 
(58) A B C D E  





If there are these two types of sentences in the input, then the TP across phrases is 
lower (e.g., BC = 0.5) than TP within phrases (e.g., AB = 1.0). This makes TP pattern 
very informative . 
Finally, the grammars also incorporate movement rules just like the ones in 
Morgan et al. (1989). The movement operation is be captured by the addition of 
following optional phrase structure rules.  
 
(60) Optional PS rules added for Grammar 1 
S’ → EP + S 
S → AP 
 
 







Figure 25: PS trees involving movement and substitution in Grammar 1 
 
 
(61) Optional PS rules added for Grammar 2 
S’ → DP + S 
S → AP 
 
 





    
 
Figure 27: PS trees involving movement and substitution in Grammar 2 
 
 
In Grammar 1, the EP can be moved to the front, while in Grammar 2, the DP can be 
moved. Again, this creates peaks and dips in TP that signal phrase boundaries. 
Imagine you have following two types of sentences in Grammar 1 input. 
 
(62) A B C D E  
(63) C D E A B 
 
Now the TP across phrases (e.g., BC) is 0.5, but TP within phrases (e.g., AB) is 1.0. 
In this way, these grammars included four types of manipulations which (a) 
made certain constituents optional, (b) allowed for the repetition of certain 
constituents, (c) substituted proforms for certain constituents and (d) moved certain 
constituents. Incorporating all these manipulations resulted in the higher TPs between 




is always 1.00. The patterns of TP based on all the possible sentences generated by 
the grammars are given in tables below. 
 
Table 3: Transitional probabilities for all sentences in Grammar 1 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 1.00 0.81 1.00 0.51 
Backward TP 1.00 0.45 1.00 0.90 
 
Table 4: Transitional probabilities for all sentences in Grammar 2 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 0.90 1.00 0.21 1.00 
Backward TP 0.51 1.00 0.42 1.00 
 
 
3.1.2 Method  
Participants 
Forty-four native speakers of English participated in Experiment 1. The 
participants were undergraduate students at the University of Maryland, gave 
informed consent prior to participating and received monetary compensation. 
Twenty-two participants were randomly assigned to hear Grammar 1 during the 
familiarization and the other 22 were assigned to Grammar 2.  
 
Material 
Both Grammars 1 and 2 generate finite languages without recursion that 
generate a total number of 7260 possible sentences each. 80 sentences were picked as 
the presentation set. Two sentences (2.5%) were the canonical sentence type 




All 80 sentences were randomized. The sentence types and 80 sentences that 
appeared in the presentation set are shown in Appendix A.  
 
Table 5: Transitional probabilities for 80 input sentences in Grammar 1 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 1.00 0.24 1.00 0.25 
Backward TP 1.00 0.19 1.00 0.34 
 
Table 6: Transitional probabilities for 80 input sentences in Grammar 2 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 0.33 1.00 0.15 1.00 




Each word token was individually recorded into a Marantz PMD660 portable 
solid state recorder with a head-mounted Sennheiser HMD 280-13 microphone. A 
female speaker, who was blind to the nature of the experiment, read each word token 
in a list intonation. The recorded audio files were transferred into the Audacity sound 
editor. The words were concatenated into sentences with a 30 ms inter-word interval. 
The sentences lacked any prosodic cues to phrase boundaries. All the 80 sentences 
were then transferred into Psyscope 1.2.5 PPC program (Version X B45Dep) and 
concatenated with an intersentence interval (isi) of 1400 ms. The recorded block of 80 
sentences lasted approximately 6 min. The 80 sentences were then randomized and 
repeated 6 times in a random order to form an input sound file of approx. 36 min 







The experiment was administered individually using a Psyscope 1.2.5 PPC 
program inside a small soundproof room with an iMac and Sennheiser HD 580 
precision headphones. Given the success of the incidental condition in Saffran (2001), 
a similar procedure was adopted. Participants were asked to draw using colored 
pencils and paper, while listening to a nonsense language. They were told nothing 
about the structure of the language. They were informed that they would be tested on 
the nonsense language later, but not told about the aspects of the language that would 
be tested.  
Participants were randomly assigned to either Grammar 1 or Grammar 2. The 
participants assigned to Grammar 1 heard the Grammar 1 input sentences during the 
familiarization. The Grammar 2 participants heard the Grammar 2 input sentences. 
Each participant heard the 80 sentences six times during the 36-min familiarization 
period. The 80 familiarization sentences were randomized each time by the Psyscope 
program. They then went through a practice period, where they were asked three 
practice questions, to familiarize themselves with the question-answering process. All 
the tests were forced-choice tests. Both Grammar 1 and Grammar 2 subjects received 
the identical 56 test items. There were 4 types of test items: Fragment test, Movement 
test, Substitution test and Movement-plus-substitution test, all of which are described 
in detail below. All the test items were randomized each time in the Psyscope 





(64) “In each trial, you will hear a pair of word-sequences - 1 and 2.   
Your task is to respond, as accurately as you can, which of the two 
sequences belongs to the artificial language you just heard.  
Press F if the 1st sequence belongs to the language. 
Press J if the 2nd sequence belongs to the language.”  
 
Fragment Test 
The Fragment Test was designed to assess the extent to which participants 
represented the input language in terms of phrasal groupings. The test was forced-
choice and consisted of 16 items, 4 items testing each of the four fragment types. 
Each trial consisted of two fragments, one that was a phrasal constituent in the input 
language and the other that was often a legal sequence but not a constituent in the 
input language. The four fragment types that were tested are given in (65). The first 
two types are 2-member fragments and the last two are 3-member fragments.  
 
(65) Fragment test 
 Grammatical in Grammar 1 Grammatical in Grammar 2 
1 AB BC 
2 CD DE 
3 CDE ABC 






Figure 28: Grammar 1 (AB vs. BC) 
 
 
Figure 29: Grammar 2 (AB vs. BC) 
 
A constituent in Grammar 1 (e.g. AB) is not a constituent in Grammar 2. Similarly, a 
non-constituent in Grammar 1 (e.g. BC) is a constituent in Grammar 2, as in the 
figures above. Consequently, the correct answer for Grammar 1 was always the 
incorrect answer for the Grammar 2 condition, and vice versa. Each fragment type 




If the participants learn that the 2-member fragment (e.g. CD) is a constituent 
and that the 3-member fragment (e.g. CDE) is also a constituent, then, they must have 
learned a nested hierarchical structure as in Figure 30.  
 
 
Figure 30: Internally nested hierarchical structure 
 
To ensure that the performance on this test is a result of phrasal knowledge 
rather than frequency effects, we controlled the frequencies with which both groups 
of fragments appeared in the input. Specifically, none of the test items appeared in the 
input. Thus, the frequency with which both groups occurred was 0. They were all 
novel sequences. In this way, if learners attended only to sequential frequency, they 
would perform at chance. If their performance exceeds chance, it would indicate that 
they formed a higher-order phrasal representation.  
The test items were concatenated using the same individual word token 
recordings as the input sentences. The pairs were presented with 1400 ms of silence 
between them. The test items were randomized each time and the correct answer was 






The Movement Test was designed to assess the extent to which participants 
allowed phrasal constituents to undergo a movement operation as opposed to non-
constituents. This test was modeled on the transformational constituent test in Morgan 
& Newport (1981) and Morgan et al. (1987, 1989). The test was forced-choice and 
consisted of 16 items, 4 items testing each of the four sentence types. Each trial 
consisted of two sentences, one in which a constituent of the input language had been 
subjected to movement, and the other one in which a non-constituent of the input 
language had been subjected to movement, as in figures below. The correct answer 
for the Grammar 1 condition was always the incorrect answer for the Grammar 2 
condition, and vice versa. The four sentence types that were tested are given in (66). 
All the test items are given in Appendix C. Again, none of the test sentences occurred 
during familiarization.  
 
 










(66) Movement test 
 Grammatical in Grammar 1 Grammatical in Grammar 2 
1 CDEAB DEABC 
2 FAB DEF 
3 CDEABCD DEABCBC 




The Substitution Test was designed to assess the extent to which participants 
allowed phrasal constituents to be replaced by proforms ib and et. The test was 
forced-choice and consisted of 12 items, 4 items testing each of the three sentence 
types. Each trial consisted of two sentences, one in which a constituent of the input 
language was substituted for by a proform, and the other in which a non-constituent 




correct answer for the Grammar 1 condition was always the incorrect answer for the 
Grammar 2 condition, and vice versa. The three sentence types that were tested are 
given in (67). All the test items are given in Appendix C. None of the test sentences 
occurred during familiarization.  
 
 
Figure 33: Grammar 1 (ib CDE vs. ABC ib) 
 
 





(67) Substitution test 
 Grammatical in Grammar 1 Grammatical in Grammar 2 
1 ib CDE ABC ib 
2 AB et E A et DE 




The Movement-plus-substitution Test was designed to assess the extent to 
which participants allowed phrasal constituents to be replaced by proforms, ib and et, 
and undergo movement. The test was forced-choice and consisted of 12 items, 4 
items testing each of the three sentence types. Each trial consisted of two sentences, 
one in which a constituent of the input language was substituted for by a proform and 
moved, the other in which a non-constituent of the input language was substituted by 
a proform and moved, as in Figure 35-Figure 36. The correct answer for the Grammar 
1 condition was always the incorrect answer for the Grammar 2 condition, and vice 
versa. The three sentence types that were tested are given in (68). All the test items 






Figure 35: Grammar 1 (CDE ib) 
 
 
Figure 36: Grammar 2 (ib ABC) 
 
 
(68) Movement-plus-Substitution test 
 Grammatical in Grammar 1 Grammatical in Grammar 2 
1 CDE ib ib ABC 
2 et EAB DEA et 






3.1.3 Hypotheses and predictions  
 
Limited Hypothesis 
We considered two distinct theories of learning. One was a learning theory in 
which the deductive power of a learner is limited to the observed distributions. Under 
this theory, learners do not come with a pre-determined set of possible structures or 
rules, and what learners do is to track the distributions and build an illusion of a 
structure entirely based on them, without any preconception of what is and what is 
not a possible structure. This learning theory can be expressed as a more concrete 
hypothesis with respect to our experiments, which is that when learners get certain 
input, they make generalizations based on only the input they get. We will call this 
“Limited” Hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, learners do not allow new 
structures that were not displayed in the input. 
 
Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis 
Another learning theory we considered is that a learner already knows an 
antecedently-specified range of possible representations, and statistics is merely used 
as a source of information that helps a learner select the correct grammar that derives 
the matching surface strings. Under this selective learning theory, the acquired 
representations have deductive consequences beyond what can be derived from the 
observed statistical distributions alone. This theory can be expressed as a more 
concrete hypothesis, which states that learners generalize beyond the input but the 




will call this “Beyond and Constrained” Hypothesis. This hypothesis proposes that 
learners’ generalization extends to novel structures, as long as they are compatible 
with antecedently known constraints. An example of an antecedently known 
constraint would be something like movement of a constituent which is a natural rule 
in languages. 
 
Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis 
A third possibility is that learners generalize beyond what they see in the input 
but their generalizations are not necessarily constrained in a predictable way. We will 
call this third hypothesis “Beyond and Unconstrained” Hypothesis. An example of 
this might be something like movement of a non-constituent, which is unnatural in 
natural languages, but if a learner is unconstrained, this is a logical possibility.  
 
 
Table 7: Table of hypotheses 
 Deductive power of learner Nature of predetermined 
representations 






Beyond what can be 
derived from observed 
distributions 
Limited by constraints 




Beyond what can be 
derived from observed 
distributions 
Unlimited by constraints 
found in natural language 
 
 
In order to simplify the argument, let us take the case of the movement test to 




familiarization input the participants receive includes movement sentences. And at 
test, they have a choice between a sentence which moved a constituent in their 
language and a sentence which moved a non-constituent. The structure of “correct” 
answer was already seen in the input although the actual strings of words of the test 
sentences were novel. And the structure of the “incorrect” answer was not seen in the 
input. Limited Hypothesis would predict that learners will correctly choose the 
consistent answer, since that has the structure that they have seen. According to this 
hypothesis, they do not allow new structures that they did not see in the input.  
Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis would also predict that the learners will 
correctly choose the correct answer, since the consistent test item moved a constituent 
which is a natural operation in language. On the other hand, the participants would 
reject the incorrect answer, since it moved a non-constituent which is an impossible 
operation in natural languages.  
Lastly, Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis would predict that the learners 
might allow both test sentences, since they can allow something that they did not see 
in the input and they are not bounded by a constraint that says you cannot move a 
non-constituent. It is possible that the generalization the learners form based on the 
input they get would be that you can move any two neighboring elements. For 
example, if you heard Grammar 1 as input, and if the generalization you make from 
that is you can move any two neighboring elements, then both test items CDEAB and 
DEABC would be licit, since both have neighboring two words moved. 
Consequently, at test, the participants would not choose one test item over the other, 




In this way, the first two hypotheses (Limited Hypothesis and Beyond and 
Constrained Hypothesis) predict the same outcome, although the outcome would be 
caused by different reasons. The only hypothesis that make a unique prediction in this 
experiment is Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis.  
 
Table 8: Predictions for Experiment 1 
 Views Predictions 
Limited Hypothesis Only the consistent test 
sentences are grammatical  
Adults will choose 
consistent answers 
Beyond and Constrained 
Hypothesis 
Only the consistent test 
sentences are grammatical 





Both test sentences are 
grammatical 




3.1.4 Results and discussion  
The question that we were interested in in Experiment 1 was whether 
participants can learn the hierarchical phrase structure representation on the basis of 
transitional probability. If the subjects did acquire their input grammars, the Grammar 
1 subjects should have learned constituency consistent with Grammar 1. On the other 
hand, the Grammar 2 subjects should have learned constituency consistent with 
Grammar 2, which is incompatible with the Grammar 1 constituency, since the two 
grammars have inconsistent constituent structures. In each trial for every test, one of 
the pair was the correct answer for Grammar 1, while the other was the correct 
answer for Grammar 2. Thus, if subjects learned the constituency, we predict that 
subjects in Grammar 1 would choose the correct answer for Grammar 1 significantly 




Grammar 1 subjects chose the Grammar 1-compatible answers in contrast with the 
percentage of times Grammar 2 subjects chose the Grammar 1-compatible answers.  
 
Grammar 1 vs. Grammar 2 
Fragment Test 
The participants in Grammar 1 chose the Grammar 1-consistent answers for 
the 2-member fragment tests 56% of the time, while the participants in Grammar 2 
chose them 46% of the time. This difference was significant in a one-tailed 
independent samples t-test: t(42) = 1.81, p = 0.039. The one-tailed significance value 
is reported, because we have a specific directional prediction: we predicted that if 
subjects learned their input grammar, they would choose the answers that are 
compatible with their learned grammar. As for the 3-member fragment tests, the 
participants in Grammar 1 did not choose the Grammar 1-consistent answers (mean = 
44%) significantly more often than the Grammar 2 participants (mean = 48%): t(42) = 
-0.637, p = 0.26.  
 
Movement Test 
 As for the Movement Test, the Grammar 1 participants did choose the 
Grammar 1-consistent answers (mean = 55%) significantly more often than the 






On average, the participants in the Grammar 1 condition chose the Grammar 
1-compatible answers (mean = 54%) more often than the participants in the Grammar 
2 condition (mean = 48%). However, this difference did not reach significance in a 
one-tailed independent samples t-test: t(42) = 1.30, p = 0.10.  
 
Movement-plus-substitution Test 
On the Movement-plus-substitution Test, the Grammar 1 subjects chose the 
Grammar 1-compatible answers (mean = 50%) more often than the Grammar 2 

















The next analysis tested the experimental groups’ performance against chance. 
If subjects did learn their input grammars, regardless of which grammar they were 
exposed to, they should have chosen answers consistent with their corresponding 
grammar, significantly more than chance. Hence for the next set of analyses, we 
collapsed together the data of the Grammars 1 and 2. 
 
Overall Result 
 On the whole, subjects in both experimental groups (Grammars 1 and 2) chose 
the corresponding consistent sentence over the inconsistent sentence significantly 
more than chance, in a one-tailed independent samples t-test (mean = 53%, standard 
error = 0.01, t(86) = 2.48, p = 0.0075). Below, we report results from individual tests. 
 
Fragment Test 
The participants in both Grammar 1 and Grammar 2 chose the corresponding 
consistent 2-member fragments significantly more often than chance (mean = 55%, 
SE = 0.028, t(86) = 1.83, p = 0.036). As for the 3-member fragments, the participants 
did not choose the consistent answers significantly more often than chance (mean = 






 As for the Movement Test, the participants chose the consistent answers 




On average, the participants performed at chance (mean = 53%, SE = 0.025, 
t(86) = 1.31, p = 0.097).  
 
Movement-plus-substitution Test 
On the Movement-plus-substitution Test, the participants chose the consistent 
answers (mean = 53%, SE = 0.019) more often than chance. The difference between 


















The results of the 2-member Fragment Test, Movement Test and Movement-
plus-substitution Test show a significant difference between the two input groups. 
The participants who heard Grammar 1 as input chose the Grammar 1-consistent 
answers significantly more often than the participants who heard Grammar 2 during 
familiarization. Put another way, participants in both groups chose the answers that 
were consistent with their input grammar significantly more often than chance. On 
the other hand, we did not observe any learning on the 3-member Fragment test and 
Substitution Test. This implies that participants could not learn 3-member fragments 
and what the proforms stood for, based on 36-min exposure to the artificial language.  
Nevertheless, the fact that participants succeeded on the 2-member Fragment 
Test tells us that they formed the correct phrasal groupings based on the input of 36 
min of exposure. Subjects in the Grammar 1 condition chose AB and CD, which are 
constituents in Grammar 1, to be consistent with their learned grammar, over BC and 
DE, which are not constituents in Grammar 1. Similarly on the Movement-plus-
substitution Test, subjects in Grammar 2 preferred BC and DE, which are constituents 
in Grammar 2, to be substituted by proforms and moved, to AB and CD, which are 
not constituents in Grammar 2, to be substituted and moved.  
On Movement Test, subjects seem to have chosen the sentences in which 




constituents were moved. For example, from a canonical sentence ABCDE, the 
Grammar 1 subjects seem to have allowed CDE to move (as in CDEAB), but not DE 
to move (as in DEABC). In Grammar 1, CDE is a constituent whereas DE is not. 
Recall that the result of the Fragment Test suggested that the Grammar 1 subjects 
seem to know that CD is a constituent. If they know that CDE and CD are 
constituents, but not DE, that means that they formed a structural representation in 
Figure 30, where CDE has a nested hierarchical structure with an embedded 
constituent CD.  
 
 
Figure 30: Internally nested structure 
 
 Moreover, these results are not due to frequency effects, because none of the 
test items appeared in the input. Therefore, the TP between words in the tests (e.g. 
KOF HOX, DAZ NEB) were always 0. In order to arrive at the correct answer, 
participants had to, first, have categorized lexical items into word classes (e.g. KOF, 





 One objection to our conclusions may be that the adults did not really have a 
hierarchical tree representation like we argue, but that the subjects were simply 
noticing the chunks of constituents in the consistent (grammatical) test sentences. 
That is, in the consistent test sample, “good” transitions exist, meaning transitions 
from a category to another category that has been observed (i.e., constituents), 
whereas in the inconsistent test sample, “bad” transitions exist, meaning the transition 
from a category to another category that was not observed in the data (i.e., non-
constituents). One could argue that the results in this experiment could be attained if 
the participants were merely noticing the “good chunks” (constituents) versus “bad 
chunks” (non-constituents). While this is a relevant concern, it cannot have been the 
case. Take a look at the movement test sentences that were used. 
 
(69) Movement test 
 Grammatical in Grammar 1 Grammatical in Grammar 2 
1 CDEAB DEABC 
2 CDEABCD DEABCBC 
3 FAB DEF 
4 FABCD DEFBC 
 
 
In the first test sentence type (CDEAB vs. DEABC), there are two good chunks in 
CDEAB if the familiarization language was Grammar 1, namely CD and AB. If your 
familiarization language was Grammar 2, then there are two good chunks in DEABC, 
namely DE and BC. What is important, however, is that there are good chunks of one 
grammar in the other grammar’s consistent test sentences. Put another way, the 




For instance, if your grammar was Grammar 1, there is a good chunk (i.e., AB) in the 
G2-consistent answer. If your grammar was Grammar 2, there is a good chunk (i.e., 
DE) in the G1-consistent answer. This is illustrated in Figure 39 below. Solid lines 
represent good chunks (i.e., constituents) in G1, and dotted lines represent 
constituents in G2. 
 
 
Figure 39: Number of “good chunks” vs. “bad chunks” 
Solid line represents good chunks for G1 and dotted line represents good chunks for G2 
 
 
In the second test sentence type (CDEABCD vs. DEABCBC), there are three good 
chunks of G1 in the G1-consistent test sentence (CDEABCD), namely CD, AB and 




(DEABCBC), namely AB. If you were familiarized in G2, there are three good 
chunks in the G2-consistent answer (DE, BC, BC), but there are two good chunks in 
the G1-consistent answer too (DE, BC). 
In this way, since there always are good chunks in the “wrong” answer too, 
simply noticing good chunks does not grant you the correct answer. One might argue 
that the number of good chunks is always higher in the correct answer than in the 
incorrect answer. There are two and three good G1 chunks in the G1-consistent 
answers, while there is only one good G1 chunk in the G2-consistent answers. As for 
G2, there are two and three good G2 chunks in the G2-consistent answers, while there 
are one and two good G2 chunks in the G1-consistent answer. If the number of good 
chunks makes a difference, then there should be a difference in participants’ 
performance within the consistent answers too, because there are only two good 
chunks in the first test type (CDEAB and DEABC) in both grammars, while there are 
three good chunks in the second test type (CDEABCD and DEABCBC). However, 
this difference in participants’ performance on the first movement test type (CDEAB 
and DEABC) and the second type (CDEABCD and DEABCBC) was not significant 
in the independent-samples t-test (mean = 53%, 59%, respectively; t(42) = -0.942, p = 
0.352). 
One might look at the third test type (FAB vs. DEF) in Figure 39 and argue 
that in that particular test, there is no good chunk in the wrong answer, and as a result, 
you can choose the correct answer by merely noticing the good chunks. This is a valid 
concern. If this is the case, one would expect participants to perform better at this test 




DEABCBC), because while the third test type does not contain good chunks in the 
wrong answers, the first and second test types do. Nevertheless, the participants’ 
performance on the third test type (FAB vs. DEF) was not significantly different from 
the performance on the first type (mean = 49%, 53%, respectively; t(42) = -0.768, p = 
0.447) or the second type (mean = 49%, 59%, respectively; t(42) = -1.581, p = 0.121) 
in independent-samples t-tests. 
In sum, we can now reject the hypothesis that the participants’ success was 
due to a greater number of good transitions in the consistent test sentences than the 
number of good transitions in the inconsistent sentences. Simply detecting the good 
chunks in the consistent test sentences cannot have achieved the results of this 
experiment. If it was not the number of good transitions that differentiated the correct 
and incorrect test sentences, then what was it? The difference is what is being moved. 
In the consistent test sentences, constituents are moved, while in the inconsistent test 
sentences, non-constituents are moved. Hence, our conclusion that that was the 
distinguishing factor still holds. 
 It is worth noting that the learning achieved here is not as robust as previous 
studies. For instance, the experimental group in Thompson & Newport (2007) 
achieved almost 80% accuracy as early as Day 1, after only 20 min of exposure. On 
the other hand, the highest success rate in our Experiment 1 was 55%. There are two 
responses to this observation. First, the artificial language in Thompson & Newport 
(2007) was much simpler than our artificial languages. The canonical sentence was 





          
Figure 40: Phrase structure in Thompson & Newport (2007) 
 
 
The constituents were AB, CD and EF and such grouping is very intuitive. If you are 
given a sentence with 6 words, it seems very natural and obvious to divide them into 
3 groups of two. In fact, even the control group, who were not given any statistical 
cue, scored well above chance, achieving 60% accuracy on Day 1 and almost 80% 
accuracy on Day 5, as in Figure 15. Thompson & Newport (2007) speculate that 
perhaps that was because native English-speaking participants had tendency to break 
up input strings into binary groupings or to impose trochaic foot structure even when 
there was no prosodic information.  
In contrast, our grammars are much more complex and display nested 
hierarchy. Since our canonical sentence is a 5-word string (ABCDE), it is impossible 
to impose a binary grouping. Therefore, the low success rates in this study could be 
due to the complexity of our grammars.  
Second, our familiarization period was relatively short compared with 
previous studies. In Saffran (2001), it was 30 min for 2 days, accumulating a total of 
60 min of exposure. In Thompson & Newport (2007), it was 20 min for 5 consecutive 
days, accumulating a total of 100 min of exposure. In our experiment, it was 36 min 




large error rates.6 In any case, our main finding is that, even though the performance 
in this experiment was not as robust as previous literature, our participants did 
perform significantly above chance on 3 of 5 tests. 
The results of Experiment 1 offer an answer to one of our questions, which 
was whether the TP can be a cue to not only the phrasal groupings but also 
hierarchical constituent structure. And the answer seems to be positive. By including 
features of natural languages such as optionality, repetition, substitution and 
movement, there emerge TP peaks and dips. We found that not only can learners infer 
phrasal groupings on the basis of such statistical pattern, but they can also infer 
nested hierarchical structure.  
In Experiment 1, the Movement Test yielded a significant effect of learning. 
The subjects chose the sentences where a constituent had undergone movement over 
sentences where a non-constituent had undergone movement. Going back to our three 
hypotheses, the results from this experiment indicate that the predictions made by 
Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis were not borne out, since this hypothesis 
predicted that the performance on the movement test would be at chance. On the 
other hand, the predictions made by both Limited Hypothesis and Beyond and 
Constrained Hypothesis were borne out, because the learners correctly chose the 
consistent answer. However, the results of this experiment do not differentiate these 
two hypotheses, since both hypotheses predicted the identical outcome.  
 
                                                
6 We are considering a follow-up study where the familiarization last for 2 or 3 days to boost 
the learning. If the limited familiarization time was causing the low success rate, increasing 




Table 9: Predictions and outcomes for Experiment 1 
 Views Predictions Outcome 
Limited Hypothesis Only the consistent test 
sentences are 
grammatical  






Only the consistent test 
sentences are 
grammatical 






Both test sentences are 
grammatical 





The Limited Hypothesis is the view that the deductive power of a learner is 
limited to the observed distributions, and statistical learning does not interact with 
innate constraints. Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis, on the other hand, is the view 
that the acquired representations have deductive consequences beyond what can be 
derived from the observed statistical distributions. The results of Experiment 1 do not 
support one or the other of these two views. But given that this is the critical question 
in this dissertation, we would want to find a way to tell them apart. 
One might argue that the success of the movement test, for example, in this 
experiment was due to the abundance of movement sentences in the input, and that 
subjects were simply choosing the ones that they were most familiar with. In fact, the 
presentation set in this experiment did include a large number of sentences that had 
undergone movement operation. In the Grammar 1 input, 40% (32/80) of the whole 
presentation set was movement sentences. In Grammar 2, it was 48% (38/80). 
If we remove all the sentences generated via movement (and substitution by 
proform) rules and the participants still succeed at the movement test, it would 




data, because the correct “answer” does not appear in the exposure set. It would imply 
that participants were acting on the knowledge that was not available in the input, 
specifically the knowledge that you cannot move a non-constituent. Accordingly, in 
Experiment 2, we will remove all the sentences generated via movement rules and 
substitution rules and we will test them on movement and substitution tests, in the 
hope of being able to tell apart the two hypotheses. In this way, we should be able to 
tease apart the two hypotheses because they would make different predictions. This 
way, we hope to explore whether the representations are part of the learning system 
prior to the experience, and what the deductive consequences of distributional 
learning are.  
 
 
3.2 Experiment 2 (Adult 2) 
 
Experiment 2 tries to answer one of our main questions of this dissertation, 
which is what the deductive consequences of distributional learning are. In this 
experiment, we remove all the sentences generated by movement (and substitution by 
proforms) rules from the input and examine whether subjects can succeed under such 
condition. There are two possible outcomes. Under a learning theory where the 
deductive power of a learner is limited to the observed distributions, learners should 
not allow new structures that were not displayed in the input. Therefore, learners 
would consider both consistent and inconsistent test samples to be ungrammatical, 




come with a pre-determined set of possible structures or rules, in this case, learners 
would not know in advance that you can only move constituents. So, the subjects 
would fail to choose the correct test sentences in which constituents are moved. If this 
were the case, it would suggest that what learners do is to track the distributions and 
build an illusion of a structure entirely based on them, without any preconception of 
what is and what is not a possible structure.  
On the other hand, under a learning theory where a learner already knows an 
antecedently-specified range of possible representations, statistics is merely used as a 
source of information that helps a learner select the correct grammar that derives the 
matching surface strings. Under this selective learning theory, the acquired 
representations have deductive consequences beyond what can be derived from the 
observed statistical distributions alone. On this view, another possible outcome is that 
the subjects succeed in this condition, and they can correctly choose the test sentences 
in which constituents are moved, over test sentences in which non-constituents are 
moved. If so, it would suggest that learners’ generalization extends to novel 
structures, as long as they are compatible with antecedently known constraints.  
 
 
3.2.1 Description of the linguistic systems  
The same artificial grammars, Grammar 1 and Grammar 2, were used. The 
only difference was that all examples generated via movement and substitution-with-
proform rules were excluded from the familiarization. Just like in Experiment 1, 80 




canonical sentence type (ABCDE) in both grammars. There were four sentence types, 
which is shown below. 
 
(70) Familiarization sentence types in Experiment 2 
Grammar 1 Grammar 2 
A B F         (9) A B C D E        (3) 
A B C D E     (3) F D E             (10) 
A B C D E C D  (19) A B C D E B C    (16) 
A B F C D (49) F D E B C        (51) 
 
 
While the input lacked movement rules, it still included other manipulations such as 
repetition and optionality. These features contributed to make the TPs between words 
within phrases higher than the TPs across phrases. The resulting TP patterns of the 
presentation set are given below. All 80 sentences were randomized. The sentence 
types and 80 sentences that appeared in the presentation set are shown in Appendix B.  
 
Table 10: Transitional probabilities for 80 input sentences in Grammar 1 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 1.00 0.28 1.00 0.24 
Backward TP 1.00 0.24 1.00 1.00 
 
Table 11: Transitional probabilities for 80 input sentences in Grammar 2 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 1.00 1.00 0.22 1.00 






3.2.2 Method  
Participants 
Forty-four native speakers of English participated in Experiment 2 as subjects. 
The participants were undergraduate students at the University of Maryland, gave 
informed consent prior to participating and received monetary compensation. 
Twenty-two participants were randomly assigned to hear Grammar 1 during the 
familiarization and the other 22 were assigned to Grammar 2. 
 
Recording, Procedure, Tests 
The recording and the procedure for Experiment 2 were identical to those for 
Experiment 1. Participants were exposed to the presentation set of 80 sentences six 
times, for a total of 36 min of exposure. The administered tests were identical to the 
ones in Experiment 1.  
 
3.2.3 Hypotheses and predictions 
Recall that while the results of Experiment 1 were not compatible with the 
Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis, they were compatible with both Limited 
Hypothesis and Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis. This was mostly because all of 
the test structures were included in the familiarization. In this experiment, we remove 
all the sentences generated by movement and substitution rules, which means that the 
test sentences have novel structures that were not seen in the input. Now the three 




For convenience’ sake, let us take the case of the movement test to discuss 
different hypotheses and predictions. According to the first hypothesis, which we call 
the “Limited” Hypothesis, learners do not generalize beyond what was observed in 
the input. So at test, when they see two novel structures – one that moved a 
constituent and one that moved a non-constituent – they would consider both to be 
illicit, because neither was seen in the input. Thus, the performance should be at 
chance.  
According to the second hypothesis (“Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis”), 
learners can generalize beyond the observed input, but their generalizations are 
restricted in principled way. For instance, learners might have the knowledge that you 
cannot move a non-constituent in natural languages. If this were the case, on the 
movement test, the participants would allow the consistent test sentence in which a 
constituent was moved, but they would not allow the inconsistent test sentence in 
which a non-constituent was moved, because while the former is a possible 
movement, the latter is an impossible operation in language. Thus, the participants 
should show a preference towards the consistent test items over the inconsistent test 
items.  
According to the third hypothesis (“Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis”), 
learners’ generalizations could go beyond what was observed in the input and those 
generalizations do not have to be constrained by some principles. For example, one 
generalization the learners could form is that you can move any neighboring 
elements. If this were the case, on the movement test, learners might allow both test 




neighboring words. If so, both test sentences would be licit for the learners and the 
performance at test would be at chance, that is, the learners would not choose one 
over the other.  
In this way, the three hypotheses make distinct predictions. Both “Limited” 
and “Beyond and Unconstrained” Hypotheses predict that the performance on the 
movement test would be at chance although for different reasons. The only 
hypothesis that predicts a different outcome is Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis, 
which predicts that learners would choose the consistent test sample over the 
inconsistent test sample.  
 
Table 12: Predictions for Experiment 2 
 Views Predictions 
Limited Hypothesis Both test sentences are 
ungrammatical  
Adults will perform at 
chance 
Beyond and Constrained 
Hypothesis 
Only the consistent test 
sentences are grammatical 





Both test sentences are 
grammatical 




3.2.4 Results and discussion  
Our question in Experiment 2 was whether removing the movement sentences 
from the familiarization would nonetheless license the inference that only constituents 





Grammar 1 vs. Grammar 2 
Fragment Test 
On the 2-member fragment test, the participants in Grammar 1 did not choose 
the Grammar 1-consistent answers (mean = 53%) reliably more than participants in 
Grammar 2 (mean = 50%) in a one-tailed independent samples t-test: t(42) = 0.689, p 
= 0.248. On the 3-member fragment tests, the participants in the Grammar 1 condition 
did not choose the Grammar 1-compatible answers (mean = 47%) significantly more 
often than the participants in the Grammar 2 condition (mean = 44%, t(42) = 0.654, p 
= 0.259) either.  
 
Movement Test 
 As for the Movement Test, the Grammar 1 participants did choose the 
Grammar 1-consistent answers (mean = 61%) significantly more often than the 
Grammar 2 participants (mean = 44%): t(42) = 3.675, p = 0.0005.  
 
Substitution Test 
On the Substitution Test, the participants in Grammar 1 did not choose the 
Grammar 1-consistent answers (mean = 47%) more often than the Grammar 2 






On the Movement-plus-substitution Test, the Grammar 1 subjects chose the 
Grammar 1-compatible answers (mean = 49%) less often than the Grammar 2 
















The next analysis tested the experimental groups’ performance against chance. 
If subjects learned their input grammars, they should have chosen answers consistent 
with their corresponding grammar more often than chance, no matter which grammar 
they were exposed to. Thus for the next set of analyses, we collapsed together the 
data from the two grammars. 
 
Overall Result 
 On the whole, subjects in both groups (Grammars 1 and 2) did not choose the 
corresponding consistent sentence over the inconsistent sentence significantly more 
than chance (mean = 51%, SE = 0.01. One-tailed independent samples t-test: t(86) = 
0.928, p = 0.178). Below, we report results from individual tests. 
 
Fragment Test 
On average, the participants in both Grammar 1 and Grammar 2 did not 
choose the corresponding consistent 2-member fragments reliably more often than 
chance (mean = 52%, SE = 0.025, t(86) = 0.693, p = 0.245). Similarly, for the 3-
member fragments, the participants did not choose the consistent answers reliably 






 As for the Movement Test, the participants chose the consistent answers more 
often than chance, and this difference was highly reliable (mean = 58%, SE = 0.022, 
t(86) = 3.674, p < 0.001). 7 
 
Substitution Test 
The participants did not choose the corresponding consistent sentences more 
often than chance (mean = 48%, SE = 0.026, t(86) = -0.878, p = 0.192).  
 
Movement-plus-substitution Test 
On the Movement-plus-substitution Test, the participants did not choose the 
consistent answers significantly more often than chance (mean = 46%, SE = 0.019) 
t(86) = -1.91, p = 0.03). 
 
  
                                                
7 At first glance, the participants in Experiment 2 appear to have performed better on the 
Movement Test (mean = 58%) than the participants in Experiment 1 (mean = 54%). However, 














Except for the Substitution Test and Movement-plus-substitution Test, there 
was a general trend for choosing the input-consistent answers in all tests. The effect 
was highly reliable in the Movement Test. This result is especially striking because 
the performance of participants was most successful on the tests that involved 
movement, even though there was no movement sentences in the input. This confirms 
that the participants’ success on the Movement Test in Experiment 1 was not due to 
the abundance of movement sentences in the familiarization. Even when the input 
lacked movement sentences, adults chose the sentences in which constituents 
underwent movement as “grammatical” sentences in the artificial language.  
 In contrast with the results of the Movement test, participants did not 
successfully learn that only constituents can be replaced by a proform. This could be 
due to the fact that substitution rules were not introduced during the familiarization in 
Experiment 2. Since the proforms were excluded from the input, the participants saw 
them for the first time during the test. As a result, that probably confused the 
participants. It is interesting that in the absence of movement and substitution rules in 
the input, people can infer that only constituents can be moved, but not that only 
constituents can be substituted. There could be several reasons for such asymmetry. 
One possibility is that, while you do not need input to infer that only constituents can 
be moved, but you need sufficient information to infer that only constituents can be 




substitution may be innate and universal, you need some kind of input as a trigger to 
set the constraint on substitution to work, but you do not need any trigger to set off 
the movement rule. This line of possibility is certainly compatible with the results of 
Experiment 2. Another possibility is that learning substitution rules requires some 
kind of reference. For example, when replacing red bottle with “one” in a sentence 
like, The boy likes the red bottle and the girl likes that one, you have to know that 
“one” refers to red bottle. However, in an artificial language learning experiment, no 
semantic information that corresponds with the sentences is given. When learning that 
DAZ HOX is replaced by a proform ib, you do not even know what “DAZ HOX” 
refers to. All you have is the distributional information that DAZ and HOX often 
appear together. This suggests that statistical information that signals constituency is 
not adequate for deducing that only constituents can be substituted. It might be that it 
also requires semantic information for the referent of the proform. The current 
experiments do not answer these questions, but nonetheless, it is worth noting that we 
found a contrast between movement-rule learning and substitution-rule learning.  
Going back to our three hypotheses, the results of the movement test in 
Experiment 2 are only compatible with Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis, since 
this was the only hypothesis that predicted this outcome. The other two hypotheses 
(Limited Hypothesis and Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis) predicted that the 
learners would not choose one test sentence over the other and that the performance 
would be at chance. However, the results show that the adults preferred the consistent 





Table 13: Predictions and outcomes for Experiment 2 
 Views Predictions Outcome 
Limited Hypothesis Both test sentences are 
ungrammatical  






Only the consistent test 
sentences are grammatical 






Both test sentences are 
grammatical 





The information about constituency was contained in the input, but the 
participants in Experiment 2 were not given any movement sentences in the input. In 
that situation, why should the participants choose the sentences that moved 
constituents over the sentences that moved non-constituents? If the generalization you 
form is entirely based on the input, both test structures should be equally illicit, since 
both are new. If the generalization you form is not restricted to what was observed in 
the input, then you might equally allow both test structures, since both moved 
neighboring elements. But that is not what happened. What happened was that the 
participants chose the new structures in which constituents, but not non-constituents, 
were moved. Since the information that constituents can be moved was not included 
in the input, the inference must have come from some constraints that were known to 
the learners. And that is what was predicted by the Beyond and Constrained 
Hypothesis. In other words, the generalizations that were formed by the learners 
based on the input in Experiment 2 were not restricted to just the input, but they were 
restricted in a way that is predictable considering what is possible and what is 




behaved in the way that was compatible with possible operations in natural 
languages.  
Here, let us consider and examine alternative accounts for the results obtained 
in this experiment. First alternative account can be dubbed something like “strange 
first word” account. If you look at the sentence types of the Movement test in (71), 
you see that all the Grammar 2-compatible test sentences begin with a D word.  
 
(71) Movement test 
 Grammatical in Grammar 1 Grammatical in Grammar 2 
1 CDEAB DEABC 
2 FAB DEF 
3 CDEABCD DEABCBC 
4 FABCD DEFBC 
 
 
In contrast, none of the Grammar 1-compatible test sentences begin with a D word. 
This is due to the fact that CD is a constituent in Grammar 1. Since this study did not 
have optionality of an element within a single phrase, C and D always appear 
together, which is why no sentence began with a D word in the input of Grammar 1. 
One could argue that participants’ success was due to such serial position effects. The 
participants who heard Grammar 1 during the familiarization might know that the 
Grammar 2 test sentences are not from the language they were familiarized to, simply 
because no sentence had begun with a D. The results of Experiment 2 would be 
undermined if participants were simply noting such linear pattern. It would mean that 




movement, but because they never saw a sentence begin or end with a particular word 
class.  
This is a valid objection; however, this cannot have been the case. That is 
because the Grammar 1-compatible test sentences did not appear in the 
familiarization either. The Grammar 1-compatible movement test sentences start with 
either C or F. See the list of familiarization sentence types of Experiment 2 in (72). 
 
(72) Familiarization sentence types in Experiment 2 
Grammar 1 Grammar 2 
A B F         A B C D E        
A B C D E     F D E             
A B C D E C D  A B C D E B C    
A B F C D F D E B C        
 
 
No input sentence of Grammar 1 in this experiment starts with C or F. Therefore for 
the participants who had been familiarized with Grammar 1, both groups of test 
sentences (G1-compatible and G2-compatible) are equally unfamiliar and unseen. 
Even if they kept track of the serial positions of some elements, it would not help, 
since neither test sentence type appeared in the input. Hence, we can back up our 
interpretation of the results, which is that participants chose the sentences that moved 
constituents instead of non-constituents.  
Similarly, the G2-compatible movement test sentences all begin with a D 
word, while the G1-compatible test sentences begin with a C or F word. This is 
because DE and BC are constituents in Grammar 2, so no sentence in G2 starts with a 




with Grammar 2, you could have chosen the correct answer by simply choosing the 
test sentences that start with D, instead of C. This objection is a valid concern, but it 
cannot have been the case. That is because none of the familiarization sentences in 
Grammar 2 started with a D word either (see (72)), because no movement sentences 
were included in the input in this experiment. Interestingly, however, some 
familiarization sentences of Grammar 2 actually start with F. And half of the G1-
compatible test sentences start with F. Therefore, if you were only paying attention to 
the first word, you could actually be misled, and choose the wrong answers instead. 
But this was not attested. The participants who heard G2 as input did not perform 
significantly worse on the second and fourth test types (in which the G1-compatible 
answers start with F) (mean = 42%) than the first and third test types (mean = 46%; 
paired-samples t-test: t(21) = 0.668, p = 0.511). In this way, we can reject the 
alternative account that subjects were merely taking note of the good and bad first 
words. 
Second alternative account is similar to the first alternative, but it can be 
dubbed “strange last word”. If you look at the sentence types of the Movement test in 
(71), you see that most of the Grammar 2-compatible test sentences end in a C word. 
In contrast, none of the Grammar 1-compatible test sentences ends in a C word. This 
is due to the fact that CD is a constituent in Grammar 1. Since this study did not have 
optionality of an element within a single phrase, C and D always appear together, 
which is why no sentence ends with a C word in the input of Grammar 1. One could 
argue that participants succeeded by simply noticing that ending a sentence with a C 




This is a relevant concern, but it cannot have been the case either. Notice that one of 
the G2-compatible test sentences ends with F. It should also be noted that in the 
familiarization set, none of the input sentences of Grammar 2 ends with an F word, 
while some of the Grammar 1 input sentences end with F (see (72)). If the 
participants were simply paying attention to good and bad last words, then this could 
be misleading. The participants who heard Grammar 1 as input could be misled to 
think that the G2-compatible test sentence DEF is the correct answer, since they have 
seen sentences ending with F. If this is the case, then it would predict that participants 
perform better at test sentences ending with a C word than test sentences ending with 
F, because rejecting test sentences that end with C would be easier than rejecting test 
sentences that end with F. Nevertheless, this prediction was not borne out. The 
participants in Experiment 2 who heard Grammar 1 during the familiarization phase 
did not perform significantly better or worse on the second test type (FAB vs. DEF) 
(mean = 57%) than the first type (CDEAB vs. DEABC) (mean = 59%; t(21) = -0.326, 
p = 0.747), third type (CDEABCD vs. DEABCBC) (mean = 69%; t(21) = -1.498, p = 
0.149) or fourth type (FABCD vs. DEFBC) (mean = 57%; t(21) = 0, p = 1.0), in 
paired-samples t-tests. In sum, we can reject the alternative hypothesis that 
participants succeeded by simply paying attention to good and bad last words.  
 Third alternative account can be dubbed “number of good chunks”, which is 
the hypothesis that the subjects were simply noticing the chunks of constituents in the 
consistent (grammatical) test sentences, and that they did not have a hierarchical tree 
representation like we argue. It could be that in the consistent test sample, “good” 




been observed (i.e., constituents), whereas in the inconsistent test sample, “bad” 
transitions exist, meaning the transition from a category to another category that was 
not observed in the data (i.e., non-constituents). One could argue that the results in 
this experiment could be achieved if the participants were merely noticing the “good 
chunks” (constituents) versus “bad chunks” (non-constituents). While this is a 
relevant concern, it cannot have been the case. Take a look again at the movement 
test sentences that were used. 
 
(73) Movement test 
 Grammatical in Grammar 1 Grammatical in Grammar 2 
1 CDEAB DEABC 
2 CDEABCD DEABCBC 
3 FAB DEF 
4 FABCD DEFBC 
 
 
In the first test sentence type (CDEAB vs. DEABC), there are two good chunks in 
CDEAB if the familiarization language was Grammar 1, namely CD and AB. If your 
familiarization language was Grammar 2, then there are two good chunks in DEABC, 
namely DE and BC. What is important, however, is that there are good chunks of one 
grammar in the other grammar’s consistent test sentences. Put another way, the 
inconsistent test sample in your grammar contains good chunks of your grammar too. 
For instance, if your grammar was Grammar 1, there is a good chunk (i.e., AB) in the 
G2-consistent answer. If your grammar was Grammar 2, there is a good chunk (i.e., 




represent good chunks (i.e., constituents) in G1, and dotted lines represent 
constituents in G2. 
 
 
Figure 43: Number of “good chunks” vs. “bad chunks”. Solid line represents good chunks for G1 
and dotted line represents good chunks for G2 
 
 
In the second test sentence type (CDEABCD vs. DEABCBC), there are three good 
chunks of G1 in the G1-consistent test sentence (CDEABCD), namely CD, AB and 
CD, but there still is one good G1 chunk in the G2-consistent test sentence 
(DEABCBC), namely AB. If you were familiarized in G2, there are three good 
chunks in the G2-consistent answer (DE, BC, BC), but there are two good chunks in 




In this way, since there always are good chunks in the “wrong” answer too, 
simply noticing good chunks does not grant you the correct answer. One might argue 
that the number of good chunks is always higher in the correct answer than in the 
incorrect answer. There are two and three good G1 chunks in the G1-consistent 
answers, while there is only one good G1 chunk in the G2-consistent answers. As for 
G2, there are two and three good G2 chunks in the G2-consistent answers, while there 
are one and two good G2 chunks in the G1-consistent answer. If the number of good 
chunks makes a difference, then there should be a difference in participants’ 
performance within the consistent answers too, because there are only two good 
chunks in the first test type (CDEAB and DEABC) in both grammars, while there are 
three good chunks in the second test type (CDEABCD and DEABCBC). However, 
this difference in participants’ performance on the first movement test type (CDEAB 
and DEABC) and the second type (CDEABCD and DEABCBC) was not significant 
in the independent-samples t-test (mean = 59%, 60%, respectively; t(42) = -0.193, p = 
0.848). 
One might look at the third test type (FAB vs. DEF) in Figure 43 and argue 
that in that particular test, there is no good chunk in the wrong answer, and as a result, 
you can choose the correct answer by merely noticing the good chunks. This is a 
relevant concern. If this is the case, one would expect participants to perform better at 
this test type than at first (CDEAB vs. DEABC) and second test types (CDEABCD 
vs. DEABCBC), because while the third test type does not contain good chunks in the 
wrong answers, the first and second test types do. Nevertheless, the participants’ 




the performance on the first type (mean = 58%, 59%, respectively; t(42) = -0.107, p = 
0.916) or the second type (mean = 58%, 60%, respectively; t(42) = -0.298, p = 0.767). 
In sum, we can reject the third alternative account that the participants’ 
success was due to a greater number of good transitions in the consistent test 
sentences than the number of good transitions in the inconsistent sentences. Simply 
detecting the good chunks in the consistent test sentences cannot have achieved the 
results of this experiment. The critical factor that helped the participants distinguish 
the consistent and inconsistent test samples must have been that, in the consistent test 
sentences, constituents are moved, while in the inconsistent test sentences, non-
constituents are moved. And the results of this experiment are compatible with this 
conclusion.  
 The results of Experiment 2 are only compatible with the idea that the role of 
a learner is to identify the mapping between the surface forms and one of a range of 
possible grammars that generated them. On this approach, the role of the statistics is 
to drive inferences about which grammar out of the set of possible grammars is 
responsible for the input data. More specifically, only grammars that allow movement 
of a constituent but not of non-constituents are considered as a possibility and 
grammars that move non-constituents must not have been an option. Otherwise, it is 
impossible to explain why the subjects were able to identify the correct answers in the 
absence of movement sentences in the input. It is worth noting here that constituency 
alone does not give this result. Constituency is a necessary condition to drive this 
result, and yet, it alone does not imply that non-constituents cannot be moved. For 




sentences, and together with some kind of probabilistic table, the FSA could learn 
constituency.   
 
 




Figure 45: FSA for familiarization sentences of Grammar 2 in Experiment 2 
 
 
However, even having a representation of constituency is not sufficient to achieve the 
results of Experiment 2. If you only have FSA like above, you cannot choose the 
correct consistent answers at test. For example, it is impossible to choose between 
CDEAB vs. DEABC, sentences you have never seen before. One might argue that 
with probabilistic FSA, you can simply choose the one with a greater number of good 
transitions. But we already discussed above that this does not work. What is needed in 




constituents. The fact that the participants in our experiment seemed to know that 
without being told that constraint suggests that they already knew that prior to the 
exposure. The results from this experiment are compatible with the view that this 
constraint is linguistic in nature. In any case, the constraint could not have been 
formed by simply being exposed to the artificial language during the experiment, thus 
must have been contributed by the learners themselves.  
Experiment 2 was an attempt to answer one of our main questions of this 
dissertation, which is what the deductive consequences of distributional learning are 
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that learners’ acquired representations have 
deductive consequences beyond what can be derived from the observed statistical 
distributions alone. This implies that statistics are merely used as a source of 
information that helps a learner select the correct grammar that derives the matching 
surface strings. Furthermore, it also suggests that the representations the learners form 




Chapter 4: Infant Experiments 
 
 
In this chapter, we extend our investigation to testing infants. In the classic 
artificial language phrase structure learning studies (Morgan and Newport 1981; 
Morgan, Meier and Newport 1987; Morgan et al. 1989) and in Thompson and 
Newport (2007), only adults have been tested. Saffran et al. (2008) tested infants, but 
we argued in Chapter 2 that what the infants acquired could have been a finite-state 
grammar as in Figure 13, and not necessarily a hierarchical phrase structure. The 
results of Saffran et al. (2008) could have been achieved by infants simply learning 
the linear order of word categories.  
 
 
Figure 46: FSA of the predictive language in Saffran et al. (2008) 
 
 
In other words, whether infants can learn the hierarchical phrase structure of an 
artificial language is yet to be shown. To this end, we tested infants to see whether 




We concluded in Experiment 2 that the adults knew that only constituents are 
allowed to move prior to the exposure. Nonetheless, one could potentially argue that 
the fact that adults succeeded on the movement test in the absence of movement in 
the input is because they already knew a natural language. And natural languages 
only allow movement of constituents. So one could argue that adults extended that 
knowledge in learning the artificial language. In order to examine this possibility, we 
tested infants. If our results from Experiments 1 and 2 model what happens in 
language acquisition, infants might perform the same way as adults did. Experiment 3 
is the first of a series of infant experiments and it is a replication of our Experiment 1.  
We chose to test mainly 18-month-old infants in this dissertation because this 
is around the age that infants begin to show their knowledge of syntax. Gomez & 
Gerken (1999) showed that, by the age of 12 months, infants are sensitive to 
statistical distributions in an artificial language generated by a finite state grammar. 
By 14-months of age, infants begin to demonstrate sensitivity to properties of their 
native language syntax (Hirsch-Pasek & Golinkoff 1996), even though infants at this 
age are hardly producing two- or three-word sentences themselves. Finally, 
Santelmann & Jusczyk (1998) showed that 18-month-old infants are sensitive to non-
adjacent morpho-syntactic dependencies, but not 15-month-olds. Additionally, 
Gomez (2002) also showed that by 18 months, infants are able to detect non-adjacent 
dependencies in an artificial language. We chose to test 18-month-old infants because 
we supposed that although they are not producing “sentences”, they are able to 






4.1 Experiment 3 (Infant 1) 
 
4.1.1 Method  
Participants 
Infants were recruited via a mailing list. Fourteen infants, approximately 18 
months of age were tested (age range: 17 months 15 days to 19 months 9 days; mean: 
18 months 17 days). Eight additional infants were tested but excluded from analyses 
for the following reasons: crying (n = 4), inattentiveness (n = 3) and equipment 
failure (n = 1). The infants were randomly divided between two familiarization 
conditions. Half of the infants (n = 7) heard Grammar 1 as input during the 
familiarization period and the other half (n = 7) heard Grammar 2. Parental consent 
was obtained prior to testing, in accordance with the NIH standards for the ethical 
treatment of human subjects. 
 
Material 
The artificial languages used in this experiment were identical to the ones in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Just like in Experiment 1, the familiarization input included 
movement. The only difference was that 30 sentences, instead of 80 sentences, were 
picked as the presentation set. Two sentences (6.7%) were the canonical sentence 
type (ABCDE) in both grammars. The TP patterns of the presentation set are given in 
tables below. The sentence types and 30 sentences that appeared in the presentation 





Table 14: Transitional probabilities for 30 input sentences in Grammar 1 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 1.00 0.19 1.00 0.24 
Backward TP 1.00 0.24 1.00 0.26 
 
 
Table 15: Transitional probabilities for 30 input sentences in Grammar 2 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 0.28 1.00 0.17 1.00 
Backward TP 0.21 1.00 0.15 1.00 
 
 
Following Gomez & Gerken (1999), the 30 sentences were randomly grouped 
into six sets of 5 (henceforth “samples”). Using the same word tokens recorded for 
Experiments 1 and 2, the five sentences of each sample were concatenated in the 
Audacity sound editor with an isi of 1000 ms in a random order. Each familiarization 
sample was approximately 18 s in duration.  
Given its success in Experiments 1 and 2 and given the short attention span of 
infants, only the Movement Test was used here. In particular, CDEAB vs. DEABC 





(74) Movement test 
Grammatical in Grammar 1 Grammatical in Grammar 2  
Type Sentences Type Sentences 
Movement 
test 
1 CDEABCD JES SOT FAL 
KOF HOX 
DEABCBC SOT FAL KOF 
HOX JES 
 2  REL ZOR TAF 
DAZ NEB 
 ZOR TAF DAZ 
NEB REL 
 3  TID LUM RUD 
MER LEV 
 LUM RUD MER 
LEV TID 
 4  TID ZOR RUD 
MER NEB 




Two random orders were generated for each type (i.e., CDEAB and DEABC), 
resulting in four test samples (two Grammar 1-consistent and two Grammar 2-
consistent). The test sentences were concatenated in the same way as the presentation 
set in the Audacity sound editor with an isi of 1000 ms. Each test sample was 
approximately 14.6 s in duration.  
 
Procedure  
We used the head-turn preference procedure (Jusczyk & Aslin 1995, Kemler 
Nelson, Jusczyk, Mandel, Myers, Turk & Gerken 1995). Each infant was held on 
their parent’s lap. The parent was seated in a chair in the center of the test booth. 
Throughout the experiment, the parent listened to music on an iPod over Sennheiser 
PXC 250 noise canceling headphones with Sennheiser NoiseGard. There was a TV 
screen in the center front of the room and two flashing lights on each side of the 
sidewalls. There was also a loudspeaker under each sidelight.  
In order to familiarize the infant with the head-turn procedure, the experiment 




the TV screen in the front. When the infant looked at the TV screen, the picture 
disappeared and one of the sidelights began to flash. The side of the flashing light was 
determined randomly by a computer program each time. When the infant made a head 
turn of at least 30° in the direction of the flashing sidelight, the audio sample began to 
play and continued until its completion or until the infant failed to maintain the 30° 
head turn for 2 consecutive seconds. If the infant turned away briefly, but looked back 
again within 2 s, although the time spent looking away was not included in the count, 
the audio continued playing. The light kept flashing whenever a sample was playing. 
When the sample completed or the infant looked away for more than 2 s, the audio 
and the flashing light stopped and the centering picture appeared on the TV again. 
And the same procedure was repeated. 
A camera placed on top of the TV videotaped the infant. The experimenter 
watched the infant on a TV screen in the adjacent control room, but they could not 
hear any audio. The experimenter recorded the actions of the infant by pressing the 
buttons (center, right, left or away) using the computer program. Since the computer 
program randomly picked which sample to play each time and the experimenter could 
not hear any audio, they were always blind as to which sample was playing on a 
particular trial.  
The practice music trial lasted about 1 min. The familiarization phase began 
right after the music trial. During the familiarization, the maximum amount of time an 
infant was allowed to keep looking at a particular side was 40 s (“maximum block 
length”). The six acquisition samples were played in a random non-repeating order 




started without a break. If the infant looked away for more than 2 consecutive 
seconds, the language sample terminated even if this meant truncating a string in 
midstream. In that case, the same sample was played from where it was cut off in the 
next trial. Every infant accumulated a minimum of 70 s familiarization (“switch 
criterion”) before going on to the test phase. This amounts to approximately 19.5 
sentences. 
During the test phase, the four test samples were played in a random non-
repeating order. Here, the maximum block length was 90 s. The four samples were 
divided into two groups – Group 1 (Grammar 1-consistent) and Group 2 (Grammar 2-
consistent). During the test, there was no minimum length a child had to accumulate 
(i.e. no switch criterion), instead, Group 1 was played once and Group 2 was played 
once. Half of the infants heard Group 1 first and the other half heard Group 2 first. If 
the infant kept looking past the length of a sample (14.6 s), another sample from the 
same group started without a break. Unlike the acquisition phase, if the infant looked 
away for more than 2 consecutive seconds, that particular sample terminated and was 
never played again.  
The cycle of a familiarization phase and a test phase were repeated up to 3 
times. The procedure for the first cycle is as stated above. The second and third cycles 
were shorter in length in that the switch criterion was 35 s instead of 70 s. The test 
phase remained the same. If the infant got fussy or started crying, the experiment was 
stopped. If it stopped before it got to the test phase of the first cycle, that infant’s data 




the data was included up to that point. Therefore, among the included infants, the 
accumulated familiarization time could vary approximately from 70 s to 140 s.  
 
4.1.2 Hypotheses and predictions  
Unlike the adult experiments, because we cannot ask infants whether they 
think the test sentence is grammatical in the artificial language, what we have as a 
measure is looking times to the two test samples. Here, let us review our three 
hypotheses.  
 
Table 16: Table of hypotheses 
 Deductive power of learner Nature of predetermined 
representations 






Beyond what can be 
derived from observed 
distributions 
Limited by constraints 




Beyond what can be 
derived from observed 
distributions 
Unlimited by constraints 
found in natural language 
 
 
The first hypothesis, Limited Hypothesis is the most conservative hypothesis out of 
the three, since the generalization that is formed from the input is solely based on 
what was observed. In case of the movement test, the infants would assume that you 
can only move something that you have seen moved in the input. For example, if you 
had heard Grammar 1 during the familiarization, you have seen structures ABCDE 




sentences (CDEAB vs. DEABC), you would be able to tease them apart, because one 
of them (CDEAB) you have already seen and the other one has a structure that was 
never seen before.  
Hypothesis Two – Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis: The generalization 
the infants form is that you can move more than just what you saw moved in the input 
but it has to be a constituent in the artificial language. You cannot move non-
constituents. Under this hypothesis, infants would be able to tell apart the two test 
samples, since one moves a constituent while the other moves a non-constituent. This 
hypothesis predicts the same outcome as predicted by Limited Hypothesis but for 
different reasons. This hypothesis presupposes antecedently known knowledge, 
whereas the Limited Hypothesis does not involve such knowledge.  
Hypothesis Three – Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis: What infants 
learn from the input is that you can move any neighboring words. If this is the case, 
both test samples would be allowed since both have neighboring words moved to the 
front (CDE and DE). So at test, infants would equally listen to the two test samples.  
All of these three hypotheses are compatible with the input data that infants 
receive. Out of the three hypotheses, the only one that predicts a different outcome 
from the other two is Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis. The predictions of each 





Table 17: Predictions for Experiment 3 
 Views Predictions 
Limited Hypothesis Only the observed test 
sentences are grammatical  
Infants will show a 
difference in looking times 
Beyond and 
Constrained Hypothesis 
Only the consistent test 
sentences are grammatical 
Infants will show a 




Both test sentences are 
grammatical 
Infants will not show a 
difference in looking times 
 
 
4.1.3 Results and discussion  
The time that each infant oriented to the loudspeaker on each trial was 
recorded. Infants accumulated an average of 114.08 s acquisition time during the 
familiarization phase (range: 70.84 – 195.77 s). Four infants completed 3 cycles, 
another four infants completed 2 cycles and the rest did not complete more than 1 
cycle due to fussiness. Means of infants’ looking times during the test phase were 
computed separately for Group 1 and Group 2. For the infants who heard Grammar 1 
during the familiarization, samples in Group 1 were consistent with their learned 
grammar. Likewise, for infants who heard Grammar 2 as input, Group 2 was 
consistent with their input grammar. Consequently, for Grammar 1 infants, we coded 
the looking times to Group 1 as “consistent” and the looking times to Group 2 as 
“inconsistent”. For Grammar 2 infants, looking times to Group 1 was coded 
“inconsistent” and looking times to Group 2 was coded “consistent”.  
We first provide the data from just the first trial, since everyone completed the 
first trial, whereas not everyone completed the other two trials. The mean looking 




data from the infants whose looking time during the test phase was over 2.5 standard 
deviations from the mean was not included in the analyses. This eliminated the trial 
from one infant who looked at a side for over 37 s. The remaining infants in both 
conditions looked longer to the group that was inconsistent with their input grammar 
(mean = 8.50 s) than the group that was consistent with the input grammar (mean = 
4.12 s). This difference was significant in a two-tailed Paired Samples t-test (t(12) = -
2.423, p = 0.032, r = 0.57) and in a two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test (Z = -2.20, 
p = 0.028). 11 out of 13 infants had longer average looking times for the inconsistent 











Now we provide the results from all trials. For infants who completed more 
than one trial, the looking times were averaged. The mean looking time at either side 
during the test was 8.63 s (SD = 10.43). Again, the data from the infants whose 
looking time during the test phase was over 2.5 standard deviations from the mean 
was not included in the analyses. This eliminated three trials of two infants. The 
results show that infants in both conditions looked longer to the inconsistent samples 
(mean = 8.64 s) than the group that was consistent with the input grammar (mean = 
4.62 s). This difference was significant in a two-tailed Paired Samples t-test (t(13) = -
2.541, p = 0.025, r = 0.58) and in a two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test (Z = -2.23, 












Specifically, Grammar 1 infants listened longer to test sentences of the type 
DEABC (inconsistent) that they have never seen before than to CDEAB (consistent) 
which was already familiar to them. In the latter, CDE, which is a constituent in 
Grammar 1 is moved to the front of the sentence, while in the former, DE, which is 
not a constituent in Grammar 1 is moved. And vice versa for the infants in the 
Grammar 2 condition. This result suggests that infants showed a novelty preference. 
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to determine whether infants can learn the 
phrase structure on the basis of statistical information. After only 114 s (less than 2 
min) of exposure, infants distinguished samples that were consistent with their input 
grammar from those that were inconsistent with their input grammar, as reflected by 
significantly longer looking times to the inconsistent samples. Moreover, the fact that 
infants showed a novelty preference by listening longer to the inconsistent samples 
than the consistent sample at test tells us that they were familiarized with the artificial 
language very quickly and, by the time they got to the test phase, that the infants 
already had a well-established representation of the grammar so that new instances 
that were consistent with the grammar were not as interesting as new instances that 
were inconsistent with their established representation. Finally, the results of 
Experiment 3 indicate that 18-month-old infants can learn the phrase structure of an 
artificial language on the basis of statistical distribution without any prosodic or 
semantic information. This supports our claim that statistics can be one of the 




One alternative account for this result could be that the infants did not really 
have a hierarchical tree representation like we argue, but that they were simply 
noticing the chunks of constituents in the consistent (grammatical) test sentences. 
That is, in the consistent test sample, “good” transitions exist, meaning transitions 
from a category to another category that has been observed (i.e., constituents), 
whereas in the inconsistent test sample, “bad” transitions exist, meaning the transition 
from a category to another category that was not observed in the data (i.e., non-
constituents). One could argue that the results in this experiment could be attained if 
the participants were merely noticing the “good chunks” (constituents) versus “bad 
chunks” (non-constituents). While this is a relevant concern, it cannot have been the 
case. Take a look at the movement test sentences that we used. 
 
(75) Movement test 




There are two good chunks in CDEAB if the familiarization language was Grammar 
1, namely CD and AB. If your familiarization language was Grammar 2, then there 
are two good chunks in DEABC, namely DE and BC. What is important, however, is 
that there are good chunks of one grammar in the other grammar’s consistent test 
sentences as well. Put another way, the inconsistent test sample in your grammar 
always contains good chunks of your grammar too. For instance, if you were 




answer, too. If you were familiarized with Grammar 2, there is a good chunk (i.e., 
DE) in the G1-consistent answer. This is illustrated in Figure 39 below. Solid lines 
represent good chunks (i.e., constituents) in G1, and dotted lines represent 
constituents in G2. In this way, simply noticing the “chunks” would not achieve the 
results of this experiment, thus we can reject that alternative account.  
 
 
Figure 49: Number of “good chunks” vs. “bad chunks” 
Solid line represents good chunks for G1 and dotted line represents good chunks for G2 
 
 
Going back to our three hypotheses, the results from Experiment 3 are 
compatible with both Limited Hypothesis and Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis, 





Table 18: Predictions and outcomes for Experiment 3 
 Views Predictions Outcome 
Limited Hypothesis Only the observed test 
sentences are 
grammatical  
Infants will show a 






Only the consistent test 
sentences are 
grammatical 
Infants will show a 






Both test sentences are 
grammatical 
Infants will not show a 





Only the Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis predicted that infants would show no 
difference in looking times to the two test samples, however the infants did show a 
significant difference in looking times. Both Limited Hypothesis and Beyond and 
Constrained Hypothesis predicted this outcome, so at this point, we cannot determine 
which of these two hypotheses might be correct. The “consistent” test sample had a 
familiar structure to the infants and it had a moved constituent. The “inconsistent” test 
sample had an unfamiliar structure and it had a moved non-constituent. This is why 
the two hypotheses (Limited Hypothesis and Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis) 
predict the identical outcome. In the following experiments, we hope to tease these 






4.2 Experiment 4 (Infant 2) 
 
Experiment 4 is an attempt to replicate Experiment 3 (Infant 1) with 12-
month-old infants instead of 18-month-olds. Given that by the age of 12 months, 
infants are sensitive to statistical distributions in an artificial language generated by a 
finite state grammar (Gomez & Gerken, 1999; Saffran et al., 2008), we wanted to see 
whether infants younger than 18 months are also sensitive to the distributional 




Fifteen infants, approximately 12 months of age were tested (age range: 11;29 
– 13;13; mean: 12;22). Eighteen additional infants were tested but excluded from 
analyses for the following reasons: fidgeted and did not complete test (n = 16) and 
equipment failure (n = 2). The infants were randomly divided between two 
familiarization conditions. Half of the infants (n = 8) heard Grammar 1 as input 
during the familiarization period and the other half (n = 7) heard Grammar 2. Parental 
consent was obtained prior to testing, in accordance with the NIH standards for the 





Material and procedure  
The material (familiarization and test items) and the procedure (head-turn 
preference procedure) used in this experiment were identical to Experiment 3 (Infant 
1). 
 
4.2.2 Results and discussion  
The time that each infant oriented to the loudspeaker on each trial was 
recorded. Infants accumulated an average of 131.18 s of acquisition time during the 
familiarization phase (range: 78.78 – 183.41 s). Nine infants completed 3 cycles and 
six infants completed 2 cycles.  
For the infants who heard Grammar 1 during the familiarization, we coded the 
looking times to test items that were G1-consistent as “consistent” and the looking 
times to test items that were G2-consistent as “inconsistent”. Likewise, for infants 
who heard Grammar 2 during the familiarization, looking times to G2-consistent test 
items were coded “consistent” and looking times to G1-consistent test items were 
coded “inconsistent”.  
 We first provide the data from just the first trial, since everyone completed the 
first trial. The mean looking time at either side during the test was 7.99 s. The 
standard deviation was 7.53 s. The data from the infants whose looking time during 
the test phase was over 2.5 standard deviations from the mean was not included in the 
analyses. This eliminated the trial from two infants who looked at a side for over 30 s. 
The remaining thirteen infants looked at the “consistent” sample for the average of 




significant in a two-tailed paired samples t-test (t(12) = -1.484, r = 0.39, p = 0.164). 9 
out of 13 infants had longer average looking times for the inconsistent samples. 
  
 
Figure 50: Experiment 4 results of the first trial 
 
 
Now we provide the results from all trials. For infants who completed more 
than one trial, the looking times were averaged. The mean looking time at either side 
during the test was 8.42 s (SD = 9.70). Again, the data from the infants whose 
looking time during the test phase was over 2.5 standard deviations from the mean 
was not included in the analyses. This eliminated one trial of an infant. The results 
show that infants looked to the consistent samples for the average of 6.36 s, and to the 
inconsistent samples for the average of 7.06 s. This difference was not significant in a 
two-tailed Paired Samples t-test (t(14) = -0.49, r = 0.13, p = 0.631). 9 out of 15 






Figure 51: Experiment 4 results of all trials 
 
 
This experiment tried to replicate Experiment 3 (first infant experiment), 
using the same stimuli and procedure, with 12-month-old infants, however, the results 
were inconclusive. On average, the 12-month-olds had a slight tendency to look 
longer at the inconsistent samples just like the 18-month-olds, but the difference did 
not reach statistical significance. There could be a few possible causes for this null 
result.  
First possibility is that we did not run enough subjects, and had we run more 
infants, the difference might have reached significance. A power analysis revealed 
that in order to achieve a power of 0.8, we need to run 76 subjects in total. Thus, it is 
possible that if we run more subjects, we will obtain an effect.  
Second possibility is that the head-turn preference procedure might not have 
been suited for the infants of this age. We did lose more than half of the infants we 




the artificial languages used in our study were too boring or too complex for them to 
stay attentive. However, given the fact that past research (Gomez & Gerken 1999; 
Shady 1996; Saffran et al. 2008) was successfully conducted using this method 
indicates that this probably was not the biggest issue.  
Third, the stimuli could have been too complex and it might have been 
impossible for 12-month-olds to track this type of distributional information. The 
only cue to the structure was varying transitional probabilities between words within 
phrases and across phrases. Past studies have showen that much younger infants (8 
months) are capable of tracking transitional probabilities between syllables to learn 
word boundaries (Saffran et al. 1996a). In Saffran et al. (1996a), however, all that the 
infants had to do was figure out the word boundaries – there was no hierarchy 
involved in the input or the test items. All they had to do was track the linear 
distribution. Similarly, although the 12-month-olds successfully learned the syntactic 
system of an artificial language in Gomez & Gerken (1999) and Saffran et al. (2008), 
the artificial languages in those past studies did not necessarily involve hierarchy – 
the system could have been learned through tracking the linear word order. In both 
Gomez & Gerken (1999) and Saffran et al. (2008), the experimental results could 
have been achieved by infants learning finite state grammars. The infants in those 
studies did not need to have had a hierarchical representation of structure. On the 
other hand in our study, not only do infants have to track the distributions, they also 
have to build or map the abstract hierarchical phrase structure based on them. It could 
have been that the 12-month-old infants were too young to do that mapping, because 




type of statistics. What we speculate is that 12-month-olds require more exposure to 
allow them to draw relevant syntactic conclusions.  
 
 
4.3 Experiment 5 (Infant 3) 
 
In the previous infant experiments in this dissertation, the familiarization input 
included sentences created via movement rules. And at test, they were given two 
kinds of sentences – sentences in which a constituent in the input grammar was 
moved and sentences in which a non-constituent was moved. We are calling these 
consistent and inconsistent test samples respectively. The infants had seen the 
structure of the consistent test sentences in the input, although the exact word 
sequences were new. And the results of the first infant experiment indicate that the 
18-month-olds could at least differentiate the consistent and inconsistent test samples. 
However, because the structure of the consistent test items was already seen during 
the familiarization, it does not tell us whether infants can extend what they have 
learned to novel structures. More specifically, the results of Experiment 3 (Infant 1) 
were compatible with both Limited Hypothesis and Beyond and Constrained 
Hypothesis, since both predicted the identical outcome. This was because the 
“consistent” test sample in Experiment 3 (Infant 1) had a familiar structure to the 
infants and it had a moved constituent. The “inconsistent” test sample had an 
unfamiliar structure and it had a moved non-constituent. The Limited Hypothesis is 




and statistical learning does not interact with innate constraints. Beyond and 
Constrained Hypothesis, on the other hand, is the view that the acquired 
representations have deductive consequences beyond what can be derived from the 
observed statistical distributions. The results of Experiment 3 (Infant 1) do not 
support one or the other of the two. But given that this is the critical question in this 
dissertation, we would want to find a way to tell them apart. 
In this experiment, we will use something the infants have not seen in the 
input as test sentences. In particular, the input will include movement of some 
constituents, but during the test phase, we will present sentences that move different 
constituents than in the familiarization. If all they learn is entirely based on the input, 
they might not be able to differentiate the two test samples, because neither structure 
was seen in the input. On the other hand, if they could generalize beyond what was 
observed, then they may be able to differentiate what is linguistically possible, but 
novel, and what is linguistically impossible and novel. 
 
4.3.1 Method  
Participants 
 Twenty-four infants, approximately 18 months of age were tested (age range: 
17 months 6 days to 19 months 18 days; mean: 18 months 28 days). Seven additional 
infants were tested but excluded from analyses because of fussiness (n = 5) and 
equipment failure (n = 2). Parental consent was obtained prior to testing, in 






The artificial language and words used in this experiment were identical to 
Grammar 2 in the preceding infant experiments in this study. We only used Grammar 
2 in this experiment and not Grammar 1. The reasons for this will be explained in the 
following section where we talk about test sentences. The TP patterns of the 
presentation set are given in the table below.  
 
Table 19: Transitional probabilities for 30 input sentences in Experiment 5 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 0.28 1.00 0.17 1.00 
Backward TP 0.21 1.00 0.15 1.00 
 
Just like in previous infant experiments, the familiarization input included 
operations on constituents seen in natural languages like optionality, repetition, 
substitution by a pro-form, and most importantly, movement. However, only one 
constituent was moved in the familiarization set, namely DE. No other constituents 
were moved in the input. The following are PS trees for sentences in the artificial 





             
Figure 52: PS tree for a familiarization sentence without movement      
   
 
 




Notice that the movement rules in the familiarization front the constituent DE 
to the front (Figure 53). At test, we moved a different constituent (and non-




of 4 test items, which are shown below. None of the word sequences in all the test 
items appear in the familiarization set.  
 
(76) Test sentences in Experiment 5 
Grammatical Ungrammatical 
Type Sentences Type Sentences 
HOX JES KOF SOT FAL JES SOT KOF HOX FAL 
NEB REL DAZ ZOR TAF REL ZOR DAZ NEB TAF 
LEV TID MER LUM RUD TID LUM MER LEV RUD 
BCADE 
NEB TID MER ZOR RUD 
CDABE 










Figure 55: “Inconsistent” test sample  
 
 
In the test sentence of the structure BCADE, what is moved to the front is BC, 
which is a constituent in this artificial language. Since movement of a constituent is a 
possible rule in natural languages, this test sentence is consistent with constraints of 
natural language, and we will call this the “consistent” test sample. On the other hand, 
in the test sentence of the structure CDABE, what is moved is CD, which is not a 
constituent in this language. Because movement of a non-constituent is an impossible 
rule in natural languages, this test sentence violates constraints of natural languages, 
and we call this the “inconsistent” test sample.  
The test sentences were concatenated in the same way as the presentation set 
in the Audacity sound editor with an isi of 1000 ms. Each test sample was 




It should also be pointed out that in this experiment, we used only one 
artificial language (which is identical to Grammar 2 in previous experiments in this 
dissertation). The reason for this is because we needed a grammar in which two 
different constituents can be moved to the front. In Grammar 2 (the grammar used in 
this experiment), the canonical sentence is [[A[BC]][DE]]. There are two separate 
constituents that can be moved around – BC and DE. We needed to have two distinct 
constituents to be moved to the front, so that in the familiarization set, we can have 
one of them to move to the front, and at test, we can move the other constituent to 
move to the front.  
In Grammar 1, the canonical sentence is [AB][[CD]E]. In this grammar, CD 
(and CDE) can be moved to the front, but AB cannot. More specifically, you could 
move AB to the front, but it will not make any difference in terms of linear sound 
sequences and it is impossible to let the participants know that we intended to have 
moved AB to the front. That is why we did not use Grammar 1 in this experiment.  
 
Procedure  
 A slightly modified version of the head-turn preference procedure (Jusczyk & 
Aslin 1995, Kemler Nelson, et al. 1995) was used for this experiment. The difference 
between this and the other procedure is that in this procedure, the familiarization 
period was fixed (2 min) with a silent movie playing on the TV screen. This is the 
same procedure as the one reported in Gerken (2004, 2006), Gerken, Wilson & Lewis 




The reason we changed to this procedure is because we noticed when we ran 
previous experiments that a number of infants could not pay long enough attention to 
fully participate in the head-turn procedure during the familiarization. In regular 
head-turn preference experiments, infants must actively participate in the head-turn 
looking task even during the familiarization period, because the familiarization audio 
plays only when the infants look at the flashing light. Therefore, even though there is 
a minimum amount of familiarization time that all infants must accumulate, in a way, 
the familiarization phase is infant-controlled, and how much input they get depends 
on how attentive they are. Because of this, we noticed that a number of infants were 
not attentive enough to accumulate required amount of input and we were losing a lot 
of subjects this way.  
In the procedure for this experiment, each infant was held on their parent’s 
lap, while the parent was seated in a chair in the center of the testing booth. 
Throughout the experiment, the parent listened to music on an iPod over Sennheiser 
PXC 250 noise canceling headphones with Sennheiser NoiseGard. There was a TV 
screen in the center front of the room. During the familiarization period, infants 
watched a silent movie, while the audio input of the artificial language played 
continuously from the speakers for 2 solid minutes. The video used in this experiment 
was of dogs flying in slow motion. This way, every infant received an equal amount 
of familiarization time (2 min). 
After the familiarization phase, the test phase began. The test phase was 
basically the same as that of regular head-turn procedure. The only difference was 




getter. The test phase began by showing a colorful picture on the TV screen in the 
front. When the infant looked at the TV screen, the audio of one of the test samples 
started to play from the speakers, and continued until the infant failed to maintain the 
look at the TV screen for 2 consecutive seconds. If the infant turned away briefly, but 
looked back again within 2 s, although the time spent looking away was not included 
in the count, the audio continued playing. The colorful picture remained on the TV 
screen whenever a sample was playing. When the infant looked away for more than 2 
s, the audio stopped and the TV went blank. Then, the colorful picture appeared on 
the TV again and the same procedure was repeated for the other test sample. Which 
test sample (consistent or inconsistent with the input grammar) played first was 
randomly determined by a computer program each time.  
A camera placed on top of the TV videotaped the infant. The experimenter 
watched the infant on a TV screen in the adjacent control room, but they could not 
hear any audio. The experimenter recorded the actions of the infant by pressing the 
buttons (look or away) using the computer program. Since the computer program 
randomly picked which sample to play each time and the experimenter could not hear 
any audio, they were always blind as to which sample was playing on a particular 
trial. 
 
4.3.2 Hypotheses and predictions 
There are a few possible outcomes in this experiment. Hypothesis One 
(Limited Hypothesis): The most conservative hypothesis would be that the 




You can only move something that you have seen moved in the input. Specifically in 
this case, what infants learn from the familiarization input is that you can only move 
the constituent DE in this artificial language, and nothing else. Under this hypothesis, 
then both test samples would be considered illicit, because both have something that 
is not DE moved (BC and CD).  
Hypothesis Two (Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis): A less conservative 
hypothesis would be that it involves a more abstract generalization that goes beyond 
what was observed in the input. For instance, it might be hypothesized that what 
infants learn from this familiarization is that you can move constituents in the 
artificial language, but not non-constituents, which is compatible with the input they 
get. Under this hypothesis, infants would consider the “consistent” test sample to be 
licit, while the “inconsistent” test sample would be illicit. This is the hypothesis that 
is most compatible with what natural languages are like. That is because natural 
languages allow movement of a constituent but not of a non-constituent.  
Hypothesis Three (Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis): What infants 
learn from the input is that you can move any two neighboring words. This 
hypothesis is also compatible with the input data they receive. If this were the case, 
both test samples would be allowed since both have two neighboring words moved to 
the front (BC and CD). This is the most liberal hypothesis out of the three hypotheses 
in that it maximally allows what you can move. The three hypotheses are summarized 





Table 20: Table of hypotheses 
 Deductive power of learner Nature of predetermined 
representations 






Beyond what can be 
derived from observed 
distributions 
Limited by constraints 




Beyond what can be 
derived from observed 
distributions 
Unlimited by constraints 
found in natural language 
 
 
Because we cannot ask infants whether they think the test sentence is 
acceptable or grammatical in the artificial language or not, what we have as a 
measure is looking times to the two test samples. If Limited Hypothesis is correct, we 
should see no difference in looking times to the consistent or inconsistent samples, 
because both would be considered ungrammatical by the infants.  
If Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis is true, we would see a difference in 
looking times although we do not have a prediction as to which sample the infants 
would look longer at. One possibility is that they would look longer at the consistent 
test sample, because they think that is the “grammatical” sentence and it is compatible 
with the input grammar. On the other hand, they might look longer at the inconsistent 
test sample because that is the “ungrammatical” sentence which violates the structure 
of the input grammar.  Notice that both types of test samples are “novel” in this 
experiment, because both test samples involve a new structure that was not included 





If Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis is correct, the infants should show 
no difference in looking times, since both test samples would be considered licit. So 
only if Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis is correct should we see a difference in 
infants’ looking times. The predictions for each hypothesis are summarized in the 
following table.  
 
Table 21: Predictions for Experiment 5 
 Views Predictions 
Limited Hypothesis Both test sentences are 
ungrammatical 
Infants will not show a 




Only the consistent test 
sentences are grammatical 
Infants will show a 





Both test sentences are 
grammatical 
Infants will not show a 




4.3.3 Results and discussion  
The time that each infant oriented to the loudspeaker on each trial was 
recorded. All infants accumulated 2 min of acquisition time during the familiarization 
phase.  
There were two types of test sentences – BCADE and CDABE. BCADE 
involved movement of a novel constituent, so we will call it the “consistent” test 
sample in the following analyses. CDABE involved movement of a non-constituent, 




First, we report the results in terms of raw looking times. The mean looking 
time at either test sample was 17.66 s (SD = 19.73 s). The data from the infants 
whose looking time during the test phase was over 2.5 standard deviations from the 
mean was not included in the analyses. This eliminated trials from two infants who 
listened to a test sample for over 67 s. The remaining 22 infants, on average, looked 
longer to the inconsistent test sample (mean = 18.97 s) than the consistent test sample 
(mean = 10.16 s). This difference was significant in a two-tailed Paired Samples t-test 
(t(21) = -2.489, p = 0.021, r = 0.48) and in a two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test 
(Z = -2.451, p = 0.014). 17 out of 22 infants had longer average looking times for the 
inconsistent samples. This difference was significant in Sign Test (p = 0.017). 
 
 






 Next, we report the proportion of looking time to each test sample. This is 
because we found a major tendency of infants looking to the first sample presented to 
them during the test phase much longer than the second sample presented to them, 
regardless of their consistency to the input grammar (consistent or inconsistent). In 
particular, infants listened to the first test item on average for 22.26 s and to the 
second test item for 13.07 s (two-tailed Paired Samples t-test: t(23) = 1.784, p = 
0.088; two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test: Z = -1.943, p = 0.052). 
This tendency to look at the first sample presented to them longer is quite 
natural considering the setup. The infants first watch a silent movie for 2 minutes 
(while the artificial language plays from the speakers), then on the TV, a bright, 
colorful picture comes up which infants see for the first time. In this situation, it is 
expected that the infants get interested in the new picture and look at it for a long time 
the first time they see it.  
To avoid this tendency to influence the data of the results, we took the mean 
of each infant’s looking times to the first and second test items, then we calculated the 
looking times to the first and second test items as a proportion over the mean. The 
data from the infants whose looking time during the test phase was over 2.5 standard 
deviations from the mean was not included in the analyses. This eliminated trials 
from two infants who listened to a test sample for over 67 s. The remaining 22 
infants, on average, looked longer to the inconsistent test sample (mean = 1.267) than 
the consistent test sample (mean = 0.733). This difference was significant in a two-
tailed Paired Samples t-test (t(21) = -3.226, p = 0.004, r = 0.58) and in a two-tailed 




average looking times for the inconsistent samples. This difference was significant in 
Sign Test (p = 0.017). 
 
 
Figure 57: Experiment 5 results. Proportion of looking time over mean 
 
 
The results show that 18-month-old infants looked longer at the inconsistent 
test sample, even with the consideration for the effect of longer look time towards the 
first test item. These results suggest that the distributional information can be used to 
cue phrase structure and that the infants can distinguish sentences which moved novel 
constituents vs. sentences which moved novel non-constituents. 
Notice that the term “novelty” preference is not exactly accurate here, because 
both test samples were novel, and even the “consistent” test sample was never 




not seen in the input (see Figure 54 and Figure 55 above). In this experiment, the 
familiarization set included sentences derived via a movement rule, but only one 
constituent, namely DE, was moved in the input (DEABC). The “consistent” test item 
(BCADE) was derived by movement of a constituent in the input language, but that 
constituent had never been moved in the input. So the structure was still novel. The 
“inconsistent” test item (CDABE) was derived by movement of a non-constituent in 
the artificial language. The results indicate that infants could distinguish the two types 
of test samples and they were not simply choosing what they had seen before, but at 
the very least, they were doing something new.   
Furthermore, it should be noted here that this result could not have been 
obtained by a finite state grammar. The familiarization language in this experiment 
could be expressed by an FSA like the following. 
 
 






However, if you only have the FSA like the one above, it is impossible to tell apart 
the two test sentences – BCADE and CDABE. Neither test structure (consistent or 
inconsistent) is represented in this FSA. Therefore, the infants must have had a phrase 
structure representation of the artificial language in order for them to succeed.  
In terms of our three hypotheses, the predictions of the Limited Hypothesis 
and Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis were not borne out, since both hypotheses 
predicted no difference in infants’ looking times. This suggests that the generalization 
the infants formed based on the received input is not that you can only move the 
constituent DE in this language. Furthermore, the generalization formed cannot be 
that you can move any two neighboring words either. The results of this experiment 
are only compatible with Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis, which predicted that 
infants would show a difference in looking times between the two test samples. This 
suggests that the generalization the infants formed was you can move any constituent 
in the language but you cannot move non-constituents. This is the only conclusion 
that is compatible with the results of this experiment. 
 
Table 22: Predictions and outcomes for Experiment 5 
 Views Predictions Outcome 
Limited Hypothesis Both test sentences are 
ungrammatical 
Infants will not show 






Only the consistent test 
sentences are 
grammatical 
Infants will show a 






Both test sentences are 
grammatical 
Infants will not show 








In other words, at least at the end of the experiment, the infants knew that 
moving constituents is a possible operation in language, but not moving non-
constituents. If the infants have such general knowledge that moving constituents is 
allowed, they could extend that knowledge to allow movement of new constituents. 
But what is still unclear is where this knowledge came from. It could be that children 
knew this even before the familiarization period, or it could be that infants learned 
this general rule during the experiment. We will attempt to answer this question in 
our next experiment. More specifically, we will remove all the movement sentences 
from the familiarization input and test infants on the movement test (movement of a 
constituent vs. non-constituent). If the knowledge that you can only move a 
constituent is innate, then we would expect children to succeed at the task, whereas if 
the knowledge was acquired during the experiment and if the input information was 
necessary, then we would expect children to fail in the next experiment.  
 
 
4.4 Experiment 6 (Infant 4) 
 
The results of Experiment 5 (Infant 3) supported the Beyond and Constrained 
Hypothesis which indicates that infants formed a generalization that you can move a 
new element as long as it is a constituent. What is still unclear is that where that 
knowledge came from. Did infants form that generalization based on the knowledge 
they acquired during the 2-minute exposure to the artificial language? Or did they 




answer this question by removing all the movement sentences (just as we did in 
Experiment 2 (Adult 2)) and test them on movement test.  
There are a few possible outcomes. First possibility comes from a view that 
the input signal contains sufficient statistical regularities that guide the learner to 
arrive at the abstract representations (Elman et al. 1996; Bybee 1998; Tomasello 
2000). On this view, a learner does not come with preexisting linguistic symbolic 
component, and learners’ task is to collect and compile accurately predictive statistics 
from the data, thus the outcome of the learning is solely based on the observed input 
distributions. If this were the case, it is necessary to observe some constituent moving 
in the input to learn that you can move a constituent; consequently, we would expect 
infants to not be able to distinguish two test samples in this experiment.  
Second possibility comes from a view that learners use statistics to simply 
identify particular abstract syntactic representations (Miller & Chomsky 1963; Yang 
2006; Pearl 2007). On this view, the learner may come equipped with antecedent 
knowledge about possible linguistic structures and representations, and statistical 
learning interacts with that knowledge. Under this selective learning theory, the 
acquired representations have deductive consequences beyond what can be derived 
from the observed statistical distributions alone. If this were the case, it would not be 
necessary to have observed movement to learn that you can only move a constituent, 





4.4.1 Method  
Participants 
 Thirty-one infants, approximately 18 months of age were tested (age range: 17 
months 3 days to 19 months 13 days; mean: 18 months 10 days). Fourteen additional 
infants were tested but excluded from analyses because of fussiness (n = 11), crying 
(n = 2) and inattentiveness (n = 1). Parental consent was obtained prior to testing, in 
accordance with the NIH standards for the ethical treatment of human subjects. 
 
Material 
The same artificial grammars and words as in the previous experiments in this 
dissertation (Grammar 1 and Grammar 2) were used. The only difference was that all 
examples generated via movement rules were excluded from the familiarization. Just 
like in Experiment 3 (Infant 1), 30 sentences were picked as the presentation set. 
While the input lacked movement rules, it still included other manipulations such as 
repetition, optionality and substitution (by something other than pro-forms). In the 
Grammar 1 presentation set, one sentence (3.3%) was the canonical sentence type 
(ABCDE), three sentences (10%) involved substitution (ABF; i.e., the constituent 
CDE was replaced by F), six sentences (20%) involved repetition (ABCDECD) and 
twenty sentences (66.7%) involved both substitution and repetition (ABFCD; i.e., the 
constituent CDE was replaced by F and a constituent CD was added on the end). In 
the Grammar 2 presentation set, five sentences (16.7%) involved substitution (FDE; 
i.e., the constituent ABC was replaced by F), four sentences (13.3%) involved 




and repetition (FDEBC; i.e., the constituent ABC was replaced by F and a constituent 
BC was added on the end). These features contributed to make the TPs between 
words within phrases higher than the TPs across phrases. The resulting TP patterns of 
the presentation set are given below. All 30 sentences were randomized. The sentence 
types and 30 sentences that appeared in the presentation set are shown in Appendix E.  
 
Table 23: Transitional probabilities for 30 input sentences in Grammar 1 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 1.00 0.23 1.00 0.21 
Backward TP 1.00 0.21 1.00 1.00 
 
Table 24: Transitional probabilities for 30 input sentences in Grammar 2 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 1.00 1.00 0.14 1.00 
Backward TP 0.14 1.00 0.13 1.00 
 
 
Following Gomez & Gerken (1999), the 30 sentences were randomly grouped 
into six sets of 5 (henceforth “samples”). Using the same word tokens recorded for 
previous experiments, the five sentences of each sample were concatenated in the 
Audacity sound editor with an isi of 1000 ms in a random order. Each familiarization 
sample was approximately 17 s in duration.  
The test sentences were identical to the ones in Experiment 3 (Infant 1). That 
is, only the movement test was used here as well, namely CDEAB vs. DEABC. The 





(77) Movement test 
Grammatical in Grammar 1 Grammatical in Grammar 2  
Type Sentences Type Sentences 
Movement 
test 
1 CDEAB JES SOT FAL KOF 
HOX 
DEABC SOT FAL KOF 
HOX JES 
 2  REL ZOR TAF DAZ 
NEB 
 ZOR TAF DAZ 
NEB REL 
 3  TID LUM RUD 
MER LEV 
 LUM RUD MER 
LEV TID 
 4  TID ZOR RUD 
MER NEB 




Two random orders were generated for each type (i.e., CDEAB and DEABC), 
resulting in four test samples (two Grammar 1-consistent and two Grammar 2-
consistent). The test sentences were concatenated in the same way as the presentation 
set in the Audacity sound editor with an isi of 1000 ms. Each test sample was 
approximately 14.6 s in duration.  
It should be noted here that the exposure sentences could be generated by 
finite state grammars, like the following.  
 
 







Figure 60: FSA for familiarization sentences of Grammar 2 in Experiment 6 
 
 
But it should also be noted that these FSAs cannot generate the test sentences. Both 




 The procedure we used in this experiment was identical to Experiment 5 
(Infant 3) with fixed familiarization period. It was a slightly modified version of the 
head-turn preference procedure (Gerken 2004, 2006; Gerken, Wilson & Lewis 2005; 
Gerken & Bolt 2008) in that during the familiarization phase, the audio stimuli played 
continuously for 2 minutes while a silent movie (with moving laser lights) played on 
the TV screen. The main difference between this procedure and the regular head-turn 
procedure is that the familiarization phase is not infant-controlled here. The reason 
for this is so we would not lose so much data due to lack of attention and interest of 
the infants during the familiarization phase. The infants participate in the head turning 






4.4.2 Hypotheses and predictions 
Let us review our three hypotheses. Hypothesis One (Limited Hypothesis): 
The generalization that the infants form is entirely based on the observed input, and 
the learners are not equipped with preexisting linguistic knowledge about possible 
structures (Elman et al. 1996; Bybee 1998; Tomasello 2000). 
Hypothesis Two (Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis): A learner is equipped 
with preexisting knowledge about possible structures, and statistics is merely used as 
a source of information that helps a learner select the correct grammar that derives the 
matching surface strings. Under this selective learning theory, the acquired 
representations have deductive consequences beyond what can be derived from the 
observed statistical distributions alone. This hypothesis proposes that learners’ 
generalization extends to novel structures, as long as they are compatible with 
antecedently known constraints. An example of an antecedently known constraint 
would be something like movement of a constituent, which is a natural rule in 
languages. 
Hypothesis Three (Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis): Learners 
generalize beyond what they see in the input but their generalizations are not 
necessarily constrained in a predictable way. An example of this might be something 
like movement of a non-constituent, which is unnatural in natural languages, but if a 
learner is unconstrained, this is a logical possibility. The three hypotheses are 





Table 25: Table of hypotheses 
 Deductive power of learner Nature of predetermined 
representations 






Beyond what can be 
derived from observed 
distributions 
Limited by constraints 




Beyond what can be 
derived from observed 
distributions 
Unlimited by constraints 
found in natural language 
 
 
In this experiment, we removed all the sentences generated by movement 
rules from the familiarization set, which means that the test sentences have novel 
structures that were not seen in the input. According to the Limited Hypothesis, 
learners do not generalize beyond what was observed in the input. So at test, when 
they see two novel structures – one that moved a constituent and one that moved a 
non-constituent – they would consider both to be illicit, because neither was seen in 
the input. Thus, the performance should be at chance.  
According to Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis, learners generalize beyond 
the observed input, but their generalizations are restricted in a principled way. For 
instance, learners might have the knowledge that you cannot move a non-constituent 
in language. If this is the case, on the movement test, the participants would allow the 
“consistent” test sentence in which a constituent was moved, but they would not 
allow the “inconsistent” test sentence in which a non-constituent was moved, because 





According to Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis, learners’ generalizations 
could go beyond what was observed in the input and those generalizations do not 
have to be constrained in a principled way. For example, one generalization the 
learners could form is that you can move any neighboring elements. If this is the case, 
on the movement test, learners might allow both test structures even though they are 
both novel, because both test sentences move neighboring words. If so, both test 
sentences would be licit for the learners and the performance at test would be at 
chance, that is, the learners would not choose one over the other. 
Because we cannot ask infants whether they consider the test sentence to be 
grammatical or acceptable, what we measure is their looking times toward each test 
type. If Limited Hypothesis was correct, we should see no difference in looking times 
to the consistent or inconsistent samples, because both would be considered 
ungrammatical by the infants.  
If Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis is correct, we would see a difference in 
looking times although we do not have a particular prediction as to which sample the 
infants would look longer at. One possibility is that they would look longer at the 
consistent test sample, because they think that is the “grammatical” sentence and it is 
compatible with the input grammar. On the other hand, they might look longer at the 
inconsistent test sample because that is the “ungrammatical” sentence which violates 
the structure of the input grammar. In Experiment 3 (Infant 1), the infants showed a 
novelty preference and looked longer at the “inconsistent” test sample. We suggested 
that that could have been due to the fact that infants were familiarized by the input 




to the new, more surprising sentences. However, this could have been due to the fact 
that in Experiment 3 (Infant 1), the structures of the “consistent” test sentences had 
already appeared in the familiarization phase, which strengthens the possibility that 
the infants were bored with the familiar structures and were more intrigued by the 
new structures. In this experiment, however, both test structures are novel, so the 
infants might not behave the same way they did in Experiment 3.   
If Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis is correct, the infants should show 
no difference in looking times, since both test samples would be considered licit. So 
only if Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis is correct, we should see a difference in 
infants’ looking times. The predictions of each hypothesis are summarized in the 
following table.  
 
Table 26: Predictions for Experiment 6 
 Views Predictions 
Limited Hypothesis Both test sentences are 
ungrammatical 
Infants will not show a 




Only the consistent test 
sentences are grammatical 
Infants will show a 





Both test sentences are 
grammatical 
Infants will not show a 




4.4.3 Results and discussion  
The time that each infant oriented to the loudspeaker on each trial was 




phase. Just like in Experiment 3 (Infant 1), for the infants who heard Grammar 1 
during the familiarization, we coded the looking times to “grammatical in G1” test 
sample as “consistent” and the looking times to “grammatical in G2” as 
“inconsistent”. Likewise, for infants who were familiarized with Grammar 2, looking 
times to grammatical-in-G2 test sample were coded “consistent” and looking times to 
grammatical-in-G1 test sample were coded “inconsistent”.  
We report the results in terms of raw looking times. The mean looking time at 
either test sample was 13.5 s (SD = 11.3 s). The data from the infants whose looking 
time during the test phase was over 3 standard deviations from the mean was not 
included in the analyses. This eliminated trials from two infants who listened to a test 
sample for over 47 s. In addition, the data from the infants whose looking time during 
the test phase was shorter than 3 s was also excluded from the analyses, on the 
reasoning that less than 3 s is not an adequate amount of time to hear enough 
sentences to make a decision about the structure of the artificial language. This 
eliminated trials from four infants. The remaining 25 infants, on average, looked 
longer to the consistent test sample (mean = 15.08 s) than the inconsistent test sample 
(mean = 10.70 s). This difference was significant in a two-tailed Paired Samples t-test 
(t(24) = 2.096, p = 0.047, r = 0.39). 15 out of 25 infants had longer average looking 






Figure 61: Experiment 6 results 
 
 
The results show that 18-month-old infants looked longer at the consistent test 
sample than to the inconsistent test sample. These results suggest that the infants are 
sensitive to the transitional probabilities as a cue to the hierarchical phrase structure 
and that the infants can distinguish sentences that moved constituents vs. sentences 
that moved non-constituents in the input grammar. Just like in Experiment 5 (Infant 
3), the term “novelty preference” is not appropriate here either because both test 
samples involved novel structures. In this experiment, the infants listened longer to 
the consistent sample, but even the consistent test sample involved a structure the 
infants had never seen before.  
If we were to speculate about reasons for this result, one could argue that the 




sentence in the artificial grammar. On the other hand, in the previous experiments 
(Experiments 3 & 5), the infants listened significantly longer at the inconsistent test 
samples, meaning they listened longer at the ungrammatical sentences. This 
experiment is the only experiment in this dissertation in which the infants showed a 
longer looking time to the consistent test sample. One thing that is different between 
this experiment and all the other infant experiments is that since the input lacked 
movement and substitution by proforms sentences, the number of sentence types of 
the input was much smaller than in other experiments. For example, in Experiment 3 
(Infant 1) and Experiment 5 (Infant 3), there were 15 sentence types in the input, 
whereas in this experiment, there were only 4 sentence types in Grammar 1 input and 
only 3 sentence types in Grammar 2 input. Therefore, it is possible that infants in 
previous experiments were bored with their artificial grammar by the time that the 
familiarization period ended, but the infants in this experiment were more interested 
in seeing the different sentence types of their grammar.  
Another possible reason for infants looking longer at the consistent sample is 
that, unlike previous experiments, even the consistent test structures were novel 
sample in this experiment. In Experiment 3 (Infant 1), the actual word strings of test 
sentences were novel, but the structures were not. But in this experiment, even the 
structures of grammatical test sentences were new, so that could be why infants were 
more interested in them.  
Recall that the exposure sentences in this experiment could be generated by 
finite state grammars as in Figure 59 and Figure 60. Importantly, however, the results 




is because those FSAs cannot generate the test sentences. If you only have the FSAs 
like the ones above, it is impossible to tell apart the two test structures – BCADE and 
CDABE. Neither test structure (consistent or inconsistent) is represented in this FSA. 
Therefore, the infants must have had a phrase structure representation of the artificial 
language in order for them to succeed. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
study showing infants learning of a hierarchical phrase structure instead of a finite 
state grammar.  
One alternative account for this result could be that the infants did not really 
have a hierarchical tree representation like we argue, but that they were simply 
noticing the chunks of constituents in the consistent (grammatical) test sentences. 
That is, in the consistent test sample, “good” transitions exist, meaning transitions 
from a category to another category that has been observed (i.e., constituents), 
whereas in the inconsistent test sample, “bad” transitions exist, meaning the transition 
from a category to another category that was not observed in the data (i.e., non-
constituents). One could argue that the results in this experiment could be attained if 
the participants were merely noticing the “good chunks” (constituents) versus “bad 
chunks” (non-constituents). While this is a relevant concern, it cannot have been the 
case. Take a look at the movement test sentences that we used. 
 
(78) Movement test 







There are two good chunks in CDEAB if the familiarization language was Grammar 
1, namely CD and AB. If your familiarization language was Grammar 2, then there 
are two good chunks in DEABC, namely DE and BC. What is important, however, is 
that there are good chunks of one grammar in the other grammar’s consistent test 
sentences as well. Put another way, the inconsistent test sample in your grammar 
always contains good chunks of your grammar too. For instance, if you were 
familiarized with Grammar 1, there is a good chunk (i.e., AB) in the G2-consistent 
answer, too. If you were familiarized with Grammar 2, there is a good chunk (i.e., 
DE) in the G1-consistent answer. This is illustrated in Figure 39 below. Solid lines 
represent good chunks (i.e., constituents) in G1, and dotted lines represent 
constituents in G2.  
 
 
Figure 62: Number of “good chunks” vs. “bad chunks” 
Solid line represents good chunks for G1 and dotted line represents good chunks for G2 
 
 
In this way, simply noticing the “chunks” would not achieve the results of this 
experiment, thus we can reject that alternative account. Furthermore, even if you did 
notice “good chunks” (constituents), that knowledge alone cannot give this result. 




asymmetry between moved constituents and moved non-constituents. You also need 
to know that only movement of constituents is possible and not non-constituents. In 
sum, you need two things to achieve the results in this experiment. One, you need to 
know constituency in the given sentence, and two, you need to have had a preexisting 
knowledge that moving non-constituents is an impossible rule.  
In terms of the three hypotheses, again only the predictions of Beyond and 
Constrained Hypothesis were borne out. Both Limited Hypothesis and Beyond and 
Unconstrained Hypothesis predicted that the infants would show no difference in 
looking times, so neither of their predictions were borne out. Beyond and Constrained 
Hypothesis was the only hypothesis that predicted a difference in infants’ looking 
times between the two test samples. This suggests that the generalization the infants 
form is not limited to what they saw during the familiarization and that the infants 
form a generalization that goes beyond the observed input. It also suggests that the 
generalization the infants form is not unconstrained in that they did not hypothesize 
that you can move any neighboring elements. The fact that the infants showed a 
difference in looking times (regardless of which one they listened longer to) indicate 
that they could at least distinguish the test samples that moved constituents vs. test 
samples that moved non-constituents. If statistical learning interacts with nothing but 
the presented distributional information, both test samples would be considered illicit, 
since both are new. The infants must have had a prior knowledge to help them 
distinguish the two test samples. But if that prior knowledge was that you can move 
any neighboring elements (which is not the case in natural language), then the infants 




samples moved neighboring elements. One natural conclusion is that the infants knew 
that constituents can be moved, but not non-constituents, which is the case in natural 
language. And this is what was predicted by Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis, 
which states that infants’ generalization is not restricted to the input distributions, but 
it interacts with innate knowledge on what is a possible operation and what is an 
impossible operation in natural language.  
 
Table 27: Predictions and outcomes for Experiment 6 
 Views Predictions Outcome 
Limited Hypothesis Both test sentences are 
ungrammatical 
Infants will not show 






Only the consistent test 
sentences are 
grammatical 
Infants will show a 






Both test sentences are 
grammatical 
Infants will not show 





A question that was left unanswered by Experiment 5 (Infant 3) was where 
such knowledge came from. Was that knowledge known prior to the experiment or 
was it learned based on the familiarization set in the experiment? The results of this 
experiment suggest that it could not have been learned during the experiment because 
there were no movement sentences in the input in this experiment. In addition, simply 
representing constituency or simply having a hierarchical structure does not provide 
any information about what can and cannot be moved. The fact that infants were able 
to distinguish the two test structures that were both novel suggest that 18-month-old 




this supports the view that learners come equipped with antecedent knowledge about 
possible linguistic structures and that the learners have deductive power that goes 




Chapter 5: Experiment 7 (Simple Recurrent Network 
Simulations) 
 
In this chapter, we will present a series of neural network simulations with 
Simple Recurrent Networks (SRN) on the artificial language learning task. SRNs 
have been proposed to be able to learn a number of different aspects of human 
language, including syntax (Elman, et al. 1996; Elman 1991, 1993, Rohde & Plaut 
1999). Recall that the results of Experiment 2 (Adult 2) and Experiment 6 (Infant 4) 
showed that even in the absence of movement sentences in the input, human adults 
and infants still could distinguish sentences in which constituents were moved vs. 
sentences in which non-constituents were moved. In other words, adults and infants 
were able to generalize beyond the observed input. From these results, we inferred 
that that knowledge must have been known antecedently because it could not have 
arisen from the input. Therefore, it would be interesting to see if learners can form the 
same generalization in the absence of such innate knowledge.  
As Elman (1991) states: 
 
“[In the connectionist approach], tasks must be devised in which the 
abstract linguistic representations do not play an explicit role. The 
model’s inputs and output targets are limited to variables which are 
directly observable in the environment. This is a more naturalistic 




forms for communicative purposes rather than to do linguistic 
analysis… The value of this approach is that it need not depend on 
preexisintg preconceptions about what the abstract linguistic 
representations are. Instead, the connectionist model can be seen as a 
mechanism for gaining new theoretical insight.” 
 
Connectionism is an approach that tries to explain language acquisition without 
children having abstract linguistic knowledge (Elman et al. 1996). Simple Recurrent 
Network is a computational model that is claimed to reflect cognitive processing. 
SRNs have no inherent assumption about linguistic representation or structure, and 
yet, SRNs are proposed to successfully acquire language without innate, linguistic 
specific mechanisms (Rohde & Plaut 1999). We carried out the network simulations 
because we were interested in whether SRNs could learn to generalize beyond input, 
and whether structure could really follow from experience alone. 
 
5.1. Method 
We used the simulation software called LENS (Rohde 1999) for all the 
simulations reported below.  
 
The architecture of the network 
Simple Recurrent Network of the type proposed in Elman (1990) was used in 
these simulations. The basic structure of the network is shown in Figure 63, and the 










Figure 64: Structure of the network used in the simulaitons 
 
 
The network had four layers: an input layer, a hidden layer, a context layer 
and an output layer. Our input and output layers consisted of 21 nodes each. The 




layers are feed-forward layers that are connected uni-directionally as in Figure 63. 
The hidden layer and the context layer are connected bi-directionally. That is, the 
activations of the hidden layer at one time step are copied into the context layer, 
which then can feed into the hidden layer as inputs at the next time step. In this way, 
the context layer works as a one-step state memory.  
The activation levels of hidden and output nodes are computed as the sum of 
all the activations values of every unit, squashed by the logistic function. The training 
was done by adjusting the weights to minimize the sum of squared error between the 
word predicted by the network and the target next word, using the back-propagation 
learning procedure, similarly to what is reported in Elman (1991) and Rohde & Plaut 
(1999). The network’s task at test was to correctly predict the next word. 
The input grammars for the network were identical to Grammar 1 and 
Grammar 2 that were used for the adult and infant experiments. In particular, the 
same 80 sentences that were used for adult experiments were chosen here as input. 
Either Grammar 1 or Grammar 2 was fed as input. During the training of the network, 
one word was presented at a time. One epoch of 80 sentences were used during the 
training of the network, and the criteria for terminating learning was going through 
those 80 sentences. We chose the criteria of 80 sentences because those were the 
identical 80 sentences as the ones used in our adult experiments.  
There were four input conditions: in the first condition, the network was 
trained on Grammar 1 as input and the input included movement sentences (just like 
in Experiment 1 (Adult 1)). We will call this condition G1-Train-Mvmt. In the second 




sentences (G2-Train-Mvmt). The TP patterns of the input for these two conditions are 
given below.  
 
Table 28: Transitional probabilities for 80 input sentences in G1-Train-Mvmt 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 1.00 0.24 1.00 0.25 
Backward TP 1.00 0.19 1.00 0.34 
 
Table 29: Transitional probabilities for 80 input sentences in G2-Train-Mvmt 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 0.33 1.00 0.15 1.00 
Backward TP 0.18 1.00 0.16 1.00 
 
 
In the third condition, the network was fed Grammar 1 as input but the input lacked 
any movement sentences (just like in Experiment 2 (Adult 2)). We will call this 
condition G1-Train-NoMvmt. Similarly, in the fourth condition, the network was fed 
Grammar 2 as input but the input lacked movement sentences (G2-Train-NoMvmt). 
The TP patterns of those conditions are listed below. 
 
Table 30: Transitional probabilities for 80 input sentences in G1-Train-NoMvmt 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 1.00 0.28 1.00 0.24 
Backward TP 1.00 0.24 1.00 1.00 
 
Table 31: Transitional probabilities for 80 input sentences in G2-Train-NoMvmt 
 A-B B-C C-D D-E 
Forward TP 1.00 1.00 0.22 1.00 






At test, we presented the movement test sentences (the same 16 sentences 
used for the movement test in Experiments 1 and 2 (Adult1 & 2)).  
 
Grammatical in Grammar 1 Grammatical in Grammar 2  
Types Sentences Types Sentences 
Movement 
test 
1 CDEAB JES SOT FAL 
KOF HOX 
DEABC SOT FAL KOF 
HOX JES 
 2  REL ZOR TAF 
DAZ NEB 
 ZOR TAF DAZ 
NEB REL 
 3  TID LUM RUD 
MER LEV 
 LUM RUD MER 
LEV TID 
 4  TID ZOR RUD 
MER NEB 
 ZOR RUD MER 
NEB TID 
      
 5 FAB KER KOF HOX DEF SOT FAL KER 
 6  NAV DAZ NEB  ZOR TAF NAV 
 7  SIB MER LEV  LUM RUD SIB 
 8  NAV MER NEB  ZOR RUD NAV 
      
 9 CDEABCD JES SOT FAL 
KOF HOX JES 
SOT 
DEABCBC SOT FAL KOF 
HOX JES HOX 
JES 
 10  REL ZOR TAF 
DAZ NEB REL 
ZOR 
 ZOR TAF DAZ 
NEB REL NEB 
REL 
 11  TID LUM RUD 
MER LEV TID 
LUM 
 LUM RUD MER 
LEV TID LEV 
TID 
 12  TID ZOR RUD 
MER NEB TID 
ZOR 
 ZOR RUD MER 
NEB TID NEB 
TID 
      
 13 FABCD KER KOF HOX 
JES SOT 
DEFBC SOT FAL KER 
HOX JES 
 14  NAV DAZ NEB 
REL ZOR 
 ZOR TAF NAV 
NEB REL 
 15  SIB MER LEV 
TID LUM 
 LUM RUD SIB 
LEV TID 
 16  NAV MER NEB 
TID ZOR 







We presented the network with 16 movement test sentences that are grammatical in 
Grammar 1 and further 16 movement sentences that are grammatical in Grammar 2, 
regardless of the input grammar and input condition. That is, no matter which 
grammar the network was fed as input (G1 or G2), both test types (G1-compatible or 
G2-compatible) were used for all the simulations. The network gets 16 test sentences 
as input, and they produce probability of the following word as output. The prediction 
was that if the network did learn the artificial language, it should assign higher 
probabilities to the test sentences that are consistent with their input grammar. 
 
5.2. Results and discussion 
We carried out a whole set of simulations with a range of training parameters, 
since we were unsure which parameter setting worked the best. The two parameters 
we varied are the batch size and the learning rate, because we had no a priori 
prediction as to which setting of these parameters would achieve the optimal learning. 
A batch size is the number of examples the network processes before it updates the 
weights of the links during the training. For example, a batch size of 10 means that 
the network updates weights of the links each time it process 10 examples. In this 
experiment, the batch size was varied from 19 to 59 with an interval of 10 (i.e., 19, 
29, 39, 49, 59). Learning rate is the scale of how radical that weight change is. Bigger 
learning rate indicates that the weight change can be dramatic, while a small learning 
rate means the weight changes are small. The learning rate here was varied from 




Although these values seem smaller than what is generally used, they are close to the 
learning rate of 0.01 used in Lewis & Elman (2001). Additionally, smaller learning 
rates than ours have been used before, as in the learning rates ranging between 0.004 
and 0.0003, reported in Rohde & Plaut (1999). In sum, we carried out 25 (5 x 5) 
different simulations for each condition, thus 100 (25 x 4) simulations altogether. 
It should also be noted that in each simulation, we carried out 10 runs with the 
same parameter setting. The network outputs the probability of each word in test 
sentences. First, we took the product of the probabilities of all the words in each test 
sentence. Then we took the average probability of those 16 test sentences. Since it is 
the product of the probabilities, the numbers were extremely small, we therefore 
computed the log of those numbers, for all 10 runs. We then took the average of those 
10 runs, giving an average probability for G1 test sentences and G2 test sentences. 
We then took the ratio of those two numbers (G1/G2), which is the dependent 
variable used in the analyses below. 
In omnibus ANCOVA (ratio ~ batch size * learning rate * input condition), 
the covariate, batch size, was not significantly related to the ratio of probabilities 
(F(1, 99) = 0.032, p = 0.858), neither was the covariate, learning rate (F(1, 99) = 0.03, 
p = 0.955). There was no interaction of the batch size and the learning rate either 
(F(1, 99) = 0.184, p = 0.669). This suggests that varying the batch size or the learning 
rate did not have an effect on the output probabilities the network produced. The only 





In a one-way ANOVA (ratio ~ input condition), there was a significant effect 
of input condition on the ratio of probabilities (F(3, 99) = 3.431, p = 0.02). Post-hoc 
tests revealed that the only pair that differed significantly from each other was G1-
Train-Mvmt condition and G2-Train-Mvmt condition (Tukey HSD: p = 0.023; 
Bonferroni: p = 0.026). This effect is driven by the high ratio of the G2-Train-Mvmt 
condition (Mean = 1.026; Figure 65).  
 
 































Looking within each combination of batch size and learning (i.e., each point 
in the above graphs), none of the simulations in the G1-Train-Mvmt condition and 
G1-Train-No Mvmt condition yielded a significant difference for the probabilities for 
G1 test sentences and G2 test sentences. In other words, in the simulations in which 
the network received G1 as input, the mean probabilities the network assigned for G1 
test sentences were never significantly higher than the mean probabilities the network 
assigned for G2 test sentences, regardless of whether the input contained movement 
sentences or not (for an example, see Figure 70). That is, the SRN failed to learn the 




these numbers are log probabilities, a larger negative log number indicates a larger 
probability (i.e., -4.3 signifies a larger probability than -4.45). 
 
 




When the SRN received G2 with movement sentences as input (i.e., G2-Train-
Mvmt condition; Figure 68), there were three settings of the two parameters in which 
the network achieved a successful learning. There are the three settings that achieved 
the most successful learning in the condition that included movement. Therefore, by 
choosing these settings for the following comparisons, we are giving the model the 




G2-Train-No Mvmt condition; Figure 69) of all of these three settings failed to learn 
the artificial grammar.  
Specifically, in one combination with the batch size of 49 and the learning rate 
of 0.009 (Figure 71), in the G2-Train-Mvmt condition, the mean log probabilities for 
G2 test sentences (Mean = -4.220) were significantly higher than the mean log 
probabilities for G1 test sentences (Mean = -4.527) in a two-tailed Paired Samples t-
test (t(9) = -2.651, p = 0.026). On the other hand, with the same setting in G2-Train-
No Mvmt condition, the mean log probabilities for G2 test sentences (Mean = -4.546) 
were not significantly higher than the mean log probabilities for G1 test sentences 
(Mean = -4.640) in a two-tailed Paired Samples t-test (t(9) = -1.401, p = 0.195). Note 
again that since these numbers are log probabilities, a larger negative log number 






Figure 71: G2-Train condition simulations with batch size 49 and learning rate 0.009 
 
 
With another setting of the batch size 19 and the learning rate 0.007, in the 
G2-Train-Mvmt condition, the mean log probabilities for G2 test sentences (Mean = -
4.251) were significantly higher than the mean log probabilities for G1 test sentences 
(Mean = -4.560) in a two-tailed Paired Samples t-test (t(9) = -2.872, p = 0.018). But 
again, with the same setting in G2-Train-No Mvmt condition, the mean log 
probabilities for G2 test sentences (Mean = -4.450) were not significantly higher than 
the mean log probabilities for G1 test sentences (Mean = -4.637) in a two-tailed 
Paired Samples t-test (t(9) = -2.149, p = 0.060).  
With the combination of batch size 59 and learning rate 0.009, in the G2-




4.276) were significantly higher than the mean log probabilities for G1 test sentences 
(Mean = -4.534) in a two-tailed Paired Samples t-test (t(9) = -2.799, p = 0.021). With 
the same setting in G2-Train-No Mvmt condition, however, the mean log 
probabilities for G2 test sentences (Mean = -4.583) were not significantly higher than 
the mean log probabilities for G1 test sentences (Mean = -4.722) in a two-tailed 
Paired Samples t-test (t(9) = -1.177, p = 0.269).  
In sum, all the parameter settings with which the network successfully learned 
the artificial grammar in the condition where the input included movement, the 
network with the identical settings failed to learn when the input lacked movement 
sentences. Even though we gave the models best chance to succeed by choosing the 
most successful settings, the model with the same settings still failed to learn in the 
No Movement condition. Furthermore, the opposite was also true. That is, the setting 
that achieved the most successful learning in the No Movement condition did not 
achieve a successful learning in the Movement condition counterpart. We will look at 
this analysis below.  
There was only one setting in which the network was successful even when 
the input lacked movement sentences. That was combination of batch size 29 and 
learning rate 0.003 in the G2-Train-No Mvmt condition (Figure 72), and the mean log 
probabilities for G2 test sentences (Mean = -4.434) were significantly higher than the 
mean log probabilities for G1 test sentences (Mean = -4.729) in a two-tailed Paired 
Samples t-test (t(9) = -2.642, p = 0.027). However, with the same setting in the G2-
Train-Mvmt condition, the network failed to learn the artificial language. The the 




higher than the mean log probabilities for G1 test sentences (Mean = -4.340) in a two-
tailed Paired Samples t-test (t(9) = -0.141, p = 0.891). 
 
 
Figure 72: G2-Train condition simulations with batch size 29 and learning rate 0.003 
 
 
To summarize, with the settings at which the SRN successfully learned the 
grammar with movement sentences in the input, it failed to learn when the input did 
not include movement. This indicates that based on the peaks and dips in the 
transitional probabilities, the SRN correctly figured out the constituency of the 
sentences, thus successfully predicting the consistent grammar at test in the 
movement-in-the-input cases. But, since SRNs do not have any assumption about 




movement of constituents), when the input lacks movement, they failed to predict 
upcoming words at test. This suggests that networks cannot extend what they learned 
from the environment to novel structures, and that the generalization they form does 
not go beyond the observed input. This result strengthens our claim from Experiment 
6 (Infant 4) that infants’ knowledge that only constituents can be moved was known 
antecedently.  
However, we also have results of the SRN seemingly succeeding in learning 
the artificial language when the input lacked movement sentences. But in this case, 
the network failed to learn the language when the input included movement. This 
result is harder to interpret, since it is unclear why the network can assign high 
probabilities to the consistent but never-seen-before structures while it fails to assign 
high probabilities to the consistent structures they have seen before. In the latter case, 
it should be so easy to distinguish the consistent and inconsistent grammars that we 
can only conclude that the network must not have learned the grammar at all in this 
case.  
In any case, what is clear is that the neural networks do not act the same way 
as human infants do in our experiments. Human infants were able to distinguish the 
two different artificial languages with or without movement sentences in the input. 
The results from the simulations do not reflect how infants performed in our 
experiments. Infants were successful regardless of whether the input included 
movement or not. Because we have a single case where the network correctly 
assigned higher probabilities to the consistent test sentences than to the inconsistent 




from these simulations is that human infants must have some knowledge that the 
networks do not have, which helped the infants generalize beyond the input when 




Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
Traditionally in language acquisition, nativism and empiricism have been 
characterized as two opposing views that do not need each other. But we suggested 
that both nature and nurture need each other. The question is how the two interact, 
what is innate and what is learned from the input. The two might play different roles 
in language acquisition – innate knowledge specifies range of possible grammars and 
structures, while statistical learning is a method for mapping the surface string to 
abstract representation. This dissertation was examined how the environment interacts 
with the structure of the learner.  
The main questions in this dissertation were what the deductive consequences 
of distributional learning are, and whether the representations are part of the learning 
system prior to the experience. Is statistical learning entirely a product of tracking and 
summarizing the surface distributions? Or is it an interaction of tracking the 
distributions and innate knowledge that the learners already have? In order to 
investigate these questions, this dissertation focused on the acquisition of phrase 
structure as a case study.  
Hierarchical representation is a hallmark of natural language syntax and 
phrasal constituency plays a fundamental role in any syntactic operation, since all 
syntactic operations refer to and manipulate it. A child might come with innate 




optional NP” but that is not sufficient. That knowledge alone does not prevent a child 
from having an incorrect tree representation of a sentence, as in Figure 73.  
 
 
Figure 73: An incorrect tree 
 
 
Since words, word order and grammatical rules differ from language to language, 
there must also be a mechanism that guides the child to the correct phrase structure 
representation of sentences for a particular language (Fodor 1966; Pinker 1984; 
Grimshaw 1981; Chomsky 1981; Macnamara 1982). A difficulty is constituency and 
phrase structure are highly abstract notions and the input to a child does not come 
marked with obvious labels or brackets signaling the constituency. Several different 
kinds of information were proposed to be perceptually available to a prelinguistic 
learner, including prosody (Gleitman & Wanner 1982; Gleitman, Gleitman, Landau 
& Wanner 1988; Morgan 1986), meaning (Pinker 1984; Grimshaw 1981; Macnamara 





In Chapter 2, we reviewed past studies that investigated infants’ sensitivity to 
the prosodic, semantic and distributional information as a cue to syntactic structures. 
We saw that infants are in fact sensitive to these cues, but also that none of these cues 
is completely sufficient on its own. For example, there are cases where there exists a 
mismatch between phonological and syntactic phrases and between syntax and 
semantics. In those cases, learners could be misled and misparse the sentence. What 
we propose is that infants make use of a combination of all these cues. And one 
particular type of cue we investigated in this dissertation was distributional 
information. 
 Thompson & Newport (2007) showed that adults can learn the phrase 
structure of a miniature artificial language on the basis of transitional probability 
patterns. What has not been shown in Thompson & Newport (2007), however, is 
whether transitional probability can signal hierarchically nested structures. So our 
more specific question in this dissertation was: can infants infer hierarchical phrase 
structure on the basis of statistical distribution?  
We can summarize our research questions as follows:  
 
(79) What are the deductive consequences of distributional learning?  
(80) Are representations a part of the learning system prior to the experience? 
(81) Is statistical learning entirely a product of tracking and summarizing the 
surface distributions? Or is it an interaction of tracking the distributions and 
innate knowledge that the learners already have? 




of statistical distribution? 
(83) Can infants learn phrase structure of an artificial language without any 
prosodic or semantic information? 
 
To answer those questions, we designed and carried out seven original 
experiments. We created two minimally different artificial languages that differed 
only in constituency. These two grammars (Grammar 1 and Grammar 2) were used 
throughout all seven experiments.  
 
 







Figure 75: PS tree of the basic Grammar 2 sentence  
 
 
In the experiments, the participants listened to either Grammar 1 or Grammar 
2 during the familiarization/training period. At test, they were presented with two 
types of test sentence. One type was called the “consistent” sample and these were the 
test sentences that are grammatical in their input grammar. The other was called the 
“inconsistent” sample and they were the test sentences that are ungrammatical in their 
input grammar. One of the tests was movement test, whose consistent test sample had 
a constituent in the input language moved to the front, while the inconsistent test 
sample in the movement test would have a non-constituent moved to the front. What 
we were looking for was which test sample the participants would choose, listen 
longer to, or assign higher probabilities to (in case of network simulations).  
There were three kinds of familiarization set. One had all kinds of sentences 
generated by all the operations, including movement and substitution rules 
(Experiment 1, Experiment 3, Experiment 4, Experiment 7). The other kind excluded 




proforms (Experiment 2, Experiment 6, Experiment 7). The final type included 
movement sentences but the structure of the movement sentences in the input and 
movement sentences of the test were different (Experiment 5).  
Three specific hypotheses were presented for these experiments. Hypothesis 
One (Limited Hypothesis): The generalization that the infants form is entirely based 
on the observed input, and the learners are not equipped with preexisting linguistic 
knowledge about possible structures (Elman et al. 1996; Bybee 1998; Tomasello 
2000). This hypothesis corresponds to the purely statistical learning theory.   
Hypothesis Two (Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis): A learner is equipped 
with preexisting knowledge about possible structures, and statistics are merely used 
as a source of information that helps a learner select the correct grammar that derives 
the matching surface strings. Under this selective learning theory, the acquired 
representations have deductive consequences beyond what can be derived from the 
observed statistical distributions alone. This hypothesis proposes that learners’ 
generalization extends to novel structures, as long as they are compatible with 
antecedently known constraints. An example of an antecedently known constraint 
would be something like movement of a constituent, which is a natural rule in 
languages. 
Hypothesis Three (Beyond and Unconstrained Hypothesis): Learners 
generalize beyond what they see in the input but their generalizations are not 
necessarily constrained in a predictable way. An example of this might be something 




learner is unconstrained, this is a logical possibility. The three hypotheses are 
summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 32: Table of hypotheses 
 Deductive power of learner Nature of predetermined 
representations 






Beyond what can be 
derived from observed 
distributions 
Limited by constraints 




Beyond what can be 
derived from observed 
distributions 
Unlimited by constraints 
found in natural language 
 
 
General predictions for the purely statistical approach (Limited Hypothesis) and the 
approach in which statistics interacts with innate knowledge (Beyond and 
Constrained Hypothesis) are listed below (Except from Lust, 2006). 
 
(84) Predictions of a purely statistical approach 
i. Learners have a direct relation to input data 
ii. No universal linguistic constraints are predicted (e.g., no structure dependence) 
iii. Only randomly, if at all, attend to parametric variations of language 
iv. Not creative but highly imitative; generalizations should only be based on 
perceived forms or analogy 





(85) Predictions of an approach in which nativism and statistics interact 
i. Learners have an indirect relation to input data 
ii. Be constrained in language acquisition 
iii. Be structure dependent from the beginning, and attend to the parameters of 
language variation 
iv. Be creative, i.e., go beyond the stimuli, and not simply copy 
v. Not offend universals shown across natural languages  
 
 The results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 (where the input included 
movement sentences) supported predictions made by both Limited Hypothesis and 
Beyond and Constrained Hypothesis, while rejecting the predictions made by Beyond 
and Unconstrained Hypothesis. From these results, we can rule out Beyond and 
Unconstrained Hypothesis, and we can be confident that a learner does not make a 
generalization that is impossible in natural languages, even if that generalization is 
compatible with the input data. The results of Experiment 5 (in which the exposure 
data included movement of one constituent and the subjects were tested on movement 
of a different constituent) revealed that Limited Hypothesis as well as Beyond and 
Unconstrained Hypothesis cannot be correct. The results of Experiment 5 indicate 
that the generalization the infants form is not entirely based on the statistical 
distribution observed, but it goes beyond that, and that it must be a combination of the 
observed input and the knowledge of some constraints. This further supports Beyond 
and Constrained Hypothesis. What was left unclear was where such knowledge came 




infants already knew it. The results of Experiment 2, Experiment 6 and Experiment 7 
(in which the exposure data lacked movement sentences) support the idea that the 
infants already knew the constraint that you can only move constituents prior to the 
experiment, but the neural networks do not.  
 In other words, the predictions made by an approach that combines statistical 
learning with innate knowledge were born out.  
 
(86) Predictions of an approach in which nativism and statistics interact 
i. Learners have an indirect relation to input data 
 Learners learned the input data, but were also able to generalize the 
knowledge that was beyond the input data. 
ii. Be constrained in language acquisition 
 The learners’ generalization were constrained, not unconstrained, even 
when the input data were compatible with the unconstrained hypothesis. 
iii. Be structure dependent from the beginning, and attend to the parameters of 
language variation 
 Learners knew that you can only move constituents and not non-
constituents. What learners learned can only be described in a phrase 
structural representation, and cannot be attributed to learning of linear 
order or some other low-level regularities.  
iv. Be creative, i.e., go beyond the stimuli, and not simply copy 
 The generalizations the learners formed went beyond the stimuli, in that 




of a non-constituent is impossible even in the absence of any movement 
in the stimuli. 
v. Not offend universals shown across natural languages  
 In all natural languages, movement of a non-constituent is not a possible 
rule. Learners in our experiments adhered to this. 
 
Now, we can answer our research questions. 
 
(87) What are the deductive consequences of distributional learning?  
 Learners have a deductive power that goes beyond the input data. 
(88) Are representations a part of the learning system prior to the experience? 
 Learners have a preexisting knowledge about what is and is not possible 
in movement rules. This knowledge cannot have been learned 
discovered from the exposure data, therefore it must have been known 
prior to the experiment.  
(89) Is statistical learning entirely a product of tracking and summarizing the 
surface distributions? Or is it an interaction of tracking the distributions and 
innate knowledge that the learners already have? 
 The results of these experiments cannot have been explained if the 
learning is solely based on tracking and summarizing the surface 
distributions. They can only be explained if the statistical learning 
interacts with preexisting linguistic knowledge of the learner. 




of statistical distribution? 
 The results confirm that transitional probabilities can be a cue to not 
only phrasal groupings but also nested constituent structure. The only 
cue to constituency in the artificial languages was transitional 
probabilities. Participants were sensitive to the distributional 
information that signaled internally nested structure. 
(91) Can infants learn phrase structure of an artificial language without any 
prosodic or semantic information? 
 Artificial languages in these experiments lacked prosodic and semantic 
cues to phrasal boundaries. And yet, the participants were able to learn 
the structure of a sentence without relying on prosody or meanings.  
 
To sum up, the current findings suggest that, in addition to cues such as 
prosody, morphology and semantics, transitional probability is another additional cue 
to phrase structure. The experimental results in this dissertation suggest that the 
transitional probability can be a cue to not only the phrasal bracketing but also 
hierarchical constituent structure. More importantly, the results of Experiments 2 and 
6 showed that movement in the input is not required to learn that only constituents 
can undergo movement. Crucially, knowing the constituency of the language alone 
does not guarantee that you know only constituents can be moved. That is, the 
constraint on movement does not automatically follow from constituent structure. 
And our experiments showed that even when the learners were only given the 




moved. In other words, they did not need to have seen movement in the input to know 
the constraint on movement, which suggests that they knew the constraint already.  
Finally, these results suggest that learners can project what they have learned 
based on the distributional information to novel structures they have not yet seen. 
Importantly, however, such projection to new structures occurred only within and not 
outside the realms of what is allowed in natural language. This provides novel 
evidence that statistical learning interacts with innate constraints on possible 
representations and rules. In particular, we wish to have shown a way in which the 
two (innate knowledge and statistical learning) interact. If learning was only based on 
the statistical distributions, it might help you correctly identify constituent structure of 
sentences, but it does not ensure the constraint on movement. Thus, we suggest that 
statistics are used only as a path into inherently known abstract representations. The 
learners have a deductive power that goes beyond the input stimuli, which suggests 
that statistical learning is used merely as a method for mapping the surface string to 
abstract representation, and that learners are constrained by innate knowledge that 






Appendix A: Familiarization sentences for Experiment 1 (Adult 1) and Experiment 7 
(SRN Simulations) 
Sentence types (numbers in parentheses indicate number of times used in the 
familiarization)  
 
Grammar 1  Grammar 2  
et E  ib C D (3) A B C D E et (2) 
A B C D E et (1) A  et D E (2) 
C D E  ib (1) D E F B C (11) 
A B C D E (2) A B C D E (2) 
F A B C D (4) D E F et (3) 
A B  et E et (2) ib F et (1) 
ib  et E et (2) ib A et B C (1) 
A B  et E (2) ib A B C B C (1) 
ib  et E C D (2) D E F (2) 
F  ib (1) A B C D E B C (7) 
A B  et E C D (13) ib A et (1) 
ib F C D (5) F D E et (1) 
et E  ib (1) D E A et et (1) 
C D E A B et (2) ib F B C (2) 
A B C D EC D (1) D E A B C B C (1) 
et E A B (2) D E A et B C (12) 
F  ib C D (2) ib F (1) 
A B F (2) A  et D E B C (6) 
F  ib  et (1) A  et D E et (2) 
ib F (1) D E A et (1) 
F A B (2) F  ib B C (3) 
C D E  ib et (1) F D E B C (16) 
C D E  ib C D (2) A  et ib et (1) 
C D E A B (4)   
ib C D E C D (3)   
A B F C D (11)   
et E  ib et (1)   
A B F  et (1)   










Familiarization sentences  
 
Grammar 1 Grammar 2 
DAZ HOX REL LUM FAL DAZ HOX REL LUM FAL 
DAZ HOX REL LUM TAF DAZ HOX REL LUM TAF 
 et TAF  ib TID SOT LUM FAL MER  et LEV JES 
 et FAL  ib JES LUM LUM TAF NAV NEB JES 
KOF LEV  et RUD TID SOT SOT RUD DAZ  et 
DAZ HOX NAV  ib KOF  et HOX REL 
NAV  ib TID SOT NAV LUM TAF LEV REL 
TID SOT TAF  ib JES LUM NAV SOT RUD HOX REL 
SIB MER HOX SOT RUD DAZ  et HOX TID 
KOF LEV  et RUD  et SOT RUD DAZ  et  et 
DAZ LEV NAV  et NAV ZOR FAL LEV JES 
NAV  ib  et  ib KER LEV REL 
TID SOT TAF  ib  et LUM TAF DAZ  et LEV JES 
 et RUD MER HOX REL LUM SOT TAF NAV 
DAZ HOX NAV TID SOT ZOR FAL KOF  et HOX TID 
 ib KER TID SOT SOT RUD SIB HOX REL 
SIB DAZ HOX SIB LUM TAF LEV JES 
DAZ LEV NAV ZOR FAL NAV LEV REL 
 ib NAV JES LUM SOT TAF NAV  et 
KOF LEV JES ZOR FAL  et ZOR FAL KER LEV JES 
MER HOX TID SOT RUD REL LUM DAZ LEV JES ZOR FAL LEV REL 
JES ZOR FAL MER HOX  et SOT TAF MER  et HOX REL 
MER HOX NAV JES LUM KOF  et LUM FAL 
 et RUD MER HOX REL SOT MER  et ZOR FAL 
MER HOX  et FAL SOT TAF KER HOX REL 
REL LUM TAF  ib JES ZOR  ib KER 
DAZ HOX  et FAL SOT RUD MER  et LEV JES 
KOF NEB  et TAF REL SOT  ib MER  et 
KOF NEB  et TAF JES LUM ZOR FAL NAV 
 ib  et TAF REL SOT DAZ LEV JES ZOR FAL HOX REL 
NAV  ib REL SOT SIB ZOR FAL  et 
 et TAF KOF LEV LUM TAF KOF  et NEB JES 
 et FAL KOF NEB JES ZOR DAZ  et LUM FAL HOX TID 
REL SOT RUD  ib KER ZOR FAL HOX REL 
DAZ HOX  et FAL REL LUM NAV LUM FAL LEV REL 
 ib TID SOT RUD REL SOT NAV SOT TAF LEV REL 
REL SOT TAF KOF NEB MER HOX TID SOT RUD HOX REL 
DAZ LEV NAV TID SOT LUM TAF KOF  et LEV JES 
REL LUM FAL KOF LEV ZOR FAL NAV LEV JES 




DAZ LEV SIB JES LUM LUM FAL DAZ  et LEV JES 
 ib JES LUM FAL TID SOT SIB  ib HOX REL 
KER DAZ HOX REL LUM  ib NAV HOX TID 
NAV DAZ LEV REL SOT SIB ZOR FAL LEV REL 
REL SOT TAF KOF NEB  et ZOR FAL SIB HOX REL 
NAV  ib  ib MER HOX TID HOX REL 
 ib  et FAL REL SOT KER SOT RUD HOX REL 
MER HOX SIB JES LUM MER HOX TID SOT TAF LEV REL 
DAZ LEV  et TAF TID SOT KOF  et LUM TAF NEB JES 
DAZ LEV SIB REL LUM ZOR FAL KER NEB JES 
MER HOX  et RUD TID SOT SIB LUM FAL LEV REL 
 et TAF DAZ LEV KOF  et SOT RUD  et 
DAZ LEV NAV JES LUM ZOR FAL NAV NEB JES 
 et RUD  ib REL SOT ZOR FAL DAZ  et LEV REL 
REL SOT TAF DAZ LEV SOT TAF KER  et 
KOF NEB  et TAF  et LUM FAL DAZ  et HOX TID 
KER MER HOX REL LUM DAZ  et ZOR FAL HOX REL 
DAZ HOX NAV REL SOT DAZ HOX TID SOT TAF LEV JES 
 ib KER REL SOT SOT RUD KER NEB JES 
 et FAL  ib  et KOF LEV REL LUM TAF HOX REL 
DAZ LEV  et FAL JES ZOR DAZ  et LUM TAF HOX REL 
 et TAF  ib LUM TAF MER  et LEV REL 
 ib SIB MER  et LUM TAF  et 
DAZ LEV  et FAL TID SOT NAV SOT TAF HOX TID 
 et RUD KOF LEV JES ZOR LUM FAL NAV HOX TID 
 et TAF MER HOX TID SOT DAZ HOX REL SOT TAF LEV JES 
DAZ HOX KER REL LUM KOF LEV REL SOT TAF  et 
 ib KER JES LUM  ib SIB  et 
KER DAZ LEV REL SOT ZOR FAL DAZ LEV REL HOX REL 
DAZ HOX  et TAF JES LUM NAV SOT TAF LEV JES 
DAZ HOX KER REL SOT NAV LUM FAL LEV JES 
 ib  et TAF  et MER  et LUM FAL NEB JES 
DAZ LEV KER TID SOT MER HOX REL SOT RUD  et 
 ib JES LUM TAF JES LUM MER  et  ib  et 
 ib  et RUD  et SIB LUM TAF HOX REL 
DAZ LEV  et RUD REL SOT KER  ib LEV JES 
 ib NAV REL LUM SOT RUD SIB  et 
KOF NEB  et FAL REL LUM KER SOT TAF LEV REL 
JES ZOR FAL DAZ LEV NAV  ib LEV REL 







Appendix B: Familiarization sentences for Experiment 2 (Adult 2) and Experiment 7 
(SRN Simulations) 
Sentence types (numbers in parentheses indicate number of times used in the 
familiarization)  
 
Grammar 1 Grammar 2 
A B F         (9) A B C D E        (3) 
A B C D E     (3) F D E             (10) 
A B C D E C D  (19) A B C D E B C    (16) 





Grammar 1 Grammar 2 
DAZ HOX SIB JES LUM KER LUM TAF HOX TID 
DAZ LEV SIB REL LUM KER SOT TAF HOX REL 
MER HOX KER JES LUM NAV ZOR FAL HOX TID 
DAZ LEV KER REL LUM NAV SOT RUD NEB JES 
KOF LEV KER NAV SOT TAF LEV JES 
MER HOX KER REL SOT NAV LUM TAF HOX TID 
KOF NEB KER SIB SOT TAF 
MER HOX SIB TID SOT NAV ZOR FAL 
DAZ LEV SIB REL SOT NAV LUM FAL NEB JES 
MER HOX KER TID SOT KER ZOR FAL LEV REL 
DAZ HOX SIB TID SOT SIB SOT TAF NEB JES 
KOF NEB NAV JES LUM KER ZOR FAL HOX REL 
KOF NEB JES LUM TAF JES LUM SIB SOT RUD HOX TID 
KOF NEB KER JES ZOR SIB LUM FAL LEV REL 
KOF NEB SIB JES LUM KER ZOR FAL 
DAZ HOX KER REL LUM NAV SOT RUD LEV JES 
DAZ LEV SIB JES LUM KER SOT RUD NEB JES 
DAZ LEV KER SIB SOT RUD LEV REL 
DAZ HOX TID SOT TAF REL LUM KER LUM TAF NEB JES 
KOF NEB KER REL SOT SIB ZOR FAL LEV REL 
DAZ LEV REL SOT TAF REL SOT NAV LUM FAL HOX REL 
KOF NEB SIB REL SOT KER SOT TAF LEV REL 
DAZ HOX KER DAZ LEV REL LUM TAF 
MER HOX KER JES ZOR NAV LUM FAL 
MER HOX TID SOT TAF JES ZOR KER LUM TAF HOX REL 
KOF NEB NAV TID SOT SIB SOT TAF HOX REL 
DAZ HOX KER REL SOT SIB SOT RUD LEV JES 
DAZ LEV KER JES LUM DAZ LEV JES LUM FAL NEB JES 




KOF LEV NAV JES ZOR KER LUM TAF LEV JES 
DAZ LEV REL LUM TAF TID SOT KER ZOR FAL HOX TID 
DAZ HOX KER JES ZOR KER LUM FAL LEV JES 
KOF LEV SIB TID SOT SIB LUM FAL LEV JES 
KOF LEV KER JES ZOR NAV SOT TAF 
MER HOX TID SOT TAF REL SOT SIB LUM TAF NEB JES 
MER HOX NAV TID SOT SIB SOT TAF LEV JES 
KOF NEB NAV REL LUM KER LUM FAL HOX TID 
DAZ HOX REL LUM TAF JES LUM NAV LUM TAF HOX REL 
DAZ LEV SIB TID SOT MER HOX REL LUM TAF HOX REL 
KOF LEV REL LUM TAF KOF LEV JES LUM FAL HOX TID 
MER HOX NAV JES LUM KER LUM FAL NEB JES 
DAZ LEV KER TID SOT DAZ HOX TID SOT RUD HOX TID 
DAZ HOX KER TID SOT KOF NEB JES LUM FAL HOX TID 
MER HOX SIB REL LUM KER SOT RUD HOX TID 
KOF NEB SIB REL LUM KER SOT TAF 
KOF NEB SIB TID SOT KER SOT RUD HOX REL 
DAZ HOX REL SOT TAF SIB LUM FAL HOX REL 
DAZ HOX SIB REL LUM KER SOT RUD LEV REL 
KOF LEV SIB REL SOT SIB LUM TAF HOX TID 
KOF LEV NAV NAV ZOR FAL LEV JES 
MER HOX NAV JES ZOR DAZ LEV REL SOT TAF LEV JES 
MER HOX TID SOT RUD SIB ZOR FAL HOX REL 
DAZ LEV NAV REL SOT SIB LUM TAF LEV REL 
DAZ LEV NAV JES LUM DAZ HOX REL SOT TAF LEV JES 
KOF LEV KER REL SOT SIB SOT RUD NEB JES 
DAZ HOX NAV NAV SOT RUD HOX REL 
DAZ LEV NAV JES ZOR NAV SOT TAF HOX TID 
KOF LEV NAV REL SOT KER ZOR FAL LEV JES 
KOF NEB KER REL LUM DAZ LEV REL SOT RUD LEV JES 
KOF NEB JES ZOR FAL TID SOT DAZ HOX TID SOT RUD HOX REL 
KOF LEV KER JES LUM SIB ZOR FAL 
DAZ HOX REL SOT TAF JES LUM SIB LUM FAL 
DAZ LEV KER REL SOT MER HOX REL SOT RUD HOX TID 
MER HOX SIB NAV SOT RUD LEV REL 
MER HOX SIB REL SOT KER ZOR FAL NEB JES 
DAZ LEV REL LUM TAF JES ZOR NAV LUM TAF LEV REL 
KOF NEB JES LUM FAL JES ZOR KOF LEV REL LUM FAL 
KOF NEB JES LUM FAL TID SOT KER LUM FAL 
MER HOX NAV REL SOT KOF LEV REL LUM TAF 
DAZ LEV REL SOT RUD REL LUM KOF NEB JES LUM FAL HOX REL 
DAZ LEV JES LUM TAF REL LUM KOF LEV JES LUM TAF HOX REL 
KOF LEV NAV TID SOT NAV LUM TAF LEV JES 
DAZ LEV REL SOT RUD REL SOT DAZ LEV JES ZOR FAL HOX REL 
DAZ HOX SIB DAZ LEV JES LUM TAF NEB JES 




KOF LEV SIB SIB SOT RUD 
DAZ HOX REL LUM FAL JES ZOR NAV ZOR FAL NEB JES 
MER HOX TID SOT RUD REL LUM NAV LUM TAF NEB JES 
KOF LEV REL LUM FAL TID SOT MER HOX REL LUM TAF NEB JES 
MER HOX REL LUM FAL JES LUM KOF LEV REL LUM FAL LEV JES 
 
 
Appendix C: Test items for Experiments 1 & 2 (Adult 1 & 2)  
 
Grammatical in Grammar 1 Grammatical in Grammar 2  
Types Sentences Types Sentences 
Fragment test 1 AB KOF HOX BC NEB REL 
 2  DAZ NEB  LEV TID 
 3  MER LEV  HOX JES 
 4  MER NEB  NEB TID 
      
 5 CD JES SOT DE SOT FAL 
 6  REL ZOR  ZOR TAF 
 7  TID LUM  LUM RUD 
 8  TID ZOR  ZOR RUD 
      
 9 CDE JES SOT FAL ABC KOF HOX JES 
 10  REL ZOR TAF  DAZ NEB 
REL 
 11  TID LUM 
RUD 
 MER LEV TID 
 12  TID ZOR RUD  MER NEB TID 
      
 13 ABF KOF HOX 
KER 
FDE KER SOT FAL 
 14  DAZ NEB 
NAV 
 NAV ZOR 
TAF 
 15  MER LEV SIB  SIB LUM 
RUD 
 16  MER NEB 
NAV 
 NAV ZOR 
RUD 
      
Movement test 17 CDEAB JES SOT FAL 
KOF HOX 
DEABC SOT FAL KOF 
HOX JES 
 18  REL ZOR TAF 
DAZ NEB 
 ZOR TAF 
DAZ NEB 
REL 
 19  TID LUM 
RUD MER 
 LUM RUD 





 20  TID ZOR RUD 
MER NEB 
 ZOR RUD 
MER NEB TID 
      
 21 FAB KER KOF 
HOX 
DEF SOT FAL KER 
 22  NAV DAZ 
NEB 
 ZOR TAF 
NAV 
 23  SIB MER LEV  LUM RUD 
SIB 
 24  NAV MER 
NEB 
 ZOR RUD 
NAV 
      
 25 CDEABCD JES SOT FAL 
KOF HOX JES 
SOT 
DEABCBC SOT FAL KOF 
HOX JES 
HOX JES 
 26  REL ZOR TAF 
DAZ NEB 
REL ZOR 
 ZOR TAF 
DAZ NEB 
REL NEB REL 
 27  TID LUM 
RUD MER 
LEV TID LUM 
 LUM RUD 
MER LEV TID 
LEV TID 
 28  TID ZOR RUD 
MER NEB TID 
ZOR 
 ZOR RUD 
MER NEB TID 
NEB TID 
      
 29 FABCD KER KOF 
HOX JES SOT 
DEFBC SOT FAL KER 
HOX JES 
 30  NAV DAZ 
NEB REL ZOR 
 ZOR TAF 
NAV NEB 
REL 
 31  SIB MER LEV 
TID LUM 
 LUM RUD 
SIB LEV TID 
 32  NAV MER 
NEB TID ZOR 
 ZOR RUD 
NAV NEB TID 
      
Substitution test 33 ib CDE ib JES SOT 
FAL 
ABC ib KOF HOX JES 
ib 
 34  ib REL ZOR 
TAF 
 DAZ NEB 
REL ib 
 35  ib TID LUM 
RUD 
 MER LEV TID 
ib 
 36  ib TID ZOR 
RUD 
 MER NEB TID 
ib 
      





 38  DAZ NEB et 
TAF 
 DAZ et ZOR 
TAF 
 39  MER LEV et 
RUD 
 MER et LUM 
RUD 
 40  MER NEB et 
RUD 
 MER et ZOR 
RUD 
      
 41 ib et E ib et FAL A et ib KOF et ib  
 42  ib et TAF  DAZ et ib  
 43  ib et RUD  MER et ib  
 44  ib et RUD  MER et ib  
      
Movement-plus-
substitution test 
45 CDE ib JES SOT FAL 
ib 
ib ABC ib KOF HOX 
JES 
 46  REL ZOR TAF 
ib 
 ib DAZ NEB 
REL 
 47  TID LUM 
RUD ib 
 ib MER LEV 
TID 
 48  TID ZOR RUD 
ib 
 ib MER NEB 
TID 
      
 49 et EAB et FAL KOF 
HOX 
DEA et SOT FAL KOF 
et 
 50  et TAF DAZ 
NEB 
 ZOR TAF 
DAZ et 
 51  et RUD MER 
LEV 
 LUM RUD 
MER et 
 52  et RUD MER 
NEB  
 ZOR RUD 
MER et 
      
 53 et E ib et FAL ib ib A et ib KOF et 
 54  et TAF ib  ib DAZ et 
 55  et RUD ib  ib MER et 












Appendix D: Familiarization sentences for Experiments 3, 4 & 5 (Infant 1, 2 & 3) 
Sentence types (numbers in parentheses indicate number of times used in the 
familiarization)  
 
Grammar 1 Grammar 2 
A B F              (2) F D E            (2) 
 ib  et E C D      (1) A  et D E B C     (8) 
C D E A B  et      (1) A  et D E         (1) 
 et E  ib C D      (1) D E F B C          (1) 
A B  et E C D      (6) A B C D E         (2) 
A B C D E          (2) A  et D E  et      (1) 
F A B C D          (2) D E F              (3) 
C D E  ib C D      (1) F  ib B C         (1) 
F A B              (1)  ib F B C         (1) 
A B F C D          (4) A B C D E B C     (1) 
 et E A B          (3) F D E B C         (4) 
 ib F  et          (1) A B C D E  et    (1) 
F A B  et          (1)  ib A  et B C      (1) 
C D E A B C D     (1) D E A B C  et     (1) 
A B  et E         (3) D E A  et B C     (2) 
 
 
Familiarization sentences  
 
Grammar 1 Grammar 2 
DAZ HOX REL LUM FAL DAZ HOX REL LUM FAL 
DAZ HOX REL LUM TAF DAZ HOX REL LUM TAF 
DAZ HOX  et FAL JES LUM MER  et SOT TAF NEB JES 
 et RUD DAZ HOX NAV ZOR FAL 
KOF LEV  et FAL REL SOT KOF  et SOT RUD LEV REL 
MER HOX  et TAF MER HOX REL SOT RUD NEB JES 
KOF LEV SIB JES ZOR NAV ZOR FAL HOX REL 
KOF LEV KER REL SOT SOT TAF KER 
DAZ LEV  et TAF LUM FAL DAZ  et LEV JES 
KOF NEB  et FAL JES ZOR KER  ib LEV JES 
 et FAL DAZ LEV DAZ LEV REL LUM FAL  et 
 et FAL KOF LEV SIB SOT TAF HOX TID 
 ib  et TAF JES LUM SIB ZOR FAL NEB JES 
DAZ HOX NAV JES ZOR DAZ  et LUM TAF LEV JES 
DAZ LEV SIB KOF  et LUM TAF NEB JES 
KOF LEV  et RUD JES ZOR ZOR FAL NAV NEB JES 
DAZ HOX NAV JES LUM SOT TAF MER HOX REL  et 
JES LUM FAL DAZ LEV JES LUM KOF  et LUM FAL HOX REL 
KOF NEB  et TAF MER  et SOT RUD 




 et FAL  ib JES ZOR  ib MER  et NEB JES 
SIB MER HOX  et MER  et LUM FAL LEV REL 
MER HOX  et FAL REL LUM LUM TAF MER  et LEV REL 
KER DAZ HOX REL SOT KOF  et LUM FAL LEV JES 
SIB KOF LEV JES LUM SOT TAF NAV 
REL LUM FAL KOF NEB  et SIB SOT RUD HOX TID 
JES LUM FAL  ib REL SOT MER  et SOT RUD NEB JES 
KER KOF LEV NAV SOT TAF 
KOF NEB NAV  ib KER NEB JES 
KOF LEV  et TAF JES ZOR SOT RUD KER 
 
 
Appendix E: Familiarization sentences for Experiments 6 (Infant 4) 
Sentence types (numbers in parentheses indicate number of times used in the 
familiarization)  
 
Grammar 1 Grammar 2 
A B C D E        (1) F D E             (5) 
A B F (3) A B C D E B C  (4) 
A B C D E C D (6) F D E B C      (21) 
A B F C D   (20)           
 
 
Familiarization sentences  
 
Grammar 1 Grammar 2 
KOF LEV NAV TID SOT SIB LUM TAF HOX TID 
KOF NEB SIB JES ZOR KER LUM FAL 
MER HOX SIB REL SOT SIB LUM FAL HOX TID 
KOF LEV SIB TID SOT SIB SOT RUD 
DAZ HOX SIB JES LUM NAV SOT TAF HOX REL 
MER HOX REL SOT RUD NAV SOT TAF NEB JES 
DAZ HOX KER REL LUM SIB LUM TAF LEV JES 
DAZ HOX SIB REL SOT KER LUM FAL NEB JES 
MER HOX KER KOF NEB JES LUM TAF NEB JES 
KOF LEV NAV REL LUM KER SOT TAF LEV JES 
DAZ LEV SIB JES ZOR SIB LUM FAL 
DAZ HOX NAV TID SOT KER ZOR FAL HOX TID 
DAZ HOX REL LUM TAF REL 
LUM 
DAZ LEV JES LUM FAL LEV REL 
KOF LEV KER JES LUM NAV SOT TAF LEV REL 
MER HOX SIB JES LUM KER ZOR FAL 
MER HOX TID SOT RUD REL LUM SIB LUM TAF LEV REL 




MER HOX REL SOT RUD JES LUM KER LUM FAL LEV REL 
DAZ LEV REL SOT RUD JES ZOR KER LUM FAL HOX REL 
KOF LEV KER REL SOT SIB SOT TAF LEV REL 
MER HOX SIB JES ZOR NAV ZOR FAL LEV REL 
DAZ HOX KER NAV LUM FAL 
KOF NEB NAV REL LUM KER LUM TAF HOX REL 
DAZ HOX SIB TID SOT KER LUM TAF NEB JES 
KOF LEV NAV JES ZOR SIB ZOR FAL NEB JES 
KOF NEB KER KOF LEV REL LUM FAL LEV REL 
KOF LEV NAV REL SOT KOF NEB JES LUM TAF LEV JES 
MER HOX KER REL SOT NAV ZOR FAL NEB JES 
KOF NEB NAV REL SOT NAV ZOR FAL LEV JES 
DAZ HOX REL SOT RUD JES ZOR KER SOT RUD HOX TID 
 
 
Appendix F: Test items for Experiments 3, 4 & 6 (Infant 1, 2 & 4) 
 
Grammatical in Grammar 1 Grammatical in Grammar 2  
Type Sentences Type Sentences 
Movement 
test 
1 CDEAB JES SOT FAL KOF 
HOX 
DEABC SOT FAL KOF 
HOX JES 
 2  REL ZOR TAF DAZ 
NEB 
 ZOR TAF DAZ 
NEB REL 
 3  TID LUM RUD 
MER LEV 
 LUM RUD MER 
LEV TID 
 4  TID ZOR RUD 
MER NEB 
 ZOR RUD MER 
NEB TID 
 
Appendix G: Test items for Experiments 5 (Infant 3) 
 
Grammatical in Grammar 1 Grammatical in Grammar 2  
Type Sentences Type Sentences 
Movement 
test 
1 BCADE HOX JES KOF SOT 
FAL 
CDABE JES SOT KOF HOX 
FAL 
 2  NEB REL DAZ 
ZOR TAF 
 REL ZOR DAZ 
NEB TAF 
 3  LEV TID MER 
LUM RUD 
 TID LUM MER 
LEV RUD 
 4  NEB TID MER ZOR 
RUD 
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